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In 1992, the Salinas administration launched a major reform liberalizing several 
aspects of Mexico’s ejido sector. The reform is to be understood as a major effort at 
introducing and enforcing clearly defined property rights in Mexico’s agrarian landscape. 
Compared to the private sector, the ejido sector was characterized by a higher rate of 
poverty and a higher labor to land ratio. A basic proposition is that weak property rights 
were an underlying cause of that gap.  
As an implementing tool, a program of land rights certification and registration, 
Procede, was launched in 1993.  A key objective of the reform was to improve the 
efficiency of the ejido factor markets, raise farm productivity, and increase household 
income. Activation of land markets was instrumental in the short term to that objective 
while out-migration from ejido communities was seen as an inevitable outcome of the 
adjustment process.  This research analyzes the Procede’s impact on the ejidos’ land 
rental markets and on the sources of household income. 
The empirical analysis starts by examining how the program was delivered to the 
ejido communities and its acceptance by the ejidatarios. It then studies participation in 
land leasing markets and the Procede’s influence on the amount of land transacted in the 
rental market. The impact that the Procede has had on farm, non-farm, and agricultural 
labor household income is then estimated. 
It is found that although the Procede has indeed helped ejido land markets to work 
better, several institutional factors are still a limiting factor in transferring land from less 
to more productive farms. Ejido households have began a process of diversification of 
their income sources as a result of the Procede, signaling that improved tenure security 
has raised the return to uses of labor off the farm relative to on farm uses. Local 
agricultural labor markets have become a more important source of income, as well as 
non-farm employment in non-agricultural activities. Finally, it is found that the criteria 
followed in delivering the Procede to the ejido communities responded more to the 
interests of the bureaucracy entrusted with the program than to social welfare concerns. 
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In 1992 the Salinas administration launched a major reform with the aim of 
deregulating markets in Mexico’s mainly rural ejido sector. The reform is to be 
understood as a major effort at introducing and enforcing clearly defined property rights 
in Mexico’s agrarian landscape. As an implementing tool, a program of land rights 
certification and registration, Procede, was launched in 1993. A key long-term objective 
of the reform was to improve the efficiency of the ejido farms, raising their productivity, 
by raising investment and farming intensity. The content and rationale of these reforms 
are explored in chapter 1, along with a review of the salient features of the ejido sector. 
One of these key features, induced among other factors by tenure insecurity, was the 
ejido sector’s higher labor to land ratio relative to the private agricultural sector1. This 
difference in factor intensity epitomizes the welfare gap that exists between the two 
agricultural sectors, the dualism inherent in Mexico’s agricultural sector, and the 
backwardness of the ejido sector at the onset of the 1992 Agrarian Reform.  
Research goals
The economic literature on land titling suggests that the main benefit that farm 
households derive from stronger property rights to land rests in the increase in farm 
productivity that follow from two key channels. First, better defined and enforceable 
property rights improve access to credit, thereby favoring investment in land 
1 Computation based on the 1991 agricultural census. 
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improvements. Moreover, as these investments are mostly attached to land and therefore 
unrecoverable in the case of eviction, stronger property rights will reduce the risk of 
losing the investment after some time. Second, by increasing investment in land 
improvements, the marginal productivity of other movable factors will rise. We refer to 
these as long-term effects of land titling in a system of enforceable rights. In the short run 
other effects should show up as well. Activation of the land rental market is one. Land 
transactions should present fewer risks to land owners and one would expect the supply 
of land to increase as a result. In addition, households will reallocate labor across 
activities if this is used in order to reduce the chance of eviction. The latter effect may 
have important implications in terms of household income depending on the extent to 
which households would increase their supply of labor to non-farm activities and reduce 
the time allocated to on-farm activities in those instances in which eviction risk causes 
the marginal productivity of labor to fall below the market wage rate. We shall focus on 
the analytics of these two short-term effects in chapter 3, after a brief review of the 
literature on land titling in chapter 2.   
In chapter 4, we explore in detail the process by which some ejidos were certified 
and others not by the end of 1997. The latter point is an important one as it addresses one 
of the key empirical issues faced when examining the selection process underlying many 
land titling programs. The research analyzes then in chapter 5 the Procede’s impact on 
the ejidos’ land rental markets. The key question this chapter intends to address is 
whether the Procede has unlocked a process by which ejido land can be transferred from 
less to more productive farmers, thereby raising total agricultural production. Chapter 6 
focuses on the participation by ejido households to non-farm and off-farm activities. In 
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that chapter we also attempt quantifying the impact of the Procede on household income. 
We do that by estimating household income functions in a context in which stronger 
property rights affect the shadow price of factors of production, thereby causing 
households to shift ‘regime’. Panel data from two ejido surveys conducted in 1994 and 
1997 are used in constructing and presenting the empirical evidence. 
Contribution to the literature
The analysis undertaken in this research intends to add to the existing literature on 
land titling on three accounts. First, it intends to assess the extent to which land titling 
programs such as the Procede are effective at activating land markets in areas where land 
rental activity is traditionally low. Is such inactivity a result of weak property rights? Or 
do other factors impede land transactions? Second, when rural factor markets are 
imperfect, changes in property rights regimes may affect the productivity of household 
assets and consequently the household’s allocation of labor across activities. In that 
context, does the supply of labor to off-farm activities represent an important aspect of 
the overall impact on household income? Could increased participation in off-farm 
income activities represent a major source of gain for the household from land titling 
programs?  Ultimately, these answers might allow uncovering aspects and effects of land 
titling programs that have been overlooked in the literature and that might in fact 
represent important sources of economic gains and losses.  
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Chapter 1: The Ejidos2 in the context of Mexico’s agrarian development.
1.1. Introduction.
Over half of Mexico’s land and almost two thirds of its cropland belong to ejidos
and comunidades, which together conform what is known as the social property sector.
These institutions were the result of an eight-decade long process of land distribution that 
followed the Mexican revolution of the early twentieth century. Under this form of 
tenure, rights to land use were strongly regulated, limited, and to a certain extent 
insecure. Such a state of affairs is at the root of the technological stagnation, low labor 
productivity, and widespread poverty characterizing the ejidos.  The 1992 reforms, in the 
broader framework of market liberalization in agriculture, sought to establish a tenure 
system where factor markets could work more efficiently in the context of enhanced 
security. The reform was seen as a necessary precondition for inserting half of Mexico’s 
agricultural sector and three quarters of its farms into a process of trade liberalization that 
two years later would culminate with the signing of the NAFTA treaty. The reform is to 
be understood as a major effort at introducing clearly defined property rights in Mexico’s 
agrarian landscape and was built on the assumption that tenure insecurity was indeed a 
major obstacle to productivity growth in Mexico’s agricultural sector.  A land registration 
and certification program, the Procede, was launched with the objective of enhancing 
2 One important clarification is needed. Rather than resorting to the term social sector or agrarian 
communities, which in legalistic terms appropriately describe those forms of tenure that have emerged as a 
result of the long process of land distribution in Mexico, we shall from now on refer to the term ejidos, 
confounding by so doing both ejidos and comunidades. Given that the former represent over 85% of the 
agrarian communities, we feel somewhat excused. When the need arises of distinguishing between 
comunidades and ejidos we shall do so explicitly.
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tenure security, while favoring a gradual process of privatization of land rights in the 
ejidos.   
  The next section will briefly review the salient economic, historical, and legal 
characteristics of the ejidos before the 1992 reforms, in particular the meaning of tenure 
insecurity among ejidatarios. Section 3 explains the legal changes introduced by the 
reforms of 1992 and their impact on the institutional functioning of the ejidos. Section 4 
discusses the Procede, while section 5 reviews preliminary evidence regarding the 
acceptance of Procede among ejidatarios and how these perceived the program. Key 
descriptive statistics based on a panel of 1281 ejido households surveyed in 1994 and 
1997 are reported in section 6 in order to prepare the background for the analytical work 
that will follow.  Finally, section 7 examines briefly the policy context in which the 1992 
reforms were introduced. 
1.2. The Ejidos before the 1992 reforms
Before the revolution, cultivable land in Mexico was concentrated in a few large 
private properties. The post-revolutionary ideology favored the idea of redistributing land 
to agricultural laborers, away from large landowners. Landless households formerly 
employed on the haciendas would get access to land and form an ejido. In terms of land 
use, the typical ejido would consist of a portion of land devoted to individual cultivation 
by ejidatarios, a common land where animals could be grazed, firewood collected, and 
other economic activities carried out, and finally an area for dwellings. 
Historically, the process of land distribution has not been smooth and its nature 
and scope has changed considerably with historical circumstances. The major impulses in 
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the process of land distribution corresponded to the periods immediately following the 
end of the revolution and the promulgation of the 1917 constitution and that coinciding 
with the Lazaro Cardenas presidency of the late ‘30s. The majority of the ejidos, and in 
particular those endowed with land of better quality, were formed in those years. The 
following decades were marked by a process of land distribution that languished for long 
periods, peaked in others, often following the election cycle (Sanderson, 1984). The 
dominant party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), would become more and 
more interested in using land distribution as a mean of consolidating its influence and 
perpetuate its power. In addition, ejidos came to be seen as a tool for directly controlling 
the process of food production and distribution at controlled prices as part of the 
Mexico’s food self-sufficiency strategy. Central authorities would determine which crops 
were to be produced and their selling prices. Production credit was channeled to the 
ejidatarios through the official credit system and under the control of the ejido authorities. 
Inputs were delivered at subsidized prices and crops insured on favorable terms. 
During the late ‘70s and early ‘80s the process of land adjudication became more 
and more dominated by the petitions of landless households and land poor farmers 
(Sanderson, 1984).  With the steaming-off of the ideological push behind land 
redistribution, the process of adjudication became less easy and more fraught with risks 
and tensions. Land invasions were a common way of pressing authorities to recognize the 
claims.3  In the meantime, petitioners often squatted on the lands under reclamation. In 
the context of weak law enforcement it was not uncommon for violence to break out 
between occupants and former owners. All of this represented of course a considerable 
3 This is very much akin to the process of land distribution and violence documented by Alston et al (2002) 
in the case of Brazil.  
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source of tenure insecurity. Yet, even when land was finally adjudicated, tenure security 
was often weak. First, ejidos’ borders were often poorly demarcated, nor were the 
assignment of individual parcels within the ejido clearly identified. Ejidatarios, at best 
could receive a certificate recognizing their status and the number of hectares on which 
they had the right of usufruct. Parcel borders were not clearly indicated, but only 
recognized by the community at large and as such respected. 
With time, such a system of informal security was put under pressure by a 
growing ejido population and the ‘turnover’ of ejidatarios that coincided with an informal 
process of land sales and subdivision by inheritance. A growing population, by necessity 
tied to the local economy of the village, sought access to increasingly scarce land. Where 
possible, ejidos resorted to petitions for enlarging their areas at the expense of 
neighboring properties. In other instances, encroachment on common lands, where 
feasible, would be considered as a way of endowing the landless households. 
Conflicts concerning land rights were common and widespread among ejidatarios. 
One important source of conflicts was the legal prohibition to inherit usufruct rights to 
more than one son. In practice, this provision was largely ignored, leading to an ever-
increasing atomization of land rights (minifundismo). This meant that an increasing 
number of second-generation ejidatarios did not obtain a formal title to their lands and 
therefore were left in a legal limbo in which the community informally recognized their 
rights. Along this group of  ‘quasi’ ejidatarios were the posesionarios, land possessors 
who only had an informal recognition by the community. They were typically refused 
access to the ejido’s common lands and had no power of say over the internal affairs of 
the ejidos.   Thus, to properly understand the tenure security argument ascribed to the 
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1992 reforms it is important to appreciate the fact that illegal land sales, illegal bequests 
of usufruct rights, and illegal appropriation of common lands gave rise to a wide number 
of farmers that lacked a formally recognized right to land. Moreover, it was not 
uncommon for legally entitled ejidatarios to be left without a title due to a faulty 
bureaucracy. 
Conflicts related to access to land were increasing also due to the mounting 
demographic pressure within the ejidos. Relatives of the ejidatarios (independently of 
whether these were ejidatarios with a formal or informal title) and other residents that had 
a loose familiar relationship to the ejido members constituted the class of the avecindados 
(neighbors). These had no right to purchase or rent the ejido land before the 1992 reform 
and were also not awarded a formal right to access the common lands. A key innovation 
of the 1992 reform was the recognition of such rights to the avecindados. One would 
therefore expect that the removal of the restrictions on land rental, however imperfectly 
observed and enforced, would have led to an increase in the demand for ejido lands by 
these otherwise landless group of farmers.  The number of avecindados before the 1992 
reforms is not known. According to the information provided by the Procede (discussed 
below) in a sub-sample of almost 16,000 ejidos the number of avecindados amounted to 
roughly 490,000 as compared to 1,212,000 ejidatarios and 173,000 posesionarios 
(Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria, 1998).  
An important question is the extent of tenure insecurity among ejidatarios 
(whether formally or informally recognized as such). Ejidatarios were not squatters on 
state-owned lands. Nor was tenure insecurity a result of complicated norms as one would 
for example find in many areas of Africa, where different rights overlap over a parcel 
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(Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994). The lack of formal certificates would weaken the 
position of an ejidatario under some specific circumstances. In effect, a continued 
presence of the ejidatario on his lands was enough to ensure that no one would challenge 
his right to that land (Finkler, 1978). Instead, insecurity tended to be related to the legal 
restrictions that the ejidatario faced when employing on the farm labor other than the 
family one or when renting the land out. In effect, land rentals and the hiring of labor 
were widely practiced, albeit illegal. The question hinged more on how illegal actions 
were tolerated within the community. In communities that were created out of the 
ideology that land should be tilled by those that needed it, the risk of being expropriated 
was always present and no one could guarantee that a decision to hire labor or rent land 
would be interpreted as a signal of privilege in societies with a strong egalitarian culture. 
Thus, to rent the land ejidatarios needed to secure the support of their community or of 
the ejido authorities. In those instances where the local leadership was particularly strong, 
the consent of their local authorities was essential in order to minimize the risks of 
expropriation. In some instances, though, ejidos had enough internal cohesion, to 
generate cross support among ejidatarios. This could occur due to close family ties 
among ejidatarios or to a relatively homogeneous structure of the community, whereby 
most ejidatarios would share the same needs4.   
Finally, local government representatives were very well aware that illegal sales, 
rentals, and hiring of labor were practiced in the ejidos under their supervision, but both 
due to a sense of realism or because of a culture of corruption (or because of both 
4 For example, many ejidos located in the North and endowed with good quality lands would rent in mass 
their lands to large private farmers.  
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reasons) they would not generally intervene, except when explicitly instigated by the 
ejido authorities.   
Thus, one could argue that in general terms, rights to land were understood by the 
ejidatarios as something more than simple rights of usufruct. Ejidatarios had informal 
rights of use and transfer that in some instances were subjected to restrictions by the local 
community or by their caciques. Were fully recognized by their community, ejidatarios’ 
land rights approached something very near to fully individualized land rights. This 
situation suited very well the need of those communities that were a relatively high 
degree of cohesion, nor much inserted into dynamic markets, and where the local system 
of informal safety nets and reciprocity in transactions were strong. In these auto-
referenced communities, the demand for fully defined property rights was still weak and 
local institutions served much better the function of ensuring the ejidatarios’ rights to 
land than the local official authorities. Land rights were mostly circulated locally and 
costs of transaction could be kept low by relying on social networks. 
On the other hand, where producers were connected to markets and where a 
strong sense of individual entrepreneurship was already widespread and were reliance on 
access to factor markets was a key ingredient in the ability to adjust to evolving external 
conditions, the system of property rights represented by the pre-1992 Agrarian Law was 
probably unsatisfactory. It is among those types of ejidos, those located in the most 
dynamic rural areas where one would expect to find the strongest demand for better-
enforced individual rights if not complete property rights. 
To illustrate the conditions of the agricultural sector in Mexico before the 1992 
reforms, it is useful to compare the ejido and the private sector, which together accounted 
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for over 98% of the agricultural land. As table 1.1 shows, there were stark differences 
between the ejido and the private sector in 1991, just before the reforms of article 17 of 
the constitution. With over two thirds of Mexico’s agricultural producers being 
ejidatarios and with almost seven tenths of the labor force in the rural sector concentrated 
in the ejidos, the latter sector had a much higher ratio of labor to land than the private 
one. In terms of non-land assets, private farmers enjoyed twice the number of tractors and 
thrice the number of cattle and landholdings owned of their ejido counterparts. 
The differences in factor endowments helps in understanding why poverty in the 
ejido sector is much more widespread than among private farmers. Comparing the 
percentage of overall households earning less than a minimum wage with that of 
ejidatarios below this threshold (see table 1.2), one can safely conclude that average 
income in the ejido sector is much below the average income of the rest of the 
agricultural sector. Thus, Mexico’s rural sector can be characterized as a dual sector, in 
which ejidos and private farmers possess substantially different relative factor 
endowments and where labor productivity gap can be clearly identified with differences 
in tenure. Labor immobility in the ejidos was a consequence of the land tenure insecurity 
induced by the existing legal framework. These gaps together with the overall low 
productivity of Mexico’s agricultural sector were the main motivations behind the policy 
reform of the agricultural sector and of the 1992 reform of Article 27 of the Constitution 
in particular. To these we now turn. 
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1.3. The reforms of Art.27: context and content
During the early 1990s, the ejido sector underwent significant changes on two 
fronts. While agricultural policy reforms were meant to move the whole agricultural 
sector out of stagnation, the 1992 agrarian reforms were seen as a precondition for the 
most backward ejido sector to step into the path towards modernization. The need to 
devise a specific policy for the ejido sector rested on two basic considerations. First, 
further land for redistribution was becoming increasingly scarce. Second, the ejido 
institutional structure itself was deemed incompatible with the goals of modernization, 
productivity growth, and poverty reduction. In the early nineties, the debate was centered 
on the extent to which land rights in the ejido sector should be privatized. In particular, 
there was an intense discussion as to whether common lands should be maintained as 
such or whether they should be divided among ejidatarios or even opened to a full-
fledged privatization. The cultural resistance from below, organized by the National 
Peasant Confederation, explains why the 1992 reform fell short of the complete 
dissolution of the ejidos and provides an interpretation of why some key restrictions on 
land rights have remained in place. Nevertheless, we shall show in the course of this 
research, that in fact a large share of the common lands were appropriated by the 
ejidatarios who correctly anticipated that any de facto variation would be regularized 
through the process of certification contemplated by the reforms (see Muñoz et al. 2003 
for a discussion of the appropriation of common lands during the implementation of the 
1992 reforms). 
The 1992 reform sought to de-politicize the administration land rights in both 
ejido and private sectors. The intent was to create a legal environment in which property 
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rights would be defined, recognized, and enforced. The first step towards that direction 
was to create three institutions with the function of enforcing and administering the 
emerging configuration of ejido rights over individual and communal lands.  The 
Agrarian Attorney office (PA) was to act as an ombudsman ensuring under all 
circumstances the respect of the law.  An independent system of agrarian tribunals was 
instituted to serve as an ultimate instance for conflict resolution. Finally, the National 
Agrarian Registry (RAN) was created with the purpose of certifying the rights that would 
be registered through a land titling and certification program, the Procede, soon to be 
launched. 
The second step was the recognition of a juridical personality of the ejidos. 
Marking an important change from the pre-1992 ideology, the ejidos became legal 
entities, while the ejido assembly acquired exclusive powers over all of the ejido’s 
internal affairs, thereby diminishing substantially the role played by the ejido authorities. 
Moreover, the ejidatarios as well as recognized posesionarios had complete autonomy 
over the management of their land endowments, meaning that land could be freely rented 
and labor hired. While the ejido assembly regulates those aspects that concern important 
aspects of the community life, such as the use of the common lands, it has no right over 
the ejidatarios individual land. It has been argued that the 1992 reform, by recognizing 
the juridical personality of the ejidos, in effect configured a new type of rights in the 
ejido sector. These rights lay between the simple right to usufruct and complete private 
property rights. For example, while the individual ejidatario is assured protection from 
the ejido’s interference in the administration of his land, the Law still prohibits the sale of 
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land to outsiders, but not to the ejido insiders5,6. Thus, the right to alienate the property 
was recognized but restricted.   
With respect to avecindados and posesionarios, the LA contains provisions that 
allow the assembly to formally recognize their rights. Posesionarios are not given the 
right to vote but the ejido assembly cannot affect their holdings. Avecindados, as a result 
of the 1992 reforms, are allowed to purchase and rent ejido land and have been granted 
the right to participate to the assembly that regulates the matters concerning the urban 
areas of the ejido. 
1.4. Procede and the implementation of the 1992 reform
For the 1992 reforms to become effective, the new set of rules and provisions had 
to become common knowledge among its intended beneficiaries. Widespread illiteracy 
among ejidatarios, and the often-legalistic wording of the new Agrarian Law, made an 
autonomous and diffused process of learning and understanding the meaning and scope 
of the reform problematic7.  Moreover, recognition of several new rights (such as the 
right to sell land within ejidos or to acquire full rights to land) depended on having the 
ejido communities explicitly recognizing them in an assembly, which in turn had to be 
officially sanctioned to be valid. In addition, in an environment characterized by diffuse 
5 Needless to say, ejidatarios find their way around this restriction by employing traditional pre-1992 illegal 
methods.
6 Other important changes consisted in that ejidatarios have been allowed to form associations for 
marketing products or buying inputs and to use their lands to participate in joint ventures with private 
firms. 
7 The case of West Bengal is still another example of the importance of implementing in the field the legal 
provisions of the reforms (see Banerjee et al. (2002)). 
15
illiteracy, the new rules could be misinterpreted and/or used to the advantage of those 
better off within the ejidos.  
To implement the reforms on the ground, a certification and regularization 
program, the Programa de Certificacion de Derechos Ejidales y Titulación de Solares 
Urbanos (Procede), was launched officially in January 1993. The program would initially 
target ejidos, while comunidades were to be left out during its first phase and were to be 
approached only at the end of 1996. 
Procede officially certifies and titles the land holdings of the ejidatarios. Titles 
indicate the size of the plots, name of adjoining farmers, and are attached to a cadastral 
map. The ejidatarios’ right to share the benefits from the use of the commons is also 
reported in the titles. Moreover, ejidos may also request to have urban plots in the 
dwelling areas being certified and titled.  The Agrarian Registry (RAN) inscribes the 
certificates in the Register and provides copies of the general plan of the ejido. The ejido 
plan is important for two reasons. First, it precisely draws the internal boundaries and is 
available to the whole community for consultation. Thus, it can be used locally as a mean 
of solving border disputes that may arise after the Procede is concluded. Second, should 
the ejido decide in the future to formally assign new rights over parts or all of the 
common lands, this will be done on the basis of the newly existing documentation. 
In spite of being administered by the officials of the Agrarian Attorney Office, the 
Procede is meant to be participative, democratic, and transparent. The program is 
formally voluntary at the ejido level, but mandatory at the household level once a 
majority of ejido members agreed to adopt and implement the program. Ejidatarios 
decide, on a majority basis, whether to join the program. During the program the ejido 
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assembly is empowered to subdivide and/or reclassify the community’s lands as common 
lands, individual parcels, and settlement area8. The assembly is at the center of the 
process and the modalities it has to follow, rigidly specified by Law, are intended to 
make the process as transparent and democratic as possible. A representative of the 
Agrarian Attorney fully supervises the process in order to certify that the whole 
procedure mandated by the Law is completely respected. The typical operative process 
that characterizes the Procede is organized in ten successive steps: 
1. The program’s administrators select specific areas where the promotion of the 
program will be carried out more intensively among ejidatarios; 
2. Ejidos are then screened on the basis of available historical legal information. The 
program administrators determine whether the ejido are worth being approached;
3. The objectives and modalities of the Program are first explained to the ejido’s 
governing bodies. If these consent, a first assembly of ejidatarios is summoned; 
4. If the assembly approves, a committee of ejidatarios is formed in order to help in the 
implementation of the program’s following steps; 
5. The committee and the teams from Agrarian Attorney and INEGI (the National 
Geographic Office, responsible for the material measurement of land) determine how 
the ejido lands are divided and trace out the demarcations between plots, between 
common, urban, and parceled lands, as well as the ejido’s limits. This work 
presupposes the consent and collaboration of all the ejidatarios that own the plots. 
During this process, records on land occupancy by subjects without a formal title are 
also collected;
8 Other types of assignments are also possible, but we omit them here for simplicity, as they are minimal. 
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6. The results and materials obtained during the previous phase are presented to a 
second assembly for approval;
7. At this point, plots, common lands and settlement areas are measured and maps are 
produced together with individual files reporting the information collected until then;
8. A third assembly is then summoned. This is the most important assembly of all, as 
ejidatarios, avecindados, and posesionarios are required to participate and approve all 
of what has been so far achieved, including the resolution of internal and external 
conflicts over the land; 
9. If the assembly approves, the PA delivers the request for inscription to the RAN, 
which then proceed to print titles and all other legal documentation; 
10. Finally, RAN delivers the titles to the by now certified ejidatarios. 
While the program fell well behind its initial aim of completing the certification 
and titling of all ejido lands by 2001, the Procede has nevertheless produced impressive 
results.  Overall, 2.9 million agrarian subjects (ejidatarios and comuneros) received their 
titles and certificates and 57.2 million hectares of land have been measured and mapped 
(an area almost twice the size of Spain). As of December 2000, 100% of the 29,932 
ejidos and comunidades had been approached, 86% joined the Procede. 76% of the 
communities have been titled and certified.
1.5. Procede’s advance and its perception by the ejidatarios
Throughout our work, we shall use data collected from two representative surveys 
conducted in 1994 and 1997, covering 288 ejidos and over 1600 individual households 
(see section 1.7 for more details on the surveys). We use information on ejidatarios’ 
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opinions concerning the Procede to draw some preliminary suggestions concerning the 
program’s impact in certified ejidos and its acceptance among the uncertified ones. While 
this data reflects subjective evaluations and should be taken with some care, it offers an 
insight into the non-randomness characterizing the process of certification and acquisition 
of titles.
According to the information contained in the 1997 survey, almost 50% of the 
ejidos in the survey had completed the Procede and had received their titles, while 
another 25% of the ejidos had the program in process. As tables 1.3 and 1.4 show, by the 
end of 1997 the Procede had advanced in all regions of Mexico, but in some regions more 
than others. The highest share of certified ejidos was located in the North Pacific and 
Gulf regions, while the slowest advance, in relative terms, had taken place in the South 
Pacific (i.e. Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero)9. As we shall argue in chapter 3, the advance 
of the Procede was not random and ejidos were targeted according to specific 
characteristics in order to maximize the number of certified ejidos within the initial years 
of the program’s operations. For example, the comunidades, mainly located in the South 
Pacific, were excluded from the Procede until late 1996 due to their institutional 
specificity requiring a tailored approach to titling.  
The 1997 ejido survey included questions on the attitude of the ejidatarios 
towards the Procede and on the major effects the program had on their communities in 
their view. As reported in table 1.5, 52% of the ejidatarios in uncertified ejidos (which 
include ejidos that rejected the program or that had not been contacted yet) opposed the 
program on principle. On the other hand, a great majority of ejidatarios belonging those 
9 Although the 1994 survey did not include Chiapas, the figures reported on Procede’s advance are drawn 
from the 1997 survey, which in fact included Chiapas. 
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ejidos that had been certified or were in the process of so doing had a positive opinion 
about the program.  Although many ejidos had not yet been contacted by the end of 1996, 
these figures suggest that indeed some selection had in fact been taking place at the ejido 
level. In addition, the opposition displayed by many non-certified ejidatarios implies that 
the program by the end of 1997 was about to enter a phase in which it would prove much 
harder to entice ejidos into joining.    
Table 1.6 reports the motivations for opposing or favoring the Procede. Among 
those that opposed the program, the fear of land taxes and distrust of the government 
were the prominent motivations, while the risk of losing the land was also important for 
one opponent out of six. Among supporters, the desire to acquire tenure security was the 
overwhelming motivation. Resolution of border conflicts and the possibility of using the 
land as a mean of accessing credit were the two next most important reasons, although 
not among the majority of the interviewed. The same type of information was received by 
ejido authorities when answering community questionnaires (table 1.7). Notice that 35% 
of the ejidos that were not certified nor participating to the program reports not having 
being contacted yet. 
Concerning perception about impacts, table 1.8 shows that the great majority of 
ejidatarios in certified ejidos felt that no significant changes had followed as a result of 
the program.  This is to be expected given the short time that had elapsed since 
completion of the program for many of the surveyed certified ejidos.  Only 5% of the 
interviewed, matched by a 5% with an opposite view, thought that more investment took 
place as a result of the Procede. A significant minority of ejidatarios felt nevertheless that 
the program had some impact in terms of land markets. In assessing these replies, one 
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should bear in mind that by 1996 a major credit crunch had occurred and that the ‘Tequila 
crisis’, together with the signature of the NAFTA had created an environment of 
uncertainty around the future of agriculture. Many ejidatarios felt also that the quality of 
cooperation within the ejidos has in fact improved since the program’s completion. 
It is interesting to notice that the survey did not include ‘increased participation in 
non-farm activities’ among the list of alternative choice offered to respondents. In this 
research we shall examine this issue closely and we shall argue that in fact this possibility 
is an important ‘side-effect’ of land titling programs. 
Among certified ejidatarios, only one out of four expressed interest in achieving 
the dominio pleno, i.e. full property rights (table 1.9). This could reflect the fact that 
under the new legal system, land rights were felt as enough secure and that in fact tenure 
security had been largely achieved as a result of the Procede. By taking advantage of the 
existing loopholes, ejidatarios had in fact the ability to sell land even to outsiders, 
possibly more easily and cheaply than by going through the legal process of adopting the 
dominio pleno and then register the sale. Thus, while a desire for stronger tenure security 
had been widespread among most ejidatarios, this did not reach the point of requesting 
full property rights. The latter would in fact imply a complete severance from the 
entitlements attached to the status of ejidatario, such as avoiding land taxes, access to 
common lands, and belonging to a well- defined social network in spite of the limitation 
to rights that the status of ejidatario itself implied.10
Finally, table 1.10 shows how the advance of the Procede has resulted in a lower 
intensity of conflicts over ejido and individual boundaries, as well as over illegal 
10 The latter observation suggests that in tightly knit rural communities rights to land belong in fact to a 
more complex bundle of rights and that some sort of substitution among rights is at work, whereby linear 
combinations of rights are preferred to extremes.  
21
encroachment on common lands. It is interesting to notice that encroachment on common 
lands was more likely among uncertified ejidos and ejidos in process of being certified. 
But ejidos in process had a relatively higher share of encroachers coming from outside 
the ejido, while in uncertified ejidos the commons were mostly invaded by community 
members. This observation is consistent with the different attitude towards the Procede 
and with the fact that many uncertified ejidos were in fact comunidades. Lands forming 
the comunidades is typically commonly managed in a slash and burn type of agriculture 
(see Muñoz et al., 2003). Access to these lands is strongly regulated by social traditions 
and members and their off-springs are allowed to encroach when the community feels 
they are entitled to do so. This would therefore further support the hypothesis that the 
advance of the Procede did in fact successfully select those ejidos where the latent 
demand for tenure security was strongest while leaving aside those where the latent 
demand for more tenure security was weakest.   
1.6.  Key agricultural policies and programs of the ‘90s
Before reviewing the evidence from the ejido surveys, it is useful to briefly 
describe the key programs that accompanied the transition of Mexico’s agriculture 
towards trade liberalization and NAFTA. This will help better understanding some 
aspects of the empirical work in the next chapters.  
The credit market in rural areas has undergone significant changes since the late 
eighties as a consequence of the withdrawal of the state from direct intervention in 
agricultural input and output markets and of the 1994 Tequila crisis. The 1992 reforms 
abolished the previously established system of channeling credit through the ejido and 
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have de facto individualized the process.  The system has been re-planned since the early 
‘90s so that producers, now classified according to repayment history and regional 
agronomic conditions, self-select into different markets (Mhyre, 1998). The majority of 
ejidatarios deemed to have a potential as producers, were included among the clientele of 
the newly restructured Banrural, the official lending institution. Banrural dramatically 
restructured its mode of operations, reflecting the segmentation of the market. Regional 
branches were slashed by almost 50%, thereby increasing the transaction costs that 
perspective borrowers living in remote areas have to sustain in order for applying. 
Moreover, in real terms the size of loans has been also drastically reduced, while interest 
rates have increased to reflect the higher cost of money following the Tequila crisis. 
Those ejidatarios that were considered as subsistence producers with little commercial 
orientation were instead considered as the clientele of Pronasol, a program designed to 
provide credit without collateral nor obligation to repay in case of a drought or other 
natural calamity affecting harvest. Generally, Pronasol loans were small and barely 
enough to finance consumption needs between planting and harvest.  
There have been two important government programs designed to modernize the 
agricultural sector and support farmers during the process of trade liberalization.  Since 
1994 farmers producing cereals, mainly grains, began receiving payments from the 
Procampo program. These payments were on a per hectare basis and were conditional on 
cultivating crops belonging to a list mainly including grains. Procampo was launched to 
compensate farmers for the reduction in guaranteed prices that had coincided with the 
signature of the NAFTA treaty. In spite of falling short of covering the costs of fertilizers 
and other variable inputs, Procampo was nevertheless a significant source of cash 
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considered the overall situation of scarcity of liquidity (Sadoulet et al. 2002). Over 80% 
of the farmers in our sample received Procampo during the 1996/97 crop year (and none 
during the 92/93 crop year). 
1.7. Descriptive evidence
The evidence on which most of this dissertation is based draws from two 
household surveys (ejido surveys in short) that were undertaken in 1994 and 1997. The 
first survey covered the 1992/93 crop year, while the second survey covered the 1996/97 
crop year11. The sampling plan of the 1994 survey was based on a previous survey 
conducted in 1990 by Mexico’s Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hydraulicos 
(SARH)12 and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
of the United Nations. That survey covered 5,007 ejidos from the whole of Mexico and 
35,090 ejidatarios. The ejidos were surveyed in a first stage by using the frame of the 
1988 Ejido Census. In the second stage, 6% of the ejidatarios within each ejido were 
selected, with a minimum of 5 per ejido. The survey was designed to be representative at 
the district level. The 1994 survey was conducted jointly by Mexico’s Secretaria de 
Reforma Agraria (SRA), ECLAC, and the University of California at Berkeley. It 
included 1,342 ejidos households and 275 ejidos. These ejidos were randomly selected 
from those included in the 1994 survey and also this time ejido households were selected 
randomly from the list of ejidatarios typically held by ejido authorities. This sampling 
strateegy is a key point for the analysis that follows. As we saw, besides ejidatarios 
recognized as such by the ejido authorities, the ejido social structure included the 
11 In the text we shall refer to the two surveys as the 1994 and 1997 surveys. 
12 SARH became then SAGAR under the Zedillo presidency and changed its name again to SAGARPA 
with the advent of the Fox presidency. 
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posesionarios (farmers without a recognized title to their land, yet recognized as 
legitimate possessors by the local ejido authority) and the avecindados, typically family 
members of ejidatarios or members of families that were living in the ejido urban area but 
that did not have access to land. A central hypothesis of this research is that the 1992 
reforms improved the right to land access of these two groups, affecting the modality of 
participation in the land rental market by the ejidatarios proper. As households in the 
1994 survey were randomly drawn from the population of ejido households, we do not 
have information on avecindados and posesionarios households. This is a detail that will 
be of relevance in explaining the results to come. Overall, the 1994 survey was designed 
to be representative at the regional level. The state of Chiapas was excluded due to the 
political turbulence predominating at that time in Southern Mexico. 
The 1997 survey was the third survey conducted on the ejido sector. It was a joint 
effort of the SRA, of the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Agrario (INDA) with the 
support of the World Bank and the University of California at Berkeley. It covered 1,665 
households from 286 ejido. Out of that sample, 1,287 households had been interviewed in 
the 1994 survey. Although, this gives the opportunity to construct a panel of households, 
the different methodology used in collecting information on household income and the 
absence of information on production costs, do not allow to use the panel structure of the 
data, forcing the analysis to a cross section approach in most cases. Nevertheless, we 
shall exploit the panel structure of the data whenever possible. 
Finally, both surveys did collect information at the community level, providing a 
reasonably rich picture of the certification and titling process represented by the Procede. 
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Tables 1.12 and 1.13 report descriptive evidence regarding changes in relevant 
ejido level and household variables between the crop year 1993/94 and 1996/97.  As table 
1.12 shows, certified ejidos appear to be smaller in terms of area (not necessarily in terms 
of population), nearer to urban areas, endowed with better public infrastructure and more 
productive, if average corn yields is taken as a reliable indicator13.  Certified ejidos are 
more densely populated and fewer of these have common lands. The data suggest that in 
selecting the ejidos to be certified, the Agrarian Attorney’s office has been ‘queuing’ 
ejidos on the basis of a set of criteria. Interestingly enough, the pattern of selection 
followed is similar to the one that would be expected to emerge if the Procede were to be 
a demand-led titling program. In fact, one would expect the demand for stronger and 
better-defined land rights to emerge in areas where land is scarcer, of better quality, and 
where more outside opportunities exist. This in fact matches the characteristics displayed 
by certified ejidos  (and ‘in-process’ as well), the information contained in table 1.12 
seems to be consistent with the hypothesis that the most productive ejidos have been 
selected first.  
Table 1.13 examines information at the household level. Households have been 
grouped into certified, uncertified, and ‘in process’ and data for 1994 and 1996 are shown 
next to each other.  Certified households have a higher per capita income than both 
uncertified and in- process ejidatarios. Farm income includes agricultural profits, from 
both crops and livestock, plus government transfers under Procampo and Alianza and net 
land rental income. In-process households display a relatively higher share of their 
income from agriculture. Looking at household size, one notices that both certified and 
13 In fact the latter could also signal better land quality. Notice that average corn yields are higher in both 
survey periods, implying that higher yields in the 1996/97 crop year need not necessarily be associated with 
the adoption of the Procede.
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uncertified households have fewer members than in-process households. As household 
size is not expected to vary systematically by Procede status, this may signal that both 
certified and uncertified households have had more migration relatively to in-process 
ejidos. 
Figures in table 1.14 show that corn production is central to the agricultural 
economy of the ejidos and, in spite of a slight decline between 1993 and 1996, it 
continues to be the key crop for many poor ejidatarios. Revenues of annuals (mainly corn 
and other grains) per hectare of cultivated land were higher for certified households in 
both years so that any higher productivity in terms of yields may in fact be more 
systematic rather than tied to Procede.  Things are less clear-cut in the case of perennials, 
but differences, as in the case of grains may be more a reflection of diverse agro-
ecological characteristics. 
Except for technical assistance, which declined considerably between 1994 and 
1996, use of commercial inputs appears to have remained quite stable. Among 
ejidatarios, though, those located in certified and in process ejidos make more use of 
improved seeds and chemical inputs. Per hectare cost of inputs is almost twice in certified 
versus uncertified ejidos. We do not have data on input expenditures for the 1992/93 crop 
year, so that we can only rely on percentages of farmers using a given input. These show 
that the differences in the use of commercial inputs between certified and uncertified 
ejidos have a structural component that is unrelated to Procede. This does not imply that 
Procede has had no impact in terms of increasing the use of commercial inputs, as 
differences in means may be driven by other factors that are correlated with the adoption 
of the Procede.
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Access to credit changed dramatically between 1993 and 1996 (table 1.15). In 
1996 only 12% of the ejidatarios borrowed from a formal source, compared to the 29% in 
1993. Moreover, almost 30% of these loans were from Pronasol, a government program 
disbursing interest-free loans. Pronsasol loans were small and insufficient to finance the 
purchase of fertilizers and other commercial inputs. Interestingly enough, though, the fall 
in the percentage of farmers having a formal loan is driven by the fall in Pronasol’s loans. 
On the other hand, Banrural increased its coverage. Yet, the average size of Banrural’s 
loans decreased considerably between the two crop years. In terms of liquidity injected 
into the ejido sector, it should be noticed that in 1994 over 80% of the ejidatarios began 
receiving Procampo payments. The increase in the use of crops as a guarantee is a 
reflection of the diminution of Pronasol’s loans (which did not require collateral) and of 
the increased share attributable to Banrural. Comparing the amount of Procampo 
payments and the average Banrural loan, both expressed in per hectare of cultivated land, 
show that the two are quite comparable. Considering that the percentage of farmers 
receiving Procampo is very high, it is plausible to hypothesize that as a result of the 
Procampo and higher interest rates in 1996, farmers have reduced their demand for 
formal loans. At the same time, Procampo may have made it more rational for Banrural 
to focus its clientele towards a specific type of producer, for whom the return to capital 
would be higher. That this is a plausible explanation is suggested by the fact (not shown 
in table 1.15) that only a handful of surveyed households that applied for a formal loan 
were in fact rejected.   
Whatever the rationale of the borrowing behavior of the ejidatarios, titled land is 
not used as a collateral for formal loans. Only a small percentage of farmers in certified 
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ejidos have been required to use land as a collateral14. This is not surprising in view of the 
fact that use of land as a guarantee continues to be prohibited under the new Agrarian 
Law. 
Table 1.16 shows the changes in farm size and in farmland use. The average size 
of farms has increased by 3.5hectares between 1994 and 1996. This reflects the increase 
in farmland assets in table 1.13 above. The increase in farm size involves both an 
increase in cultivated land (from 7.5 to 8.8 hectares) as well as an increase in pasture land 
(3.1 to 4.4 hectares) and forest land (0.8 to 1.7 hectares). Of the 1.3 hectares of average 
increase in cultivated land, 0.8 hectares are left fallow. On average fallow land increased 
from 17% to 20% of the cultivable land and it happened mostly in certified ejidos. If land 
fallowing can be interpreted as investment in land improvement, then this might be a first 
signal of a land investment effect of the Procede. Indirect information about the 
appropriation of common lands comes from the increase in pasture and forest land. The 
increase was generalized across ejidos, yet the increase in certified ejidos seem to have 
been slightly greater than in other ejidos. 
The information on farmland use can be matched with that on changes in land by 
type of tenure in table 1.17. The information in the table is organized both by Procede 
status as well as farm size classes, according to which farms are collected in three classes: 
0+ε to 5 has; 5+ε to 15 has; and larger than15 has. We notice the following points. First, 
increases in average farm size were dramatic for small and medium size farms, while 
larger farms were almost unchanged on average. Second, on average the greatest increase 
in farm size took place in uncertified and in-process ejidos than in certified ejidos. Third, 
14 Titled land may include both certified ejido land, as well as private land. This explains the fact that 5% of 
the loans among uncertified ejidatarios have titled land as a guarantee. 
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in all ejidos, the increase farm corresponds mostly to lands that are reported as communal 
and private. The increase in communal land is much greater in uncertified and in-process 
ejidos than in certified ejidos. The latter two aspects might be a reflection of either a 
difference in communal land endowments between certified and uncertified ejidos or a 
result of the fact that where the Procede has arrived first, the process has been somewhat 
slowed down and that communal land that has been appropriated in certified ejidos has 
changed tenure formally as a result of the Procede. Fourth, even in certified ejidos the 
share of communal lands in total farmland is not trivial. Thus, if the perspective of 
adopting the Procede is a catalyst in the process of subdivision of communal land, it is 
not necessarily true that no more subdivision takes place after. Finally, there is a small 
change in private land in uncertified and in-process ejidos relative to the certified ones. 
This is mostly a result of the privatization of ejido land (which can be done only after 
certification), which was much more common among middle sized and large farms.     
The next two tables (1.18 and 1.19) look at participation in the land rental market. 
Table 1.18 reports participation by farm size class and does not separate between 
different types of contractual arrangements (i.e. fixed rent, sharecropping, and loaning). 
The first observation one draws from the table is that land rental markets have become 
much more active by 1996 in terms of participation by ejidatarios. Second, participation 
to the land rental market is much greater among large farmers both in terms of leasing 
land in and out. Third, land markets are more active in certified ejidos during both survey 
periods. This may indeed be another indication of a structural difference between ejidos 
that successively would differ by participation in the Procede. An important caveat of 
these figures is that the information reported in the ejido surveys concerns ejidatarios 
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only. As we previously explained, the 1992 reform did in fact open the possibility of 
avecindados entering the land market. This implies that the information on land rental 
markets as revealed through the decision to participate by ejidatarios might grossly 
under-estimate the total effect that would account for the participation by the 
avecindados. 
Yet, there are other features that distinguish certified from uncertified ejidos that 
might be partly obscuring the role played by the Procede. Table 1.19, which organizes the 
information by type of contractual agreement, shows that fixed rent contracts have 
become more important in 1996 compared to 1994 and that they are slightly more 
important in in-process ejidos. 
In terms of land sales and purchases, only 8% of the ejidatarios were involved in 
these types of transactions between 1994 and 1996. This is a very low percentage (on 
average 3% of the ejidatarios bought or sold land in any year between 1994 and 1996) 
that can be related to the difficulty of accessing long-term credit. Olinto  (1999), working 
on the same data, showed that buyers had more land in 1993 than sellers and that 
participation to the land rental market decreased the probability of selling or purchasing 
land. Finally, almost all transactions that took place with certified land were informal, i.e. 
not registered by the Registro Agrario Nacional15 (RAN). The number of transactions is 
too small to make any generalization, but other fieldwork in Mexico (Deininger and 
Bresciani, 2001) confirms that informality of transactions still dominates in spite of the 
Procede. This poses a serious problem in that the results of the Procede may be undone as 
time passes by and land changes ownership. 
15 National Agrarian Registry
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The data just reviewed seems to point to the conclusion that ejidos that have been 
certified and those that are in the process of having Procede finalizing its work, are more 
dynamic and commercially oriented than those that have still to be contacted or that have 
rejected the program. This difference may in fact be not ascribable to the Procede per se 
and it might have persisted even if the Procede had never been launched. Drawing 
conclusions on the basis of descriptive statistics may be deceptive, as several other 
factors have affected production decisions in the ejido sector. Relative prices of 
commodities have changed, especially that of corn, which is more commonly cultivated 
among uncertified ejidatarios. On the other hand, access to credit seems to be easier for 
certified ejidatarios and, when liquidity is a binding constraint, this may have an impact 
on the decision to rent land out as a mean of financing the purchase of inputs. The 
importance of liquidity constraints in affecting land rental decisions is examined in 
chapter 3, which articulates the theoretical and econometric framework of this research. 
Here we simply point out that 75% of the land transactions registered in Mexico by the 
Procede staff (i.e. based on the universe of certified ejidos as of late 1998) required an 
advanced payment. Thus, it is highly probable that the high cost of borrowing following 
the Tequila crisis and the restructuring of the official credit market may in fact have had a 
severe effect on land transactions and that simple averages may be unable to capture the 
role played by the Procede in developing land markets by enhancing tenure security.     
1.8. Conclusions
The new agricultural programs together with the 1992 reforms and the Procede 
have sought to enhance tenure security. The evidence on ejidatarios perceptions regarding 
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the Procede suggest that the program may in fact have been successful at targeting ejidos 
were the latent demand for the program’s services was in fact highest. A relevant 
question is which structural factors determine such latent demand for property rights. 
Several theories have been advanced in regard to how property rights evolve. In the next 
chapter we shall review some of the key predictions emerging from the literature on 
property rights, their evolution, and the economic role played by titling and certification. 
In particular, given our focus on the impact of Procede on land markets, we are interested 
in understanding how participation in land markets may interact with the process of land 
titling. Chapter 3 will then examine more in detail the interplay between production 
decisions, land rentals, labor supply, and liquidity constraints. This will then pave the 
way for the empirical analysis that will follow. 
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Table 1. 1: Comparing the private and ejido sectors
Source: 1990/91 Agricultural Census







(% < 1 min wage) 
53 25 79 65 60 52
Income all farms
(% < 1 min wage) 
26 15 49 33 25 24
Source: 1990/91 Population Census
Private Ejidos
Total area (has)  108,346,084  103,290,099
No of producers  1,006,193  2,655,129
Total labor force  3,112,071  7,252,811
Labor per 100 ha  2.87  7.02 
No of tractors  149,513  146,849
Area per producer  107.68  38.90 
Share of subsistence producers 49.2% 44.5%
Cattle herd per producer  34.59  11.48 
Wood production (m3)  3,431,824  9,721,321
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North # of ejidos 29 7 29 65
(%) 44.62 10.77 44.62 100
N. Pacific # of ejidos 4 10 22 36
(%) 11.11 27.78 61.11 100
Center # of ejidos 23 15 38 76
(%) 30.26 19.74 50.00 100
Gulf # of ejidos 8 9 27 44
(%) 18.18 20.45 61.36 100
South 
Pacific # of ejidos 33 10 22 65
(%) 50.77 15.38 33.85 100
Total # of ejidos 97 51 138 286
(%) 33.92 17.83 48.25 100
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys 
Table 1. 4: Regional distribution of ejidos, by Procede status
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
Status
Region Uncertified In process Certified Total
North # of ejidos 29 7 29 65
(%) 29.9 13.73 21.01 22.73
N. Pacific # of ejidos 4 10 22 36
(%) 4.12 19.61 15.94 12.59
Center # of ejidos 23 15 38 76
(%) 23.71 29.41 27.54 26.57
Gulf # of ejidos 8 9 27 44
(%) 8.25 17.65 19.57 15.38
South Pacific # of ejidos 33 10 22 65
(%) 34.02 19.61 15.94 22.73
Total # of ejidos 97 51 138 286
(%) 100 100 100 100
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Table 1. 5: Distribution of supporters and opponents
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
Table 1. 6: Motivations for opposing or favoring Procede
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
Uncertified In process Certified
Opposed 52 11 2 20
In favor 48 89 98 80
100 100 100
All Ejidos Uncertified In process Certified
Opposed:
Land taxes 51 52 48 53
Ejido disappears 10 10 11 18
Land could be lost 13 14 19 0
Does not trust 45 49 26 18
People will sell 7 6 0 18
Not necessary, no rental 5 5 4 0
Informal rental common 4 4 4 0
In favor:
Tenure security 92 91 93 92
Solve border problems 32 36 38 28
Rent or sell land 8 7 6 9
Use land as collateral 14 15 12 13
Associate 2 2 2 2
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Table 1. 7:  Motivations for ejido participation or non participation to Procede
Reasons for ejido to participate
Tenure security 85
Government requirement 15
Solve border problems 27
Rent or sell land 9
Have access to credit 11
Have access to Procampo 4
Invest more in land 1
Reasons for the ejido to not participate
Lack of information 35
Were not convened 2
Lack of documentation 5
To avoid taxes 13
To avoid land transactions 2
No interest in land rentals or sales 1
Border problems 16
Avoid conflicts among ejidatarios 7
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
Table 1. 8: Opinions on Procede's effects in certified ejidos
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
More Less Same
Tenancy problems 5 27 67
Social cohesion of the ejido 22 12 66
Credit access 12 9 78
Investment 5 5 91
Migration 16 8 76
Land rentals 19 12 69
Land sales 24 11 65
Land compacting 3 2 95
Associations 5 4 90
Land divisions 4 2 93
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Table 1. 9: Interest in full property rights
Uncertified In process Certified Total
No 90 82 77 83
Yes 10 18 23 17
100 100 100
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
Table 1. 10: Conflicts before and after the Procede 
(percent ejidos)
Certified Not certif.
























Conflict after Procede -
Yes 7.0 -
Partially 1.0 -
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
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With commons occupied 33 32 11
Occupants
Ejido members 54 42 42
Avecindados 32 42 50
Outsiders 14 33 25
Would recognize rights 61 42 33
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
Table 1. 12: Relevant ejidos characteristics
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
Status
All ejidosUncertified In process Certified
Km from nearest urban center 25 31 21 22
Travel time to nearest urban center 50 65 44 42
Average ejido  population 1,442 1,625 2,227 1,017
Average area 3,453 4,300 3,114 2,983
Common pastures (has) 1,286 2,063 736 944
% ejidos with common pastures 61 76 53 54
Population density (hab/hect) 2.30 0.97 2.00 3.31
% households with light 82.0 78.3 81.6 84.7
ejidos with telephone line 53 49 49 58
Yearly frequency of assembly 8.45 8.50 8.55 8.37
% ejidatarios assisting assembly 63 64 60 63
% with irrigation structures 33 23 33 40
average corn yield (where cultivated) 1.18 0.96 1.11 1.37
average corn yield in 1994 1.04 0.90 1.09 1.12
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Table 1. 13: Household characteristics
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
Un-
certified In Process Certified Total
Per capita income, 1997 6,205 5,015 6,953 6,353
Share of household income
      from agriculture, 1997
57% 71% 60% 61%
Household size, 1994 5.44 5.48 5.02 5.25
Household size, 1997 5.59 5.93 5.41 5.56
Per capita land assets, 1994 2.35 2.24 3.43 2.85
Per capital land assets, 1997 2.95 2.35 3.68 3.19
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Table 1. 14: Input use, by Procede status
Uncertified In process Certified Total
1993 1996 1993 1996 1993 1996 1993 1996
Annuals, revenues 
    per hectare*
1522 1994 2127 2191 2967 2395 2303 2212
Perennials, revenues 
    per hectare*
4767 4695 6799 5736 8542 4947 6827 5091
Input expenditure 
    per hectare
n.a. 479 n.a. 596 n.a. 909 n.a. 704
% corn producers 95% 90% 89% 80% 83% 76% 88% 81%
% perennial producers 26% 25% 41% 34% 28% 24% 30% 26%
% horticulture producers 13% 8% 15% 10% 23% 16% 18% 12%
% grain producers 96% 92% 92% 82% 93% 83% 94% 86%
% using improved seeds 11% 16% 22% 22% 27% 24% 21% 21%
% using traditional seeds 89% 84% 84% 72% 78% 72% 83% 76%
% using manure 4% 7% 3% 6% 4% 12% 4% 9%
% using fertilizers 42% 45% 56% 51% 54% 51% 50% 49%
% using herbicide 28% 28% 45% 40% 33% 37% 34% 35%
% using insecticide 25% 25% 42% 35% 35% 33% 33% 30%
% using technical 
    assistance
6% 3% 15% 4% 12% 5% 11% 4%
% using tractor 5% 6% 4% 9% 10% 9% 7% 8%
% using truck/pick-up 15% 9% 15% 13% 21% 13% 18% 12%
*1996 Pesos, 1993 prices adjusted with Food Price Inde
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
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Table 1. 15:Access to credit, by Procede status
Uncertified In process
1994 1996 1994 1996
Had formal loan 25% 9% 29% 14%
Had informal loan 2% 9% 6% 14%
Among formal borrowers:
     Avg. Loan 7,058 9,765 5,712 27,626
     Avg. Loan from  Banrural* 18,823 21,011 17,044 18,638
     Avg. Loan from  Sedesol* 1,572 1,050 1,636 1,300
     Avg. Loan per hec of  cultivated land* 860 2,188 811 3,338
     Avg. Loan from Banrural per  hec cult. land* 1,085 3,792 1,787 1,665
      % farmers receiving Procampo - 84% - 82%
    Procampo payment per hec of cultivated land - 2,052 - 2,196
      % lonas from Banrural 8% 30% 28% 47%
      % loans from Pronasol 70% 30% 75% 13%
      % loans from commercial bank 12% 8% 0% 6%
      % short term loans 90% 62% 96% 78%
      % loans with crop as guarantee 9% 62% 7% 38%
      % loans with untitled land as guarantee 1% 3% 6% 9%
      % loans with titled land as guarantee 5% 0%
      % loans with gov't payments as guarantee 16% 13%
Among informal borrowers:
    Avg. Loan 3,850 3,248 4,888 1,340
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys




1994 1996 1994 1996
Had formal loan 31% 14% 29% 12%
Had informal loan 4% 9% 3% 10%
Among formal borrowers:
     Avg. Loan 10,103 18,065 8,404 18,057
     Avg. Loan from  Banrural* 30,316 35,378 25,308 28,324
     Avg. Loan from   Sedesol* 2,100 1,379 1,858 1,290
     Avg. Loan per hec of  cultivated land* 1,530 2,401 1,199 2,544
     Avg. Loan from Banrural per  hec cult. land* 3,713 3,612 2,840 3,142
      % farmers receiving Procampo - 81% - 83%
     Procampo payment per hec of cultivated land - 2,625 - 2,344
     % lonas from Banrural 23% 37% 19% 37%
     % loans from Pronasol 70% 33% 71% 28%
      % loans from commercial bank 4% 5% 5% 6%
      % short term loans 87% 78% 90% 74%
      % loans with crop as guarantee 12% 56% 10% 54%
      % loans with untitled land as guarantee 5% 9% 4% 8%
      % loans with titled land as guarantee 2% 3%
      % loans with gov't payments as guarantee 11% 13%
Among informal borrowers:
    Avg. Loan 5,592 2,036 5,055 2,229
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
* Expressed in 1996 Pesos
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Table 1. 16: Farmland use, by Procede status
Uncertified In process
Land use
1994 1996 1994 1996
Farm size (has) 10.6 14.6 9.4 11.4
Cultivated land (has) 7.3 9.1 6.8 8.3
annuals (has) 4.0 4.7 4.0 4.7
perennials (has) 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9
improved pastures (has) 1.5 1.9 0.8 0.8
fallow (has) 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.9
Natural pastures (has) 2.7 4.0 2.2 2.9
Forest land (has) 0.6 1.5 0.4 0.3
Cultivated land (% of farm) 88% 88% 83% 84%
% cultivated land with irrigation 10% 11% 17% 18%
% cultivated with annuals 73% 68% 71% 63%
% cultivated with perennials 8% 7% 14% 14%
% cultivated with impr.pastures 5% 7% 4% 4%
% cultivated fallow 17% 17% 17% 20%
Natural pastures (% farm) 11% 10% 16% 15%
Forest land (% farm) 1% 2% 1% 1%




1994 1996 1994 1996
Farm size (has) 12.5 16.2 11.3 14.8
Cultivated land (has) 7.8 8.7 7.5 8.8
annuals (has) 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.6
perennials (has) 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
improved pastures (has) 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.4
fallow (has) 1.3 2.5 1.3 2.1
Natural pastures (has) 3.7 5.2 3.1 4.4
Forest land (has) 1.0 2.3 0.8 1.7
Cultivated land (% of farm) 81% 80% 84% 83%
% cultivated land with irrigation 19% 23% 15% 18%
% cultivated with annuals 75% 65% 73% 66%
% cultivated with perennials 6% 6% 8% 8%
% cultivated with impr.pastures 7% 7% 6% 7%
% cultivated fallow 18% 22% 17% 20%
Natural pastures (% farm) 16% 16% 14% 14%
Forest land (% farm) 3% 4% 2% 3%
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
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0-5 has 2.7 2.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 5.8 3.4 2.3 0.1 0.0
5-15 has 8.3 7.8 0.3 0.1 0.0 12.7 7.8 3.5 1.4 0.0
15+ has 31.4 27.9 1.0 2.3 0.0 30.0 20.8 6.7 2.5 0.0


























0-5 has 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.1 0.0 5.3 1.9 3.4 0.0 0.0
5-15 has 8.0 7.1 0.6 0.2 0.0 15.4 6.3 6.9 2.2 0.0
15+ has 33.5 28.5 2.1 2.9 0.0 30.5 18.0 12.3 0.2 0.0
Total 10.6 8.9 1.0 0.7 0.0 14.4 6.8 6.6 1.0 0.0



























0-5 has 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 3.9 1.5 0.0 0.0
5-15 has 7.9 7.6 0.2 0.1 0.0 9.0 7.2 1.5 0.3 0.0
15+ has 25.3 24.3 0.4 0.1 0.0 25.8 15.8 8.8 1.2 0.0
Total 9.7 9.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 11.2 7.8 3.0 0.4 0.0


























0-5 has 2.8 2.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 6.5 4.5 1.7 0.3 0.0
5-15 has 8.6 8.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 12.2 9.1 1.8 1.3 0.0
15+ has 31.5 28.0 0.7 2.7 0.0 30.9 23.4 3.5 3.9 0.0
Total 13.1 12.1 0.2 0.8 0.0 15.6 11.6 2.3 1.7 0.0
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
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Table 1. 18: Land market participation, by certification status and farm size, 1994-96 
 
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
Table 1. 19: Land rental market participation, by certification status
Source: 1997 Ejido Surveys
0-5 has 5-15 has 15+ has
Procede    
 status
Leasing 
decision 1993 1996 1993 1996 1993 1996
Uncertified In 1% 5% 7% 11% 11% 6%
Out 3% 5% 3% 4% 6% 16%
In process In 3% 6% 11% 10% 7% 24%
Out 4% 9% 9% 7% 7% 9%
In
Certified Out 2% 8% 7% 10% 16% 14%
In 3% 6% 12% 14% 8% 19%
Out
Total In 2% 6% 8% 10% 13% 13%
Out 3% 6% 8% 9% 8% 16%
Non cert. In process Certified All
1993 1996 1993 1996 1993 1996 1993 1996
Rent in 3% 4% 4% 7% 4% 5% 3% 5%
Loaned in 2% 3% 2% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3%
Sharecropped. In 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 3% 1% 3%
       Total lease in 6% 8% 7% 11% 8% 11% 7% 10%
Rent out 1% 3% 3% 4% 5% 7% 4% 5%
Loan out 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Sharecropped. Out 0% 2% 0% 1% 1% 4% 1% 3%
      Total lease out 3% 7% 7% 8% 8% 13% 6% 10%
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Chapter 2: Tenure security and the economic benefits of land titling: a 
review of the literature
2.1. Introduction 
Before entering into the discussion of what theory would predict to be the welfare 
impact of titles and their registration, it is useful to define more clearly what is meant by 
tenure insecurity and how the case of Mexico’s ejidos before and after the 1992 reforms, 
in terms of land rights, fits into that definition. This is done in sections 2 and 3. Section 4 
reviews the main findings of the empirical research on the effects of land titling, looking 
at which of the various channels the literature has shown to be most important in linking 
tenure security to higher incomes and farm productivity. Section 5 reviews the available 
literature on the impact of titling programs on land markets (land rental markets more 
specifically) and on the allocation of household labor. It is argued that the literature, 
mainly focused on long-term increases in agricultural productivity, has overlooked the 
importance of land rental markets and of the reallocation of household labor to off-farm 
activities as a result of stronger property rights. The final section summarizes the 
previous discussion by referring to the specific case of the Procede and the ejido sector in 
Mexico. In particular it discusses the contributions and limitations of the present research 
to the existing literature.   
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2.2. Land rights and tenure security
The role of land rights is central to the process of agricultural development. The 
allocation of land rights affects both farm productivity as well as household income.  
From now on, we shall refer to farm productivity as the value of profits per hectare of 
farmland, where the latter includes cultivated land, pastures, as well as fallow land.  Land 
rights evolve in accordance with the social system within which they are structured and 
their trajectory is of considerable interest in understanding how the benefits of economic 
growth are redistributed in society and among successive generations. As a means of 
strengthening land rights and raising farm productivity, titling programs have acquired 
substantial interest during the past two decades. Considerable effort has been placed in 
identifying channels through which tenure security affects farm productivity and in 
measuring quantitatively its impact. 
As the effectiveness of land titling programs depends in turn on the structure of 
pre-existing land rights and their influence on insecurity as perceived by the land holder, 
a definition of what tenure insecurity (or security) means will help us in better 
articulating the discussion that follows. According to Place et al. (1994, p.19) “land 
tenure security can be defined to exist when an individual perceives that he or she has 
rights to a piece of land on a continuous basis, free from imposition or interference from 
outside sources, as well as ability to reap the benefits of labor and capital invested in that 
land, either in use or upon transfer to another holder.”  There are basically three different 
levels from which the issue of tenure security can be considered: which rights (i.e. their 
breadth), their duration, and their degree of assurance (i.e. degree of enforcement).16
16 The role of government in the assurance of property rights can be ambiguous. Leaving aside the case of 
dictatorial governments, even in modern democratic societies the government can enhance assurance by 
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The breadth of rights refers to a different dimension, specifically rights of use, of 
transfer, and of exclusion, all of which contribute to define the bundle of rights attached 
to a specific unit of land that can be claimed by a given individual. Rights of use regulate 
the type of economic activities that can be undertaken and more generally are the basis on 
which the residual claimant to profits generated by the use of land is identified. 
Transfer rights are particularly important for the following reasons. First, the 
ability to freely transfer the possession of land, with annexed rights of use, is the basis on 
which members of a society can self-select into those activities in which they are most 
productive. If a landless worker whose abilities are better rewarded in farming rather than 
by working as a petty trader wants to purchase or lease farm land, the ability to do so will 
improve her income prospects, as well as those of society at large. Conversely, a farmer 
that would enjoy a better return to his labor endowment by working off-farm or by 
migrating could benefit from selling or renting his land to that landless worker. If land 
cannot be transferred freely, this process will be blocked and efficiency losses will result. 
Second, inability to transfer land ownership even when tenure is assured (i.e. there is no 
risk of expropriation) will depress investment in land. In fact, when future returns from 
farming are uncertain, the inability to recover the costs of the initial investment in land 
improvement through higher prices or rents will make those investments irreversible. For 
example, if a farmer considers the possibility of migrating to an off-farm job that will 
yield substantially higher payoffs as compared to farming, it will matter a great deal in 
deciding over a land attached investment whether in the future, should the decision to 
extending protection to private owners against arbitrary dispossession by other individuals; or it can 
dispossess private owners of their land to achieve a social objective. The latter takes place through 
expropriation. Views differ sharply on the right of the State, through government action, to expropriate 
private land.   
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migrate become effective, the cost of that investment may be recouped by selling the land 
at a price that will account for that same improvement. From this point of view, land 
rental markets are potentially even more important than land sales markets. In fact land 
sales markets are characterized by substantial transaction costs as compared to land rental 
markets, thereby offering less scope for accessing or exiting farming. 
It should be remarked that transfer rights can be permanent or temporary: the right 
to sell and purchase land are permanent transfers rights, whereas temporary transfer 
rights are associated with the right to rent land. It is common to find in developing 
countries that temporary transfer rights are accepted while permanent ones are forbidden. 
Finally, transfer rights may be complete or limited. By complete we mean that the holder 
of the right has full freedom in choosing to whom he will transfer the rights of use. For 
example, ejidatarios have limited permanent transfer rights (ejidatarios can sell only to 
other ejidatarios of the same nucleus), while temporary transfer rights (i.e. rentals) have 
been completely liberalized. Before the 1992 reforms, both temporary and permanent 
transfer rights were formally nonexistent except for the right of inheriting and that of 
donating the usufruct right.17
The right to exclude others from the benefits generated through the use of owned 
assets is central to economic efficiency. In relation to farmland, the holder’s right to 
exclude others from harvesting greatly improves the incentives to maximize net returns. 
The inability to exclude others depresses the incentive to invest in land improvements, as 
substantial uncertainty will exist concerning the present discounted value of the flow of 
returns. It is important nevertheless to qualify the argument as many resources, including 
17 Note that the donation was in fact the escamotage that ejidatarios adopted in order to illegally sell their 
land usufructs.  
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land, are often administered as common properties. In those cases, the right to exclude is 
awarded to a community rather than to a single individual. The community is entitled to 
exploit that resource in solidarity or according to some specific rules that can be either 
codified or can be determined autonomously within the same community. In such a case, 
the right of exclusion awarded to each member is limited, in the sense that he cannot 
exclude other members of the community but can exclude outsiders. Regulations and 
incentives may be such that the resource is administered efficiently (e.g. Baland and 
Platteau, 1996).  There are many instances though where regulations are ineffective and 
lead to an inefficient use of the resource. 
The issue of duration is also an important one when analyzing the impact of 
tenure security on investment and farm productivity. While certainty about the duration 
of use and transfer rights indeed has relevant effects on investment incentives and overall 
long-term farm productivity, the impact of uncertain duration is likely to be even more 
perverse. Land tenure legislation in several countries (e.g. Ethiopia, China in some areas) 
allows for periodic redistribution of lands among households of the community.  The 
purpose of these provisions is generally that of ensuring an equal redistribution of land 
among households according to their sizes and to allow new households to access the 
village land. Several studies have investigated the impact of effect of land redistributions 
on incentives to invest in land improvements and have found their impact to be 
substantially negative. 
Limited (and uncertain) duration affects also the supply of land on the land rental 
market as the leasing of land signals to the community that the household has more land 
than it needs to support its necessities. In densely populated communities, and especially 
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in those that have been created out of an ideology that supports the transfer of use rights 
to those that till the land, this type of signal gives rise to claims by other households of 
the same community that might claim their holdings to be insufficient. These types of 
tensions affect the likelihood of being negatively affected should land redistribution 
occur in the future.  Limited duration, coupled with uncertainty, will therefore contribute 
to an inefficient use of land as well of other resources such as household labor.  When 
duration depends on manifesting a high labor to land endowment ratio, the incentives are 
to forego off-farm income opportunities, thereby reducing household income. 
Finally, the issue of assurance is key to the argument of tenure security. Both 
national laws and community regulations are meaningless in defining and assigning land 
rights unless these are enforced. Disputes, conflicts, and lack of social recognition of 
rights claimed by a farmer obviously imply weak tenure security. Moreover, disputes and 
conflicts are costly to manage and reduce resources available for productive investments.  
Typically two options are available to a society. One is to enforce rights privately. 
This can be socially inefficient if lack of coordination leads to over-investing in 
enforcement (see de Meza and Gould, 1992). The other is to entrust the enforcement of 
rights to the government or some recognized entity. The reason for doing so being that 
law enforcement is a clear case of a public good. Motivation for doing so may lie in the 
fact that there are economies of scale that can be achieved by assuring rights at the 
collective rather than individual level. The threat of sanctions against violators may be 
more effective (although maybe less credible) if delivered at the community level rather 
than individually. Where enforcement of rights is costly to deliver, individuals may still 
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prefer to enforce privately their rights (e.g. by raising fences around a field with 
improved pasture).  
2.3. Tenure security in Mexico’s ejidos
On the basis of the previous discussion, the question arises regarding the extent to 
which tenure is insecure in the context of Mexico’s ejidos and in which respects has the 
Procede affected the breadth, the duration, and the assurance of land rights. The 
discussion in section 2.2 will allow us to better understand the changes introduced by the 
1992 reforms in Mexico’s ejidos. A review of the main legal changes and of their 
effective reception by the ejidatarios will help us to better understand the sense of using a 
number of variables that reflect different aspects of the ejidos land rights in the empirical 
analysis of chapters 4 to 6. 
First of all, we should remark the great change that the 1992 reform brought in 
terms of the juridical autonomy of the ejidos from the political control of the State18. In 
addition, ejidos as such cannot interfere with the individual decisions over the use of 
individual lands. These two aspects are the cornerstones of the new set of rights that the 
1992 reform has ‘enshrined’ upon the ejidatarios. 
Use rights are now completely liberalized. Ejidatarios can freely hire on-farm 
labor. Notice that before the reform ejidatarios in fact evaded these restrictions. So doing 
involved bribes, reciprocal favors, and risks, all of which altered the shadow price of 
labor and therefore its efficient use. 
18 By juridical autonomy, we mean that ejidos were recognized as an entity entitled with rights and 
obligations towards the state and their individual members. The ejido commissioners are the representatives 
of the ejido in front of the State.   
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Transfer rights have been increased with the reforms to the advantage of both the 
single ejidatario as well as to that of the ejido as a whole. Land rental is completely 
liberalized and can be undertaken also with non-ejidatarios or with farmers that are 
members of other ejidos.  The right to sell the land is recognized by the law. While it is 
limited in the sense that the ejidatario cannot sell the land to outsiders and must give the 
right of purchase first to his family members, now ejidatarios can ask the assembly to be 
granted the status of dominio pleno, becoming to all effects private farmers19. The same 
type of limitation arises from the legal requirement of inheriting the land to one son only 
(a limitation of permanent transfer rights). Again, the restriction is removed once the 
ejidatario becomes a private farmer. 
Communal lands, where they exist, are regulated differently. First of all, the ejido 
assembly has the say over their uses. The ejido is entrusted with rights of use and 
transfer, the latter limited to land rentals. In fact, the ejido has more than simple rights to 
rent communal lands. These lands can now be conferred as capital in joint ventures that 
can involve private firms or any type of outsider. Typical cases are joint ventures for the 
exploitation of forests and woods, or livestock grazing on common lands. More 
importantly, ejidatarios now have the right of converting the use of communal lands by 
assigning these permanently to individuals. Before the reforms, communal lands were 
often used as a source of land for distribution to the new generations. Yet, mere 
possession of communal lands lacked any formal right and tenure insecurity could be 
substantial for the holders. The implementation of the Procede now formally provides the 
community with the right to reassign lands into new uses and to certify the claims that 
emerge as a result. Previously distributed communal lands have therefore been titled and 
19 Yet, acquiring the status of private farmer implies loosing the entitlement to access common lands.
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certified as ejido lands and their possessors recognized as ejidatarios. In the future, 
further redistributions can take place, the difference being that Procede would not be
expected to newly undertake the measurement and registration of ejido lands. This means 
implicitly that either the ejidos will pay for these services, or that new redistributions of 
common lands will go unregistered, further contributing to the ‘erosion’ of the cadastre 
produced by the Procede.  
The duration of the newly acquired rights is now unlimited, except for the case in 
which land is abandoned and left uncultivated for six years or more and is then claimed 
by a new holder. 
Assurance of rights is likely to be the key challenge that the new agrarian system 
faces in Mexico. As discussed in chapter one, the 1992 reforms aimed at creating a 
system of institutions that would implement and support the newly defined land rights. 
Agrarian courts, the Agrarian attorney, and the National Agrarian Registry were geared 
towards the creation of a system of agrarian justice that would provide lawful assurance 
of rights. As Zepeda (2000) points out, the system of agrarian justice is becoming 
increasingly overloaded with the result that disputes are becoming increasingly difficult 
to solve within a reasonable amount of time.   
It is against this background that the relevance of the Procede needs to be 
assessed. The Procede was not only a certification program that would register measure 
and certify land rights. The Procede was also intended to bring to an end disputes and 
conflicts over land in a democratic and participatory way, allowing at the same time the 
new system of agrarian justice to start with the right foot. Through its modus operandi the 
Procede was supposed to actually implement the spirit of the 1992 reforms in the field. 
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Mutual recognitions of rights, resolution of border disputes, measurement of land, and 
formal recognition of the rights of avecindados and posesionarios went hand in hand with 
the dissemination of the provisions of the 1992 reforms, including the new system of 
agrarian justice and the end of the process of land distribution as mean of redistributing 
land in Mexico.  
In closing this section, we need to spend few words concerning posesionarios 
(permanent holders without ownership) and avecindados. The former have a recognized 
right to use the land they operate, less clear being their right to temporarily transfer it. In 
addition, posesionarios do not have an automatic right to access common lands. The 
Agrarian Law, when mentioning the right to sell the land, refers only to ejidatarios, not to 
posesionarios. Legally, these live in a sort of limbo so that the extent of their rights is 
ultimately dependent on the practices and understandings prevailing within the 
communities in which they reside.  Avecindados, in addition to having been awarded the 
right to decide over the administration of the urban area of the ejido, are allowed to 
purchase and rent ejido parceled land and are also granted the right to use communal 
lands.  
Throughout the analysis, we shall refer to a Procede dummy that will signal the 
completion of the program in a given community. Intuitively, that dummy is assumed to 
imply that in certified communities (i.e. communities that have completed the Procede) 
tenure is more secure. How legitimate is the use of such indicator rather than recourse to 
alternative forms of indexing tenure security?  
Where land rights are complex (i.e. the bundle of rights is quite extended) and 
where substantial variation in terms of rights exists among different populations, it might 
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make sense to look for alternative operative notions of tenure security. In a series of 
important studies on indigenous land tenure in Africa (reported in Bruce and Migot-
Adholla, 1994; see also Place and Hazell, 1993),  it was sought to determine the strength 
of rights to land by ordering these hierarchically according to the holder’s ability in 
circulating such rights so that for example transfer rights were regarded as superior to the 
rights of use. Among transfer rights, rights to permanently transfer land were considered 
stronger relative to the rights of temporal transfer. In turn, permanent transfer rights were 
arranged in order of increasing strength as right to bequeath, the right to give, and the 
right to sell. This lexicographic ordering allowed defining three broad and mutually 
exclusive categories of rights: complete transfer rights (which allow the operator to sell 
the land), partial transfer rights (which select those that can receive the land upon 
bequest or gift) and limited transfer rights (which include all the rest). 
The data we use does not allow this type of approach. But in the case of Mexico, 
it is doubtful that the approach would be superior to the one of using a dummy to signal 
more security in tenure. Mexico is indeed a complex society and a mosaic of many 
different ethnic groups. But the variation of individual land rights is not comparable to 
the one existing in sub-Saharan Africa. Seventy years of centrally based agrarian reform 
have created a situation where uniformly defined legal land rights are matched by 
community-specific divergences in terms of effective rights that are not too wide. 
Nevertheless, there are some differences that need to be accounted for in the analysis. 
First, indigenous communities need to be distinguished from the rest of the ejidos. This 
distinction in the end is predictable on the basis of the Procede indicator because 
indigenous communities were intentionally excluded from the Procede until the end of 
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1997. Second, ejidatarios often own bundles of rights under different type of tenure. 
Private land, ejido land, and communal lands can be owned or possessed simultaneously 
by a given ejidatario. As different types of tenure involve a different degree of security or 
bundle of rights, it makes sense to account for their presence.   
2.4. The literature on the economics of land titling: channels and welfare impacts
While the reduction of land-related conflicts and disputes is a measure of the 
success of the Procede, from an economic point of view the question is quite different. 
What does then the theory predict to be the welfare impact of land titles and registration, 
when tenure insecurity is indeed a constraint? 
To see how this question has been addressed in the literature, we begin by 
distinguishing short from long-term effects. Both type of effects have distributive 
implications, which in some circumstances might be non trivial.  The impact on land 
rental markets, which is our ultimate interest, is treated as part of the former set of 
effects.   
Long-term effects of titling programs are mainly two. First, by reinforcing tenure 
security, titles enhance the incentives to invest in land related improvements. Second, 
titles allow land to become a better collateral for accessing credit. The latter effect is 
itself a manifestation of tenure security but to be meaningful it needs a legal system 
effectively backing transfer rights. Tenure security without transfer rights, or even with 
limited transfer rights, will not generally result into the use of land as a collateral.  
Two of the first studies to measure rigorously the impact of land titles on 
investment, access to credit, and farm productivity were those by Feder et al. (1988) and 
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Feder and Onchan (1987). Examining the different performance of Thai farmers with 
titled land and farmers squatting on lands in forest reserves, the studies were able to 
assess how tenure security had contributed to a higher rate of investment on titled lands. 
It was found that land titles eased access to institutional farm credit. The higher level of 
land-attached capital had a positive effect, through complementarity relationships, on the 
demand for commercial inputs that were more accessible by titled farmers as a result of 
easier access to credit. Overall, the combination of these effects was to raise farm 
productivity, in turn leading to higher social land values, once distortionary effects of 
subsidies on credit were controlled for. Moreover, the study showed that the price of 
untitled land was below its social value as tenure insecurity commanded a discount in 
order for land to be purchased by risk averse farmers. Overall, the cost of titling land was 
amply compensated by substantial social benefits.  
Since the Thai studies reported above, a sizeable amount of research has 
investigated the relationship between investment and tenure security and/or land titles. In 
an important paper, Besley (1995) argued that there were three main channels through 
which tenure security would raise the marginal productivity of land-attached capital20.  
First, tenure insecurity acts analogously as a depreciation factor that is taken into account 
by the farmer when discounting the flow of returns from a given investment. Second, 
tenure security increases the size of the land sales market (but one could apply the 
reasoning to the land rental market) and therefore raises the expected reward from 
improving the quality of land if the latter is reflected in a higher price of land (or rent). 
Thirdly, tenure security allows land to be used as a collateral for commercial or 
20 This is different from the issue of marginal productivity of commercial inputs that arises once land 
attached capital accumulates as a result of improved tenure security.   
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institutional credit. One of the key findings is that tenure security may in fact be 
endogenous with respect to investment. In other words, investing in land-attached capital 
may in some societies (e.g. cocoa trees in the forest zone of Ghana) actually be a way of 
reinforcing security of land rights recognized by custom.  With respect to titling 
programs, there are two important implications deriving from Besley’s study (which was 
not evaluating titling programs but only comparing different systems of customary land 
rights). First, the link between tenure insecurity and investment incentives needs to be 
clearly identified before arguing that a titling program will increase farm productivity 
through its investment effect. For that purpose, it is important to have a correct 
assessment of whether existing local customary land rights are enough to ensure that 
investment incentives are in place.  Second, the activation of the land market may be the 
key channel through which titling, by improving tenure security, may exert its strongest 
effect on the incentives to invest. Again, the source of tenure insecurity needs to be 
clearly identified by referring to which sub-bundles of land rights are weak. Tenure 
insecurity may arise only when land is supplied to the market and may not be an issue 
otherwise. In that case, insecurity does not act so much as a discount factor. Instead, it is 
the lack of the opportunity to supply in the future the land to the market and reap the 
benefits of previous investment that may in fact depress the incentive to invest.  
Further studies that have found a strong relationship between tenure security and 
investment are those by Hayes et al. (1997) in Gambia, and more recently Brasselle et al
(2002) on Burkina Faso. These studies, together with that of Place and Hazell (1993) and 
Migot-Adholla et al. (1994), reinforce the previous findings by Migo t-Adholla et al. 
(1993) and Besley (1995) on the relationship between tenure security and investment in 
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sub-Saharan countries. In these societies existing customary land rights are enough strong 
and able to manage the actual demographic pressure on land. Thus, investment incentives 
do not seem to be overly affected by lack of clearly defined and legally backed property 
rights. In those societies, land titling will not generate major benefits in terms of 
increased investment and higher farm productivity (see Firmin-Sellers and Sellers, 1999). 
In addition, credit markets may still be too underdeveloped for land titles to make any 
difference in terms of access to credit. Given the high costs typically involved with land 
titling programs, it might be preferable to postpone them and employ instead those 
resources in other more socially relevant policies. As an alternative to individual titling, 
programs that would focus on group titling (i.e. a formal recognition of common 
property) may be preferable. This consideration is reinforced by the fact that where 
individual titling is introduced into areas where communal lands are important and 
different bundles of rights held by more than one person coexist on the same land, 
conflicts and social tensions may increase rather then diminish (Atwood, 1990). 
Exceptions are of course represented by those situations where population pressure has 
presently achieved such a high level that conflicts over land are becoming endemic, to the 
point of threatening social stability. The latter is the case considered by André and 
Platteau (1998) in the case of Rwanda.  
Recent work by Alston et al. (1996) on the frontier of the Brazilian Amazon 
region shows that land titling has had a significant effect on farm investment and has 
increased the price of land. The authors confirm their hypothesis that the impact of secure
property rights through titling will be stronger the nearer the farm land to major urban 
areas. This inverse relationship between the value of land titles and distance from major 
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urban areas can be imputed to the lower cost of enforcing land rights as backed by formal 
tiles when land is located near administrative centers, the increased commercial value of 
agricultural land located near markets, and the higher costs of private enforcement of 
individual rights which are caused by the higher intensity of conflicts and disputes, these 
in turn being a function of the value of land. We shall refer to this study when looking at 
the ‘certification path’ followed by the bureaucracy implementing the Procede program 
in their selection of the ejidos to be approached for registration.
Besides its effect on the investment incentive, titles may affect the composition of 
capital assets, especially the mix between attached and non-attached capital. In a recent 
study on land titles in Paraguay, Carter and Olinto (2003) have investigated the issue in 
an environment where small farmers are constrained in their access to formal credit. 
Farmers that do not experience an improved access to credit may reduce their investment 
in movable capital in order to finance their increased demand for land-attached capital. 
On the other hand, large farmers that fully benefit from the credit effect of land titles may 
adjust their capital portfolio fully. The bottom line is that the credit effect may take place 
only to the advantage of large farms in a context characterized by substantial inequality in 
land holdings. Land titles may in fact accentuate that inequality. The study, though, does 
not estimate the impact of changes of the capital mix on farm productivity so that it is 
difficult in the end to separate the level effect attributable to more investment from the 
composition effect due to the internal adjustment of capital among its attached and non 
attached components.
The efficiency effect of changes in capital mixes is analyzed more in detail by 
Deininger and Chamorro (2002) in the case of Nicaragua.  A key finding of the study is 
63
that the marginal returns of land-attached capital assets and other assets (i.e. machinery 
and livestock) differ systematically. Thus, land titling in Nicaragua will have the effect of 
(a) raising farm productivity in the long run both by raising the mean level of investment, 
which will include investment in both attached and non attached capital; and (b) by 
favoring the adjustment in the mix of the two types of assets. The authors also find a 
significant impact of formal titles on the value of the land. The titling program 
undertaken in Nicaragua had a substantial payoff as it focused mostly on those areas 
where tenure insecurity was greatest and where the returns to titles would have been 
highest (as in fact it proved to be).      
The extent to which access to credit may be facilitated by holding a clearly 
defined title is indeed a central question in the economics of land titling. Often the accent 
has been placed on the ability of accessing long-term credits that would in turn facilitate 
investment in lumpy and sizeable investments. Yet, one aspect often overlooked is the 
importance of accessing short-term credit in affecting the ability of liquidity constrained 
farmers to finance long term investments, independently from long-term credit or land 
related investment. Typically, (e.g. Feder et al., 1988) increased use of commercial inputs
is expected to follow from their higher marginal productivity as caused by the higher 
level of capital that land titles bring about over the long-run through investment. In fact, 
when commercial inputs are on average restricted by liquidity constraints, the impact of 
land titles on their use may be substantial, provided that institutional lenders are more 
prone to accept titled land as a collateral.  Moreover, the ability to raise steadily average 
net household revenues allows cash constrained farmers to self-finance farm investment. 
Thus, it may very well be that investment follows a higher adoption of commercial inputs 
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rather than having commercial inputs adoption follow land-attached investments as 
implied by Feder et al (1988). 
Even where no additional investment was to materialize, the benefits may be 
substantial in terms of household income and higher farm productivity. This is a central 
result in a study by Lopez (1996) on the impact of land titles in Honduras. The results of 
that study show that (a) land titling had on average a strong and positive effect on 
relaxing liquidity constraints, in turn allowing farmers to increase their allocative 
efficiency21; and (b) higher farm income did not translate one to one into higher 
household income. This is a key aspect of the analysis that is lacking in most studies 
evaluating the welfare impact of land titling or land rights. The reason for linking farm 
income per capita (and not farm income per hectare as a land productivity approach 
would suggest) lies in the diversification of income sources that rural households 
normally achieve. If land titles increase the marginal return to on-farm labor, this implies 
an internal reallocation of household labor towards on-farm activities. The reallocation of 
labor endowment across on farm and off-farm activities implies that it would be 
erroneous to take farm income as the measure of the welfare impact of land titles. This 
observation raises the issue of which indicator is the one that matters when evaluating the 
impact of farm programs. Looking at the literature one has the feeling that the concern 
with farm productivity has somewhat obscured the importance of land titling programs, 
which is not that of raising yields or farm productivity per se, but instead that of raising 
household welfare, independently of whether the latter comes from farming or off-farm 
activities. 
21 The impact on farm income through investment was positive but did not represent the major channel 
through which benefits materialized. Overall, Lopez estimates the rate of return of the titling project in 
Honduras as roughly 17%.
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The consideration that titles may favor a structural reallocation of household labor 
among on and off-farm activities suggests yet another route through which a higher use 
of commercial inputs may be induced by more tenure security. A situation of that kind 
would occur in those instances in which family labor migrates and production techniques 
become more capital intensive as a result22. Under which conditions would a demand led 
credit effect arise? When tenure insecurity is mitigated by the amount of land per family 
labor, titling of land rights might give rise to such type of event. There are various 
examples of countries where land policies may deeply affect the allocation of labor 
across activities. In China and Ethiopia assignation of communal lands is based on family 
needs (e.g. Ethiopia). But pre 1992 reform Mexico also offers a good example as often 
competition for land within the ejidos was based on the size of the family. The absence of 
studies on the impact of land titles on farm households’ labor supply is quite striking.    
The distributive impact of land titles has been a subject of concern in many 
studies and words of caution have been raised in that respect. One argument is that land 
titling may exacerbate inequality by facilitating distress sales of land or by lowering the 
cost of exiting farming (e.g. the case of exclusionary agro-export booms discussed in 
Carter and Mesbah, 1993; and Carter and Barham, 1996). The argument though is 
weakened by the fact that distress land sales occur also in the absence of titles, and 
perhaps to an even greater disadvantage of the seller. In fact the ability of using land as a 
collateral once titled may offer better prospects for relying on consumption credit to 
smooth income shocks. But even if the argument were fully valid, if titles raise land 
22 For this to happen it would also be necessary for failure in the labor market to exist. Monitoring costs and 
imperfect substitutability of family with hired labor may be one source of such failure. Alternatively, that 
failure would also arise when the disutility of farm labor differs from that of off-farm labor (see Lopez, 
1986). 
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values farmers selling for distress may actually reduce their losses by selling at a higher 
price. 
The distress sale argument is similar to the one that holds that in dualistic agrarian 
systems small holders face a competitive gap with respect to larger and more 
commercially oriented farmers and that in the end they will sell their lands, thereby 
increasing land ownership concentration. This case may be typical of agro-export booms, 
when land values can increase substantially (again Carter and Mesbah, 1993; and Carter 
and Barham, 1996). Yet, by taking advantage of high land values small farmers may 
actually be benefiting from land titles by being able to exit farming at a moment of high 
prices23. Of course, it is difficult to state that this is an undesirable effect if no 
information is provided regarding the welfare of the household after exiting farming. 
Moreover, agro-export booms typically spur investment in local processing and 
packaging of fruits and vegetables. Thus local off-farm labor markets tend to develop and 
offer considerable opportunities to be employed on a more stable basis. If this is correct, 
one should not be surprised to observe the exit from farming of many small producers. 
A serious concern raised by some authors (e.g. Atwood, 1990, and Firmin-Sellers 
and Sellers, 1999) regards the possibility that in communities undergoing titling programs 
those with more power or better connections might benefit, especially by being able to 
consolidate holdings previously appropriated illegally. This is especially risky in the case 
of societies where substantial inequality exist from the outset, where vast extensions of 
lands are under communal tenure, or where civil conflicts have led to expulsion of 
households from large tracts of lands (e.g. Colombia during the last decade). Where 
23 According to Carter and Barham (1996), in Chile’s Central Valley the value of land rose to the level of 
that of California as a consequence of the fruit boom of the eighties. 
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corruption is rampant, this may be especially problematic. Tilting programs may in those 
cases lead to social tensions and disruptions and therefore increase rather than reduce 
tenure security. 
Finally, where titling programs are voluntary and available on a fee basis, better-
off farmers are able to reap the benefits of land titles (e.g. easier access to credit) while 
small poor farmers continue to be excluded and perpetuate their lack of security. Over the 
long run, this may generate an increasing differentiation within the farm sector (or the 
farming areas targeted by the voluntary program). Thus, it is often argued that mandatory 
titling programs may be more ‘just’ by leveling the field among farmers independently of 
their ability to pay. Nevertheless, mandatory programs have an important drawback in 
that some beneficiaries do not value the importance of titles (i.e. their willingness to pay 
is low even in absence of liquidity constraints). A weak latent demand for stronger tenure 
security is often revealed ex post by the fact that transactions of titled land go unrecorded. 
As a result, the initial investment incurred in setting up the program and registering titles 
is lost within one or two decades.  
2.5. Land titles, land markets, and the allocation of household labor. 
In spite of the many titling programs that have been implemented worldwide and 
of the importance of land rental markets in potentially favoring the access to land by 
small farmers (besides improving efficiency in production), very few studies have looked 
at the relationship between the two. Recently, Deininger et al. (2003) have found 
evidence that land titles in Nicaragua have contributed to improving the functioning of 
land rental markets by reassigning land from large and low-productivity farmers to small 
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and high-productivity farmers. Interestingly, the authors find that land titles have had a 
very little impact on the functioning of land sales markets and that these continue to 
transfer land from small to large farms. This direction of land transfers may have a social 
negative impact given the recognized higher productivity of small farms in the 
Nicaraguan context24. Thus, by activating land rental markets, land titles have both an 
efficiency effect (e.g. raise total net revenues from the agricultural sector) as well as a pro 
poor effect by increasing the volume of land on the rental market and facilitating the 
access by small farmers. 
The paper by Carter and Yao is an important contribution in the effort of 
modeling the relationship between tenure security and land rental markets in developing 
countries. In their paper, Carter and Yao (2002) have investigated how village-level 
reforms affecting tenure security in China have improved farm efficiency. The authors, 
posit that tenure insecurity translates into transaction costs, thereby reducing the effective 
land rents, so that nominal rents are below effective rents for those leasing land in and 
above for those leasing land out. This gives rise to three rental regimes: rental in, rental 
out, and autarky. The autarky regime is therefore plagued by two market failures, while 
the other two regimes are affected only by the labor market failure. The paper tests, and 
finds positive evidence for, the hypothesis that more tenure security reduces transaction 
costs, favoring the participation in land rental markets by small and large farms25. In 
addition, it is claimed that traditional tests of separation between production factor ratios 
24 The latter is measured by per hectare net farm revenues, reflecting private rather than social benefits.  See 
Binswanger et al. (1995) regarding the importance of distinguishing between private and social returns 
when testing for an inverse farm size productivity relationship. 
25 Of course farm size is intended as conditional on a suitable way of normalizing absolute values.
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and factor endowment ratios26 fail to take into account the discontinuity that exists in the 
relationship between the product and factor ratios. In other words, when failing to 
separate different regimes, separation tests may give a wrong answer in that efficient and 
inefficient (in the allocative sense) producers are mixed together. 
Along the same line, an interesting study is that by Olinto (1999), which focuses 
on Mexican ejidos and applyies a friction model to the same set of data we use in this 
research. Two land rental models are estimated in this paper and we spell the basic 
equations out in order to better understand the analysis we shall undertake in chapter 5. In 
his first model, Olinto estimates the relationship between farm size and landholdings 
controlling for other determinants. The key relationship analyzed empirically is given by:
(2.1) );,( θititit TNAA =
where Ait is the hectares of land cultivated by farm i at time t,  Nit is the size of the 
household, Tit is the size of landholdings, and θ is a vector of relevant parameters (e.g. 
dependency ratio, Procampo participation, etc.). According to Feder (1985), if technology 
exhibits constant returns to scale, family and hired labor are imperfect substitutes, and all 
other factor markets are perfect, there should be no relationship between farm size and 
landholdings. Olinto tests this relationship assuming that the Procede affects such 
relationship. He finds that the Procede has reduced the dependence of farm size from 
cultivated land, significantly but not by a great amount. 
The second model estimated by Olinto follows Skoufias (1995), and attempts 
measuring the impact of the Procede on the minimum size of land transacted on the 
market. The model estimated is:
26  The independence between production factor ratios and endowment factor ratios occurs when less than 
two markets are failing (Feder, 1985).     
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(2.2) itititit uXNN +== π*  if α−<*itN   or   α>*itN
0=itN    otherwise
where Nit is the effective net land rental (positive is land is rented in, negative if land is 
rented out), N* is the desired amount of net land rentals, Xit is a vector of determinants, 
including landholdings and the Procede dummy, that influence net land rental decisions, 
and α represents a threshold level above which if its sign is negative and below which is 
its sign is positive no rental takes place. In other words, it represents transaction costs that 
create an inaction range in the relationship between land rental and transaction costs. 
Olinto models such threshold as a function of a 1997 year dummy. Having a panel of 
households, he assumes that between 1994 and 1997 land rental markets have become 
more fluid. The analysis confirms that transaction costs appear to be lower in 1997, but 
fails to find evidence of an impact of the Procede on the size of land rental decisions. In 
addition, a positive association (0.2 hectares of net land rental for a change of one hectare 
in landholdings) exists between net land rentals and the size of landholdings. 
Two aspects need to be underlined with respect to these results. First, both models 
implicitly assume that the relationship between renting out land and landholdings is 
symmetric to that between renting land in and holdings. By forcing this symmetry into 
the data, both models are likely to generate biased results on both accounts. Thus, it 
would be advisable to estimate renting in and renting out decisions separately as 
asymmetry is likely to be the typical case. Second, transaction costs are modeled as a 
function of time only and not as determined by household and village level 
characteristics, including the Procede. In fact, it is likely that both fixed and variable 
transaction costs influence both fixed transaction costs (which affect participation 
71
decisions) as well as proportional transaction costs (which affect the size of the 
transaction, given participation). The empirical work in chapter 5 will attempt to address 
these issues. 
With respect to the impact of land titles on labor markets and household labor 
allocation decisions, to the knowledge of the author there is only one study that has 
attempted to investigate the issue explicitly.27 In an interesting and unfortunately very 
little known paper, Scott (1996) examines in the Chilean context the importance of 
property rights failure for the supply of household labor to non-farm activities. Among 
Chilean small farmers, many have inherited lands that have not been formally split 
among heirs, leading often to disputes over borders. Lack of agreement and the cost of 
disputes generate transaction costs that make land less productive. This effect will lower 
the return to on-farm labor. On the other hand, the ‘Lockean’ argument that property 
rights are legitimated through the occupation and exploitation of land. In turn, this 
argument suggests that labor will be allocated to on-farm labor beyond the point in which 
the value of the marginal return to labor is equal to the wage rate of hired labor, even 
where family and hired labor are perfect substitutes. 
Scott pushes his analysis one step further. He asks how the size of landholdings 
might affect the impact of insecure land rights on the supply of labor to non-farm 
activities. On one side, he argues, disputes will be more intense when landholdings are 
larger as more will be at stake per each dispute. This will lead to less off-farm 
employment. On the other side, land has an important informal insurance component as 
an asset that produces food for poor households that face imperfect credit and formal 
27 The existence of Scott’s article came to my attention as a reference in Cox Edwards (2001). It was only 
in December 2003 that I could get hold of Dr. Scott and receive a copy of his paper. 
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insurance markets. The value of this insurance, its premium, will decline as the size of 
landholdings declines. Thus, fuzzy property rights will affect the risk of losing the 
insurance represented by land less as the amount of landholdings becomes large.  
The empirical analysis concludes that the Lockean argument dominates the 
transaction costs argument. In addition, the larger the landholdings, the lower the implicit 
insurance premium, and the smaller the impact of fuzzy land rights on the supply of labor 
to off-farm activities. These conclusions are much in line with what will be found in the 
case of Mexico and represent an important finding from the point of view of land 
administration and rural development policies.   
2.6. Conclusions and contributions of the present study
This chapter started by defining tenure security and by articulating a series of 
concepts that could help us in deciphering what the status of tenure security could be in 
Mexico. The conclusion is that from a legal point of view tenure security in many ejidos 
is now much stronger as a result of the 1992 reforms. In practice, the Procede has 
facilitated the ‘delivery’ of the contents of the reform. The program has certified and 
titled land that embodies a series of rights that is broader than what existed before the 
reform.   
After that we have looked at how the literature on the economics of land titling
has analyzed the impact of land titles and tenure security on farm productivity and 
household income. We concluded that in spite of its importance, the impact of titles on 
land markets, in particular land rental markets, has received much less attention than it 
deserves. Land rental markets may be a good point of entrance into what is often termed 
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the tenancy ladder. In addition, as discussed in section 2.2, land rental markets permit a 
wider range of production decisions, increasing the shadow value of land-attached capital 
when future returns from farming are uncertain. Finally, active land rental markets may 
help building a price discovery dynamics by which the speculative nature of land sales 
markets may become more evident and easier to limit via competitive pressure28. 
Substitution between rental and purchase options may in fact help in limiting the increase 
in land prices that may originate from non-productive considerations (e.g. inflationary 
pressures, tax evasions, etc). 
Whether land rental markets and off-farm labor supply are indeed important 
channels through which land titles may lead to higher farm productivity and household 
income is in the end an empirical issue and depends very much on the specific social and 
cultural traits that vary from one context to the other. The case of Mexico, and of the 
ejido sector in particular, is important in view of the integration of the country’s 
agriculture with that of the USA and Canada via NAFTA. Adjustments in farm size will 
likely follow the competitive pressure that the grains sector is facing in Mexico 
nowadays. Small inefficient producers are likely to face increased pressure to exit 
agriculture, at least partially, unless appropriate institutions and policies are found to 
circumvent the disadvantage that these farmers face in accessing credit and commercial 
input markets. The high share of household income that small farms derive from off-farm 
employment (see table 1.13) is a sign that the process of exiting farming is already under 
way, albeit very gradually. 
28 Ideally, while land prices may reflect both a productivity and a speculative component, land rents are 
likely to reflect only the productivity one. 
74
The case of the Procede is an interesting example of a decentralized and 
participatory land regularization program. Its lessons, in terms of activation of land 
markets and impact on household labor allocation decisions is important also because of 
the dual system of land tenure that characterizes many ejidos endowed with communal 
lands.  Has the Procede given rise to a process of differentiation that will favor the 
emergence of more efficient farmers? In view of the paucity of studies that have 
addressed such question we believe that the present study can offer a contribution of 
interest. 
Two welfare indices have been used in judging the effectiveness of land titling 
programs: farm productivity and household income. We shall mainly look at the latter, 
although results on net farm income will allow inferring conclusions about the former. 
Both indices have their own merit, although the former is more narrowly sector-focused 
while the latter brings into consideration the trade-off that might exists between farm and 
off-farm activities.    
The study will not look into the impact of land titles on access to credit nor will it 
examine their impact on investment. First, credit markets in Mexico were undergoing 
significant changes during the years spanned by our data. Liquidity constraints were 
severe and only in part relaxed by the Procampo program that took off in 1994. But the 
key point is that institutional lenders were barred from requiring ejido land as a collateral, 
even if titled. For these two reasons there is no reason to expect that the Procede has had 
any impact on access to credit. 
Second to properly determine the impact of titles on investment one should rely 
on data that span at least a decade in order for adjustment in quasi-fixed inputs to have 
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taken place. Shorter time periods may be considered but only if an exceptional wave of 
investment has taken place as a result of titling and other reinforcing causes. This is not 
the case of Mexico agricultural sector. The severe liquidity constraints we just referred to, 
the “tequila” crisis and the high interest rates it brought, and a general uncertainty 
existing over the prospects of farming as a result of the progressive implementation of the 
Nafta agreements, were all factors that had a depressive impact on investment. The 
Alianza para el Campo program (see section 1.6) is likely to have revived investment, but 
our data set covers only one crop year since the launch of the program so that its effects 
do not show in the data yet. Under these conditions, the three-year period spanned by the 
ejido surveys does not lend itself to an analysis of the investment channel that has 
attracted so much attention in the literature. 
Overall, the aim of this study is to produce better knowledge of what can be 
expected from the ejido sector in the process of agricultural modernization now occurring 
in Mexico. Land markets are central to such an effort in view of over seven decades of 
land reform and of the productivity gap that separates ejidatarios and private farmers. In 
addition, as poverty is mostly concentrated in the ejido sector, it is important to 
understand how adjustment in this sector will affect household incomes and farmland 
values.   
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Chapter 3: The analytical framework.
3.1. Introduction
The analytical framework developed in this section underlies the empirical 
analysis of the remaining chapters. We want to examine how, on a theoretical basis, we 
expect Procede will affect land rentals and resource allocation decisions, in particular 
family labor. To better frame our focus in the context of the literature on land titling, it is 
useful to briefly refer to the structural and reduced form models outlined in Place and 
Hazell (1993).  The conceptual framework includes four structural equations. For a 
household endowed with n parcels identified by the subscript i=1,….,n, let:
(3.1)    ))(,,( PSXXfC sh=
(3.2)    )),(,,,( CPSXXXfL i
vph
i =
(3.3)    ),),(,,,( ii
vph
i LCPSXXXfI =





where C is the amount of credit used by the household, Xh is a vector of household 
characteristics, Xv is a vector of location dummies, Xpi is a vector of parcel-specific 
characteristics, Li are land improvements, Ii are inputs used on parcel i. Finally, S is an 
‘aggregate’ indicator of the parcel-specific land rights Si.  To adapt this framework to the 
ejido case, we have made S and Si a function of P, which denotes adoption of the Procede 
on the (to be tested) assumption that land titles strengthen land rights. The reduced form 
of the system of equations 3.1-3.4 is given by29:
29 As in the ejido sector, the typical ejidatario owns (or possesses) land of the same type of tenure, we have 
that niPSPSi ,.....1)()( =∀= . 
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In chapter 2 we have summarized the empirical literature on the effects of land titling. As 
we saw, the empirical literature has focused mainly on equations 3.1’-3.4’, with some 
studies examining a sub-set of these equations. The previous two systems of equations 
embody the implicit view that land titles are meaningful to study as a long-term 
phenomenon due to the hypothesis that land rights are a key determinant of land-attached 
investments and ultimately of land productivity. We complement that approach by 
examining three other relationships, mostly overlooked in the literature.  In particular, we 
shall focus on the following set of reduced form equations: 
(3.5’)   )(,,,( PSXXXgN pvh=
(3.6’)    ))(,,,( PSXXXgY pvhj = ;     j = f, n, o
(3.7’)    ))(,,,( PSXXXgH pvhj = ;   j = n, o
where N stands for land rented (either rented in or out), Yf is net farm income, Yn is non-
farm income, and Yo is off-farm income, Hn is household labor allocated to non-farm 
income activities, and Ho is household labor allocated to off-farm activities. We are 
therefore interested in understanding whether ejido land markets have become more 
active as a result of the Procede, how the program has affected the allocation of 
household labor across activities, and how household income components have overall 
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been affected. The theoretical model outlined in the next section serves the purpose of 
giving more information on the relationships underlying functions 3.5’ to 3.7’. 
3.2. The effects of land titling on household income and labor allocation decisions.
Households are assumed to maximize net income, which is the sum of farm 
profits and income earned out of the farm. The latter type of income includes both 
income earned in local labor markets, mainly agricultural wages, and income earned in 
non-agricultural activities. The latter is assumed to involve some sort of seasonal 
migration whose costs are borne by the household and are a function of the amount of 
labor allocated. 
Farm production technology is assumed to display constant returns to scale and is 
described by a linearly homogeneous and strictly concave function, ),,( hf llBF , in which 
the three factors of production are farm land, Bi, family labor, lf, and hired labor, lh. It is 
assumed that family and hired labor cannot substitute perfectly for each other and are 
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. Various reasons have 
been put forth to justify the assumption that family and hired labor do net enter in F ( ., . , 
. ) additively.  For example, hired laborers may find it advantageous to supply less 
efficient labor than family members, the latter being residual claimants of farm profits. In 
the farm household literature more refined specifications of the production technology 
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have been proposed in order to capture the supervisory role of family labor and its impact 
on the efficiency of hired labor. Here we limit ourselves to the requirement that the two 
types of labor cannot be substituted perfectly for each other, i.e. their elasticity of 
substitution is less than infinite. The ejidatario’s household is endowed with individual 
landholdings of size Ai and with household labor L .  Individually owned land can be 
either farmed directly or hired out ( oH ). Land can be also rented in ( )IH  so as to 
increase farm size.  The size of the farm is therefore equal to oi
i
iii HHAB −+=  . Total 
farm profits are then equal to: Iohhf rHrHwlllBFY −+−= ),;( , where w is the wage 
rate and r is the rental rate of land. Farmers take both w and r as given.  
Ejidatarios face transaction costs related to tenure insecurity when entering the 
land market. Assuming that land titles do have an effect on land tenure security, it is 
postulated that these transaction costs are reduced if the Procede is adopted. It would be 
appropriate to assume that Procede’s impact on tenure security is mediated by local 
community-specific factors. As argued in chapter 1, property and use rights of ejidatarios 
at the local level were quite different from those specified by the Law. Local customs and 
very unique cultures due to the country’s ethnical heterogeneity implied that centrally 
defined rules of the game had to be adapted to the local conditions. When applied to land 
markets, these rules limit the degree of ownership that individuals exercise over their 
endowments. In fact, these rules often influence also the allocation of households’ labor 
and livestock endowments. For simplicity, we assume that only land transactions are 
affected by village-level regulations. It is assumed that these limitations can be 
interpreted as proportional costs of transaction, so that at any ongoing land rental rates, 
the effective rent perceived by an ejidatario will be discounted by a factor ρ.
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Transaction costs are typically assumed to reflect different types of frictions in 
market participation. Two classic examples would be search and bargaining costs 
resulting from participating into land rental markets, which can be thought of as costs of 
transaction that would occur in most villages. The size of the village and the strength of 
local institutions that help reduce the moral hazard attached to transactions30 are all 
factors that influence the size of the transaction costs associated with land rentals. Tenure 
security may compound these factors, further increasing search and bargaining costs. 
Lack of precision in the measurement of the borders of a plot, or uncertainty over 
legitimate ownership of a plot may increase the screening process undertaken by farmers 
that want to rent some land out and are concerned with minimizing the risk of loosing the 
rented plot or entering into a dispute over rights to that plot. If land titles in Mexico 
matter to tenure security, then one would expect that Procede, by reducing tenure 
insecurity would diminish the size of the transaction costs. A key point to underline is 
that while transaction costs are likely to affect the rental in of land as well as the rental 
out, we expect Procede to have a direct impact on such costs primarily on rental out 
decisions. Indirect impacts could in principle imply Procede to increase rental in 
decisions through market equilibrium effects, whereby stronger tenure security increases 
the supply of rental land on the market leading to a lower equilibrium rental rate. Yet, 
ejidatarios have the option of renting land in from neighboring private farmers. 
Depending on the supply elasticity of private land and on the elasticity of demand for 
30 For example, benefits derived from renting a parcel of land might be perceived a long time after 
incurring into the rental costs, that is rental payment occurs after harvest. This is a dominant characteristics 
of land rental transactions in Mexico. Upfront payment may in fact signal that moral hazard is indeed an 
issue in Mexico’s land markets. 
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land rentals for both ejidatarios and private farmers, an increase in the supply of ejido 
land might have an insignificant impact on the equilibrium rental rate of land. 
Summarizing the above discussion, we assume that the transaction costs functions 
for leasing land out and in can be represented respectively as:   ),( j
oo VPTC ρ=    and   
)( j
II VTC ρ=   where P is a dummy variable equal to one if Procede has been adopted 
and completed, and Vj is a vector of village j characteristics that mediate the impact of the 
Procede and serve the function of representing the local rules regulating land transactions 
involving ejido lands. We therefore assume that due to the discrete change implied by the 
adoption of the Procede ),0(),1( j
o
j
o VV ρρ < . Below we shall nevertheless assume 
continuous derivatives to simplify the derivation of the results31. 
To keep the derivation of key propositions simple, we avoid positing the existence 
of liquidity constraints. While liquidity constraints may be a real issue for many small 
farmers in Mexico, we abstract from their existence. Moreover, concerns over liquidity 
constraints might be alleviated by the fact that over 85% of the ejido farmers in our 
sample receive Procampo payments during the 1996/97 crop year. Nevertheless, the 
empirical analysis will control for ownership of key assets, besides land, which are likely 
to be good proxies for farmers’ wealth.  
Bringing together the various strands of the discussion, we posit that the ejidatario 
will maximize the net income of the household by choosing the optimal amount of land 
rented in and out, oi
i
i HH , , the amount of family labor allocated to on-farm labor, fl , and 
31 This is not too much of a restrictive assumption as in fact the impact of Procede will take place through 
increased tenure security and transaction costs depend more directly on tenure security than on the 
availability or not of land titles per se. Thus, receiving a title may have a different impact on tenure security 
depending on village characteristics. As tenure security can be conceived as a continuous variable indexed 
from ‘no-security’to ‘full security’, resorting to continuous first derivatives of the transaction costs function 
may be quite appropriate. 
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implicitly that allocated to off-farm labor, fo lLl −= . To account for the presence of 
costs of accessing off-farm labor markets, we assume that the income received from of-
farm labor is a function of the amount of labor allocated to it32. Thus, we let off-farm 
income be determined by )( olg , with g’>0, g”<0. 
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(i)   hf llL +=
(ii) oHA ≥
Substituting (i) and (ii) into the objective function, and assuming that land rental out will not 
drive the farmer out of production (i.e. ii holds as a strict inequality), we obtain the 
following Lagrangian:
(3.10)  Iioohfhf
oi HVrHVPrwllLgllHHAFL )]([)],([)(),,( ρρ +−−+−−+−+=
Solving (3) with respect to IOhf HHll ,,,  the following first order conditions hold 
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hf ρ ;0≥oH   with c.s. 
32 See Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Benjamine for evidence on transaction costs to access off-farm labor 
markets in Mexico’s rural areas. 
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where c.s. stands for complementary slackness conditions. To simplify matters, we 
assume interior solutions for all choice variables so that the first-order conditions 3.11.i-
iv hold with equality. We then notice that either land is leased in or is leased out or that 
no leasing takes place. That is, the above model does not allow for contemporaneous 
leasing in and out of endowed land. This observation, in turn, leads to the conclusion that 
ejidatarios, depending on their initial land endowments, and the specific conditions under 
which common land is appropriated, will fall into three possible rental regimes in the 
land market. Either they will rent land out, in which case 3.11.iii is the relevant FOC; or 
they will rent in, so that 3.11.iv is the relevant FOC. Alternatively, they will be autarkic 
farmers in the land market if the following condition holds at the maximum:
(3.12)    )],([),,()],([ VPrllAFVPr ifhiB
o ρρ +<<−
This condition is very similar to the one in Carter and Yao (2002) and Deininger 
and Bresciani (2001), except for the appearance of the Procede variable in the transaction 
cost function. 
We now turn to the derivation of the key results of comparative statics, more 
precisely those related to changes in tenure security (P), land endowments (A), and labor 
endowments ( L ). 
The autarky regime (A):






Exploiting Cramer’s theorem the system is analyzed in order to derive the changes in the 
endogenous variables lf and lh with respect to changes in the parameters L  and A. 
Infinitesimal changes in tenure security do not affect farmers initially in the autarky 
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Rental out regime (RO):
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Applying Cramer’s theorem one obtains the following set of results:
























A few points are worth mentioning. First, in the rental out regime a farmer with a 
constant return to scale technology facing only one market failure (i.e. that related to 
labor), will determine its farm size independently from its land and labor endowments 
(see Feder, 1985). Thus, an increase in land endowments will be balanced by an equal 
increase in land rented out. In addition, the amount of family and hired labor employed 
on the farm will be independent of the household’s labor and land endowments.  Second, 
strengthening tenure security through the Procede will lead farmers to rent more land out 
or increase their incentives to participate into the land market if they were previously in 
autarky. In turn, this will lead to a reduction of family and hired labor employed on the 
farm and a contextual increase in the amount of family labor allocated to off-farm 
activities. 
The latter is a key result with two implications. First, increased tenure security 
leads farm households to diversify their income sources by increasing their participation 
to off-farm income activities. Second, farm income may fall as a result of increased 
tenure security while income from off-farm sources will acquire a larger weight in total 
household income. 
It is important to underline that the expression for 
dP
dH o
 is a complicated function 
of A, the landholdings. Consequently, land may enter non-linearly in an equation in 
which the amount of land rented out is regressed on the size of landholdings. This point is 
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worth bearing in mind when discussing the specification of the rental regressions in 
chapter 5.  More generally, the predictions obtained from this application of the basic 
model will be tested in chapters 5 and 6. 
Rental in regime (RI):
In this regime, the relevant FOCs are given by:
0'=− gFf
0=− wFh
0)]([ =+− VrF IB ρ
The derivation of the comparative static results is similar to that followed in the case of 
the rental out regime, with the exception that the land tiles variable P does not appear in 
the transaction costs function. In fact, transaction costs are affected by land titles only 
when land is rented out. We therefore have that:
















3.3. Testable propositions and introduction to the empirical work
In examining the results A-RI, we note the following. First, land market 
participation is affected by the adoption of the Procede as both more land is rented in and 
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out. Thus, the size of the set of autarkic farmers shrinks. We therefore expect, ceteris 
paribus, more farmers to participate and more land being traded. 
Second, as already noted by Carter and Yao (2002) in a different context, 
separability between production decisions and factor endowments does not hold in the 
case of autarkic farmers, while it does when farmers are either in the RO or RI regimes. 
This is not surprising in view of the fact that farmers participating in the land market are 
affected only by off-farm labor market imperfections. They are influenced by transaction 
costs in the land rental market, but once the size of the transaction costs per hectare of 
land rented out is given, farmers cannot influence the shadow price of land. Autarkic 
farmers, on the other hand, face both labor market imperfections as well as a shadow 
price of land that is inversely related with their land endowments. The result that 
separability is restored for land market participants means that improved land markets 
can lead to important efficiency gains if tenure security is increased and overall 
transaction costs are reduced33. 
Turning to the empirical framework represented by equations 3.5-3.7, the above 
results suggest a number of testable hypotheses for the empirical work that follows:
1. Procede favors participation in the rental out land market and has a greater impact on 
the supply than on the demand of land rentals. In particular, Procede favors the 
participation of small ejidatarios in the rental in market. 
2. Land titling through Procede will increase the importance of off-farm income sources 
in total household income;
33 The source of the efficiency gain lies in the fact that the optimal farm size is influenced only by 
parametrically given prices and not by endowments. Thus, land will be reallocated from less to more 
efficient farmers, thereby raising total agricultural profits. 
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3. The income-source effect will be larger especially among larger farmers as these are 
more likely to rent land out once tenure security improves;  
4. Farm revenues may decline as land tenure security improves as a result of the 
Procede.
If confirmed empirically, these propositions provide new insights on the effects of 
land titling programs. Before going ahead with the econometric testing of these 
hypotheses, it is important to understand the nature of the process by which the Procede 
has been delivered to some ejidos and not to others and why some ejidos have decided to 
join the program while others have refused to do so. This is the focus of chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4: Determinants and support of Procede’s adoption.
4.1. Introduction
As we have discussed in chapter 1, the Procede was administered at the ejido and 
not at the household level. Yet, all households in a participating ejido would receive an 
individual title at the end of the process. Either all ejidatarios would be certified and titled 
or none would be. Moreover, as explained earlier in chapter 1, during its implementation 
in any given ejido the Procede required several intermediate votes by the ejidatarios to in 
order for it to advance towards completion. A majority of ejidatarios assisting a given 
assembly was necessary for each stage to be approved and a majority was required for the 
summoned assembly to be valid. Thus, in principle a well-organized coalition of 
ejidatarios could in fact push the process through or stop it if it had enough members and 
discipline. 
Thus, the dynamics of the Procede’s adoption needs to be analyzed at the ejido 
level. The key questions we ask in this chapter are: (1) can the program’s implementation 
be explained by some criteria based on ejido characteristics; and (2) was the program 
perceived differently by different groups of ejidatarios, and if yes which of these 
characteristics were the most influential ones. The first question is addressed in section 1 
and is explored on the basis of the plausible motivations by the personnel of the Agrarian 
Attorney office (PA) and on the potential demand for tenure security by the ejidatarios 
and other groups of ejido members. 
Understanding the dynamics of acceptance or rejection at the household level 
(question 2 above) is important in order to better assess the scope and impact of the 
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program. As the literature on land titling makes clear, voluntary programs, in which 
individual households may participate or not, will maximize the efficiency impact of land 
titles. On the other hand, they might increase the inequality in the distribution of farm 
income, as titled farms will attract more land-related investments and improve access to 
credit provided the institutional framework is the appropriate one. Compulsory titling, on 
the other hand, will minimize distributive effects, but will yield lower efficiency 
outcomes. The Procede is a titling program that combines the features of both voluntary 
and compulsory programs. 
Section 2 will examine and discuss the key determinants of the process by which 
an ejido was involved in the process and by which ejidatarios accepted being involved. 
This interaction is phrased in terms of the supply of and demand for the program. Section 
3 explains how we model empirically the process, while the following section presents 
the results of the analysis. Finally, section 5 considers the issue of which characteristics 
of the ejidatarios better explain their favorable or unfavorable attitude towards the 
program. While surely not a definite answer to the issue of the distributive impact of the 
Procede, the analysis of the opinion of the ejidatarios towards the program should help 
identifying groups of winners and losers within and among ejidos. 
4.2. Modeling the administration of the Procede 
By the time the 1997 ejido survey had started, almost 50% of the ejidos had been 
certified by the Procede.  Were certified ejidos chosen randomly? To answer this 
question, we need to look at the objective function of the bureaucracy entrusted with the 
91
delivery of the program as well as the determinants of the program’s rejection or 
acceptance by the ejidatarios. 
The ‘supply’ of Procede: Before entering into the detail of whether the PA did in 
fact select ejidos according to some characteristics (that might have relevance in 
assessing the ‘dynamic’ efficiency of the program), it is worth pointing out few historical 
details. When the Procede was launched as part of the 1992 agrarian reform, the PA was 
given the main responsibility of administering the program. The PA was created in 1992 
and began its operations in 1993. Personnel were hired early that year and given the 
importance attached by the government to the institution, hiring policies were aimed at 
setting up decentralized offices staffed with motivated visitadores agrários. These were 
the link between the PA’s central administration and the ejidos and their function was to 
disseminate and implement in the field the new provisions of the 1992 reform among the 
ejidatarios. The PA offices were given brand new equipment and remunerations were 
generally high compared to other branches of the public administration. When the 
Procede was launched, the PA became the coordinator of the various strands of the public 
administration that were to be involved in the various aspects of the titling and 
certification process. Assistance by the INEGI was required in order to measure and 
produce maps. The Registro Agrário Nacional (National Agrarian Cadastre) was 
responsible for the delivery of the titles and their conservation. The resolution of conflicts 
was a responsibility of the newly reformed agrarian courts. In all instances, the 
coordinating role of the PA was essential. The Procede was then officially launched at 
beginning of 1993 but became operative only at the end of that year. Communal ejidos 
were excluded from the program until the end of 1996, as they would have required a 
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different type of organization in view of the different rules and customs governing these 
communities34. 
The budget of the PA came to be largely dominated by the activities of the 
Procede. The staff charged with the execution of the program had an incentive to select 
ejidos. Bureaucrats of the P.A. faced two very basic objectives, namely (i) meet the 
centrally established annual quota of ejidos successfully certified and (ii) acquire 
momentum, advancing the program to a stage at which the likelihood of being continued 
even after the end of the Zedillo administration could be maximized35,36.  The attainment 
of the latter objective could be measured both by the number of ejidos certified as well as 
by the share of ejido land certified37. Thus, ‘economies of scale’ could be achieved by 
targeting larger ejidos. In general, to achieve these two goals high speed in measurement 
and in conflict resolution were essential. 
Given the size of the budget, the available personnel and the need to regularize 
and certify as many ejidos as possible within a given year, the issue of minimizing the 
cost and time length of certification per ejido was essential. Certification costs can be 
separated into (i) conflict resolution costs; (ii) measurement costs; and (iii) costs of 
administering the program, where the latter would include the cost of informing 
34 Communal ejidos are included in the analysis that follows because the 1997 survey collected information 
on the participation to the program when some communal ejidos had already started the certification 
process. 
35 In other words, the P.A. faced a problem of survival and reproduction of its own structure. This is quite 
typical of bureaucracies. 
36 Evaluation of operations was organized both in terms of number of ejidos certified as well as the amount 
of land actually measured and titled. Nevertheless, the former criterion was considered to be more 
important (private communication with directing staff of the PA, 2000) 
37 It could be argued that these two indicators need not enter monotonically in a hypothetical function 
describing the probability that the program would be further financed. As a program reaches a certain 
threshold of successes in terms of ejidos certified and share of land certified, further advances may be 
perceived by policy makers as less necessary or beneficial and a preference may emerge to allocate the 
financial resources committed to the program to other newly created programs deemed socially more 
important. Yet, our analysis uses data from 1997, a year in which the program had barely reached 50% of 
all ejidos and had certified a share of ejido far less than that.  
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ejidatarios and the rest of the community about the benefits and implications of 
certification.  Conflicts had to be solved for the program to be completed successfully 
within each ejido. Measurement was necessary for the issuing of tiles. Administration 
required managing relationships with ejidatarios at the field level and coordinating with 
other public agencies at the administrative level.  
Conflict resolution costs are likely to be a major share of the total costs of a 
mandatory titling program. While resolution of conflicts over land rights can be left to the 
individual interested parties in the case of voluntary programs, this is not a possibility in 
the case of mandatory titling programs. The authority that certifies land entitlements and 
issues titles has to ensure that members of the community would accept as legitimate the 
emerging structure of land rights. As the Procede is voluntary at the ejido level, 
individual parties alone may resolve conflicts. Yet, given the potential interest of the 
community in being titled, one should expect the involvement of the community as a 
whole in the resolution of conflicts existing among a subset of its members. In this 
process, coordination among its members is required and this is precisely the type of 
assistance offered by the PA field staff. Solution of conflicts may involve long time 
periods, lengthy mediations, and the need to resort to agrarian courts. The cost per ejido 
of resolving conflicts will be a function of the number of conflicts as well as of the type 
of conflicts that characterizes a given community. 
In the ejido context there are fundamentally three different types of conflicts. One 
category is that of conflicts related to rights over individual parcels. Typically these 
involve disputes over inheritances and the borders and rights of possession of the land 
endowments.  We posit that the number of conflicts of this type in a given ejido will be a 
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function of the number of ejidatarios, posesionarios, and avecindados (i.e. landless and 
right-less ejido inhabitants) and of the value of the land. As the number of individuals 
with an interest in cultivating the land of an ejido increases, the number of conflicts is 
likely to rise on probabilistic terms, if nothing else because of the exponential increase in 
the density of relationships and interactions between members of a given ‘network’. In 
addition, we assume that population density also plays a role in increasing the frequency 
of conflicts as competition for land increases monotonically with it. 
The propensity to engage in a conflict over a tract of land will also be influenced 
by the value of that land, as any conflict is a costly activity (e.g. Alston, Libecap, and 
Mueller, 2002).  We do not have good estimates of the average value of land in the 
sampled ejidos as land markets have until recently been black markets and with little 
circulation of land, so that it is difficult to talk about a process of ‘price discovery’ in 
such settings. Nevertheless, we assume that the value of land is related to the economic 
returns it yields. These returns will depend on the productive potential of land as well as 
on the potential to commercialize the crops produced. We use the value of yields per 
cultivated hectare and the distance to the nearest urban center as proxies respectively for 
the productive and farm income potential of land. As the PA will attempt to minimize 
conflict resolution costs it will contact first ejidos in which certification is likely to 
proceed smoothly. Thus, we hypothesize that ejidos will be ‘offered’ less Procede the 
larger the number of beneficiaries, the nearest it is to an urban area, and the higher its 
productive potential. In addition, conflicts that are difficult to solve, such as those 
involving bordering ejido will deter the PA from approaching an ejido. Conflicts over 
common lands should also be seen as problematic and possibly deter the PA. 
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Measurement costs depend mostly on the topography of the location and on the 
length of borders that need to be identified and measured. The presence of an irregular 
landscape will complicate the identification of boundaries. Thus, ejidos located in 
highlands will be targeted later rather than sooner. In addition, ejidos with small average 
parcels and with larger common lands will be less attractive from the point of view of the 
PA. 
 Administrative costs include those costs related to the man-days spent by the PA 
in order to complete the various stages of the certification process (see chapter 1 for a 
description of the stages involved). It is assumed that the coordination costs are the most 
important type and that these will increase with the number of ejidatarios (not 
posesionarios and avecindados who cannot participate to the various assemblies required 
by the program), and with the distance of the ejido from the state capital, where the PA 
headquarters at the regional level are located. The longer the distance, the higher the 
transportation costs of the PA staff and the less frequent the contact between the 
visitadores agrários and a given ejido. More frequent contacts increase the confidence 
between the visitador and the ejidatarios, helping speeding up the process38.  As the ejido 
might be located near to the capital of a State different from the one to which the ejido 
belongs, we use the travel time to the nearest urban center as a proxy for traveling costs. 
The ‘demand’ for Procede: The demand for Procede can also be separated into 
different components. At the village level we shall distinguish between: (i) tenure 
security motivations (given land distribution); and (ii) land redistribution motivations 
(given tenure security).
38 For example, many ejidatarios that have a negative opinion of the Procede fear that the program has been 
devised by the government to tax the ejido land. Ejido land is still untaxed . 
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With respect to tenure security motivations, these are likely to have been stronger 
in those ejidos where conflicts were more frequent. Conflicts are assumed to be positively 
related to the value of land (e.g. Alston et al., 1996; Platteau, 1996). As we have no 
information on the value of land, we resort to indicators that are presumably related to the 
value of land. We posit that the value of land will be positively related to its productivity 
and to its potential demand. Thus, we take yields per hectare and the population density 
as two proxies. These two variables are also interacted with the distance of the ejido to 
the nearest urban area, as distance is likely to affect the value of land by reducing its 
commercial potential. This negative impact of distance can be counterbalanced by a 
positive impact. If ejidatarios in more remote ejidos have less non-farm income 
opportunities and are therefore more specialized in farming as a source of income, land 
titling may be more demanded if it serves the purpose of securing property rights in order 
to protect investments in land improvements. In addition, more remote ejidos are also 
those where migratory pressure might be highest, a further reason to secure land rights in 
order to reduce the number of household members present on the farm and perhaps lease 
some land out without running the risk of losing a portion of it.         
The presence of conflicts over common lands and over ejido borders might reduce 
the demand for Procede in some cases (in order to avoid a disadvantageous settlement) 
and increase it in others (for opposite reasons). 
Land redistribution motivations would probably be a major issue in land titling of 
communities borne out of egalitarian culture. The key aspects related to the distribution 
of land within the ejidos are related to the presence of avecindados (i.e. landless ejido 
members), the existence of common lands susceptible for redistribution (and the quality 
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of such lands). As shown in the previous chapter, almost two thirds of the ejidos were 
endowed with common lands. Most of these lands were assigned to grazing and quality 
of pastures was very variable across ejidos. Some ejidos cultivated crops collectively on 
common lands. Other ejidos, and communities in particularly, allowed individual 
members of the ejidos, or the new generations, to settle on the commons and earn a life 
there.  
The majority of ejidos had been given common lands when they initially came 
into existence. Such lands served various functions. First, as pastures they were exploited 
either to rear cattle or working animals (de Janvry et al. 1997). This was an important 
function in an undercapitalized setting. Second, common lands were a form of insurance 
on which the poorest ejidatarios could draw at times of necessity. Firewood and plants 
could be collected, wood logged, and animals grazed at times of droughts. Third, 
ejidatarios could use the commons as a land reservoir on which younger ejido members 
could establish their farms by opening new lands, albeit of lower quality39.  Thus, we 
would expect that a program that offers the possibility of regularizing appropriations of 
common lands would raise serious concerns among ejidatarios.     
Many ejidos, at the time of the regularization faced the choice of certifying an 
unequal distribution of land access or to engage in a bargaining among ejidatarios in 
order to redistribute land so as to redress unbalances. Whether an agreement could be 
reached depended on several factors among which the ability to equalize land access 
without subtracting from incumbents, and the distribution of power between opposing 
interests. Modality of access to the commons was essential in understanding the 
underlying dynamics. As Baland and Platteau (1998) have underlined, it is important to 
39 Yet technological progress raised the return from farming marginal land. 
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separate the issue of exploitation from that of appropriation. As common lands were 
primarily for grazing unequal distribution of herds translated into an unequal returns from 
use of the commons. This made cooperation over the management of the commons more 
difficult to achieve but not necessarily counter to efficiency. Owners of large herds could 
favor, and directly support, a more sustainable use of the commons given the higher 
returns they achieved from these and their larger share of environmental or congestion 
costs arising out of free riding behavior (Olson, 1965). Yet, imposition of equal access 
quotas might have more success in meeting the approval of those with fewer cattle. In 
some sense, even if equal quotas could ensure an efficient use of the commons, the latter 
solution would nevertheless leave the possibility of future encroachment and 
appropriation opened.  The arrival of the Procede had a strong impact on land 
appropriation in that it raised the issue of subdivision much earlier than one would have 
expected based on historical trend (Muñoz et al., 2003). A sudden appreciation of the 
expected value of land translated itself into a potent motive for re-discussing the existing 
distribution of land and access to common lands within the ejidos.  It should therefore be 
expected that while inequality in the distribution of individual parcels would deter 
adoption of the Procede, it would be less so if enough commons could be used to 
redistribute land. 
To model appropriately these factors, we assume that the latent demand for 
Procede related to land distribution (or redistribution) motives can be described as a 
function of: the concentration of individual parcels within the ejido (measured as the 
standard deviation of the log of per capita land); the population pressure – at the ejido 
level - on common lands (measured as the hectares of common lands divided by the size 
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of the ejido population) and its interaction with (a) the concentration of individual 
parcels, and (b) its distance from the nearest urban area; and the presence of common 
lands used for cultivation.  
Other institutional factors also play a key role in explaining the advances of the 
Procede. The existence of an internal registry would signal that the community had been 
able to regulate its internal affairs to some degree, so that ceteris paribus it will have a 
lower demand for titles as means of improving tenure security; the participation of the
ejido to an associations of ejidos, which were known to oppose the program under the 
belief it would represent a first step towards the privatization and dismantlement of the 
ejido system; the communal tenure of the village, which we would also expect to be 
negatively related with the Procede in view of the strongest customary rights that 
typically characterize these communities; and, along the same lines, whether the majority 
of the ejidatarios belonged to an indigenous group, as we expect linguistic barriers to be 
an obstacle for PA Spanish-speaking staff. 
Basic descriptive statistics regarding motivations for joining or rejecting the 
program are reported in table 4.1. The information was obtained from the ejido 
representatives and might therefore not reflect the true distribution of individual 
motivations within ejidos. 
4.3. Econometric framework
We present both a structural and a reduced form approach to the analysis of the 
determinants of the delivery of the Procede, its adoption by the ejidatarios, and its 
finalization. As table 4.1 shows, almost 14% of the sampled ejidos were not informed 
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about or were not convened to discuss the Procede. To adopt the Procede and to proceed 
to its finalization an ejido has to be first informed or convened and it is the PA that takes 
the initiative of informing. Thus, the structure of the decision making tree is such that an 
analysis of the determinants of adoption can only be applied to the sub-sample of ejido 
that were previously informed. In other words the sample of ejidos that decided over the 
adoption is truncated and their selection process needs to be incorporated explicitly. 
There are two modeling approaches, each corresponding to two alternative 
assumptions concerning the PA’s behavior in designing its certification strategy. One 
approach assumes that when the PA has to decide on whether to ‘target’ a given ejido it 
does not assess the likelihood that the ejido will accept or reject the program. Thus, the 
PA acts ‘myopically’. The second assumption is that the PA does in fact act rationally. 
Having perfect knowledge of the behavioral model that maps characteristics of a given 
ejido to the probability of accepting the program conditional on that ejido being 
contacted, it incorporates that model into its decision of whether to contact that ejido or 
not. Thus, the determinants of the ejido’s response are present also in the selection (or 
supply) equation.  
Following the myopic assumption, let )()0(Pr)1( ββ jjjj XuXobIP Φ=>+==
be the description of the process whereby the PA decides whether to inform an ejido, 
where Xj is a set of ejido characteristics observed by the PA (and the analyst). This 
selection equation sorts ejidos into those that are called upon to decide on the adoption of 
the program and those that are excluded from such decision. For the latter group, the 
indicator variable A that takes the value of one is the Procede is adopted and zero if 
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rejected is a missing value. For the ejidos in the former group, the probability that the 
Procede is adopted is a function of a set of ejido-level characteristics as of 1993, Zj.  
Let )()0(Pr)1( γβ jjjj ZvZobAP Φ=>+==  be the process that describes the 
selection of ejidos into those that adopt the program and those that reject it. The model 
can then be written in its structural form as:
(1)      )()0(Pr)1( γβ jjjj ZvZobAP Φ=>+==
Aj observed only if Ij=1
)()0(Pr)1( ββ jjjj XuXobIP Φ=>+==
);,0(~ 2uNu σ );,0(~ 2vNv σ ρ=),( vucorr
The likelihood of this function can be found in Greene (2003, pp. 713-14) and is 
estimated using Stata’s ‘Heckprob’ procedure. White’s robust variance estimator is used 
in order to account for the heteroscedasticity in the data. 
When the PA predicts the chance of success on the basis of the ejidos’ 
characteristics and incorporates that prediction into its selection process, model (1) is not 
appropriate. As the PA does the first move, the supply equation will incorporate both the 
determinants of supply and demand side of model (1). We model then the supply model 
as a probit using the full sample of 190 ejidos for which information is available. 
The demand for the Procede, also modeled as a probit, will use information only 
from those ejidos that have been targeted, a total of 166 observations. The determinants 
included in this model are those that appear in the acceptance equation (1), thus a subset 
of the determinants of the supply equation in the forward-looking behavior model just 
discussed. 
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Finally we further restrict the sample to those ejidos that have accepted the 
program, a total of 128 ejidos, and examine the probability of successfully completing the 
program. The objective is to determine whether there are any determinants of acceptance 
that are not relevant in the process of completion of the program. 
A sequence of Probits is therefore applied to Ii (full sample), Aj (targeted ejidos) 
and Pj limited to ejidos with I=1 (ejidos that have accepted entering the program). 
Comparing the succession of results provides insights as to how the role of the various 
ejido characteristics changes according to the stage of the Procede process one is. As 
before, we use White’s robust variance estimator to control for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. 
4.4.  Results
The estimates of the parameters of the structural equations are found in table 4.2. 
Alternative specifications were attempted and although the maximization process 
converges to a concave point of the likelihood function surface, invariably the estimate of 
ρ hits its boundary value of –1. The lack of robustness of the ‘structural’ model can be 
interpreted as a rejection of the myopic assumption. We therefore move directly to 
examine the results of the probit equations obtained on the basis of the ‘forward-looking-
behavior’ assumption.  
We start from the targeting equation, column 1 in table 4.3.  Concerning the 
importance of measurement costs, ejidos that are located in mountainous regions (proxied 
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by altitude) are less likely to be contacted40. The size of the ejido, on the other hand, has a 
positive sign. This contradicts our initial hypothesis. One way to rationalize it, already 
discussed in the previous section, is that the ejido’s extension could give rise to 
economies of scale in measurement due to the presence of fixed costs as well as 
contributing positively to the ability of the PA to lobby for the protracted support of the 
program by the government. Thus, the PA might be interested in presenting its 
operational results in terms of  the amount of land certified within a given year. Notice 
that the number of ejidatarios is controlled for.
Although the sign of the coefficient on the number of ejidatarios is consistent with 
the notion that administrative costs raise with the number of ejidatarios, this motivation 
(i.e. the administrative cost motivation) cannot be identified  from the conflict motivation 
which also explains the negative relationship between the number of ejidatarios and the 
probability for a given ejido to be targeted by the PA. The number of ejidatarios and of 
posesionarios both have a negative impact on the probability of involvement (or program 
delivery). The sign on the posesionarios coefficient is negative and identifies the 
(expected) conflict resolution cost motivation as posesionarios are not involved in the 
assembly that approves the advances of the Procede, but might instead represent a factor 
of opposition to the program’s implementation. As we shall see in the last section of this 
chapter, posesionarios are likely to be opponents rather than supporters of the Procede. 
Of the variables that according to our previous discussion should characterize the demand 
for the Procede, only two are somewhat significant (except for the dummy denoting a 
40 It might be argued that ejidos located at higher altitudes are more difficult to reach. On the other hand, as 
travel time to the nearest urban area is controlled for, this result is to imputed to the rougher topography of 
mountainous ejidos.
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communal ejido)41. One is the value of yields per hectare. Provided more fertile and 
economically productive land is subject to more land-related conflicts, these tend to 
become less of an issue from the point of view of the PA as the ejidos become more 
remote. The second is the percentage of ejidatarios that rents  land in, which appears with 
a positive sign. An active land rental market is expected to generate a demand for 
stronger land rights. What is puzzling is that one would expect the percentage of 
ejidatarios leasing land out also to positively affect such demand. That might be 
explained by considering that a high percentage of ejidatarios  renting land out might 
signal stronger informal land rights. Thus, the percentage of ejidatarios renting land in 
might be a better proxy, probably manifesting a demand driven pressure for land. 
    The presence of conflicts over use of the commons and boundaries of the ejido 
seem not to be a deterrent for the PA. This is a striking result, as it suggests that perhaps 
the PA is not considering either of these type of conflict particularly insurmountable.  
The acceptance equation delivers mainly two results. First, conflicts over ejido 
borders are likely to lead to a rejection of the Procede. We have just seen that this type of 
conflict is not important in explaining the targeting of a given ejido. Thus, the importance 
of this type of conflict in the acceptance equation lies in the fact that many ejidos refuse 
to give up on their conflicts (which would be the typical request of the PA in order to 
speed the certification process) and rather opt for staying out of the program. This is most 
41 A rough test of the forward looking behavior hypothesis is to test that the coefficients on: population 
pressure and its interaction with travel time, yields and their interaction with travel time, percentage of 
ejidatarios renting land in and out, per capita common land and its interaction with travel time, the dummy 
for common lands used for agricultural production, the concentration of land holdings and its interaction 
with per capita common lands, and the dummies signaling association with an ejido organization and the 
presence of a register in the ejido, all are simultaneously equal to zero. The null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at the 15% confidence level. That result lends some support to the notion that the PA bureaucracy 
was advancing on a centralized base and did not use in its planning detailed ejido-level information 
obtainable from its field staff. Rather, crude indicators were used in order to simplify the selection process 
of ejidos to be targeted.  
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likely due to the opposition by the ejidatarios to come to a compromise over these types 
of conflicts that involve neighbors that might have had a troubled history with an ejido 
since its foundations. Moreover, these types of conflicts typically involve large tracts of 
land so that a settlement might entail the risk for some ejidatarios or for the whole 
community to lose part of that land. 
Second, although the amount of common lands per capita has the right sign (i.e. 
positive), it fails to be significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on the interaction term 
between per capita commons and travel time to nearest urban center is negative, although 
very small.  These results weakly suggest that as the distance from the nearest urban area 
increases, the value of land (which is a function of yields and the cost of transporting 
crops to the market), including the commons, decreases; in turn this leads to less 
incentives for dividing the commons. 
Third, the concentration of per capita landholdings interacted with the amount of 
per capita common lands is positive and significant at the 10% level. Thus, the more 
unequal the distribution of land endowments within an ejido, the higher the probability of 
accepting the program. As within ejidos the variance of land holdings increases, the 
larger will be the group of ejidatarios with an amount of land above a given threshold. If 
these holdings were the result of past appropriations through the internal land black 
market or through violence, these ejidatarios may in fact want to regularize their 
holdings. Notice that in spite of the fact that the Procede is decentralized and democratic 
program, in fact the last assembly, which is called upon to finalize the Procede, needs 
only half of the ejidatarios to be valid. A majority of ejidatarios in favor of the Procede is 
then sufficient to let the program be approved. As a result, the Procede can be finalized 
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with 25% of the ejidatarios plus one. Thus, a motivated and well organized minority can 
have success. Clearly less opposition would be preferred. One would then expect that by 
compensating the smaller ejidatarios by agreeing to the redistribution of large tracts of 
the commons, the larger ejidatarios would have better chances of regularizing their past 
acquisitions of lands. In fact, the data suggest that this is indeed the case as more per 
capita common lands improve the impact of land inequality on the adoption decision.  
This result is in stark contrast to the one reported in Deininger and Bresciani (2001) 
where it was hypothesized that the Procede would be favored by the small ejidatarios and 
opposed by the larger ones.  
 Fourth, communal ejidos are characterized by an ‘institutional’ aversion to the 
Procede, perhaps because of the program’s objective of strengthening individual land 
rights relative to common land rights. Communal ejidos have the reputation of being 
characterized by strong customary tenure rights and if these are successful at keeping 
land conflicts low, a program like Procede might in fact appear redundant if not 
counterproductive42. 
Fifth, yields interacted with travel time (i.e. distance or infrastructure 
development) enters with a positive sign, in contrast to the targeting equation as 
previously discussed. Why is that the case? One plausible explanation calls into question 
migration incentives. To the extent that household members in remote ejidos need to 
migrate permanently to participate in non-farm activities, they might display a demand 
for secure land rights so as to reduce the risk of dispossession by community members 
left behind. The likelihood of such event is expected to depend on the value of the land in 
42 See Platteau (1996) on a forceful discussion of the negative impact of titling programs in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where customary rights are typically strong. 
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question, which in turn can be reasonably be proxied with yields. Yet, this explanation is 
difficult to reconcile with the interaction of travel time with yields. Instead, a plausible 
explanation is that productive ejidos located in more remote areas of the country may be 
characterized by a higher demand for land rentals given the little scope available to 
households for diversifying their income sources. Thus, the more productive the land, the 
higher the demand for tenure security and stronger land rights. In addition, the higher 
demand for land rights will increase with the remoteness of the ejido, a factor associated 
with greater specialization in farming.  
Regarding the probability of an ejido finalizing the Procede (column 3 of table 
4.3), notice that the number of posesionarios is a significant obstacle. As their numbers 
increase the expected number of conflicts over individual parcels and common lands is 
likely to increase. Posesionarios have much fewer rights than ejidatarios and might risk 
from the process of conflict resolution within the ejido.  
Overall, these results suggest that the certification of the ejidos has been driven to 
a large degree by the strategy adopted by the PA in order to maximize its objective 
function. Yet, there are also important ejido characteristics that determine whether an 
ejido will accept the implications and results of the programs, showing that the goal of 
titling all ejidos will not necessarily be met within the present setup provided by the 
Procede. In fact, the results suggest the ejidos pending certification will be mainly 
characterized by a large number of ejidatarios, a higher value of yields ( a factor 
associated with individual conflicts), the presence of persistent border conflicts, and 
location into mountainous areas. These characteristics will make it difficult for the PA to 
advance towards a completion of the certification process as time advances. 
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Paradoxically, those ejidos were conflict resolution would be most warranted are likely to 
be left behind and unless sufficient resources are fielded to take care of these situations, it 
might very well be that the program will be terminated on the grounds that it has been 
successful in its advances when in fact that success has been achieved by targeting less 
problematic ejidos first. For example, ejidos characterized by border conflicts 
(presumably an important type of conflict given the community attitude in rejecting the 
Procede) and a relatively high ‘density’ of posesionarios have been excluded from the 
program’s initial phase. This observation signals a major institutional weakness in a 
program like the Procede. As bureaucrats of the PA need to show progress in order to 
receive additional funds, they tend to ‘cue’  ejidos placing in the front those that are 
characterized by fewer conflicts and leaving at the end those that are most in need of 
conflict resolution. Thus, the PA bureaucrats might face the wrong system of incentives 
in organizing the advance of the program. 
Where customary land rights are enough strong the program will have less 
chances of being adopted. Communal ejidos, where customary rights are typically 
stronger, represent about 10% of all communities. Excluding those communities is not 
necessarily a negative aspect and in fact, it might make more sense to think of a different 
program designed to accommodate their specific characteristics and demands.  
4.5. Characterizing support and opposition to the Procede
Given the above results, it is of interest to gain a first, even though partial, view of 
who is likely to gain or lose from the implementation of a program such as Procede. To 
see this, we rely on information collected with the 1997 survey on the judgment that 
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ejidatarios manifest over the ‘goodness’ of the Procede. We model their positive attitude 
towards the program as a binary variable that take the value of one if they have a positive 
judgment, zero otherwise.  A Probit model is used to explain the ejidatario’s attitude as a 
function of individual characteristics and ‘location’ (i.e. distance from nearest urban 
center – a proxy for land values and off-farm income opportunities). Individual 
characteristics are: age, gender, education, size of landholdings, participation to the land 
market in 1993 (leasing in or out land), the amount of cows owned, whether the ejidatario 
had access to common lands, and whether she is a posesionario. 
The results are presented in table 4.4. They show three important results that will 
be useful in the analysis that will follow in the next chapters. First, ejidatarios leasing 
land out in 1993 were favorable to the Procede. Second, their attitude becomes more 
positive as the amount of landholdings in 1993 increases. Third, posesionarios have a 
negative perception of the Procede. These results suggest that among the gainers from the 
Procede’s implementation one would find large ejidatarios that are interested in 
participating to the land market on the supply side. Within the ejidos there are groups of 
winners and losers from the process of certification and regularization of individual 
rights. 
110
Table 4. 1: Motivations for participating and rejecting Procede
Reasons for participating in the Procede (%)
Obtain tenure security 85.2
Comply with governmental requirement 14.8
Solve border problems 27.0
To rent and sell land 9.0
To access credit 11.1
To access Procampo 4.2
To invest more in land 1.1
Total # ejidos 189
# Certified ejidos 51
# Ejidos in process 138
% of Surveyed ejidos (certified and in process) 64.1
Reasons for not participating in the Procede (%)
Lack of information about program 35.1
Were not convened 2.1
Lacked documents 5.2
To avoid taxes 13.4
To avoid land transactions 2.1
No interest in buying/selling lands 1.0
Problems with parcels' borders 16.5
Avoid conflicts ejidatarios and posesionarios 7.2
Total # ejidos 97
% of Surveyed ejidos 33.9
Source: 1997 Ejido Survey
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Table 4. 2: Determinants of Procede adoption, ‘structural model.’
(1) (2)
Prob. Accept Prob. Targeted
Population density 0.033
[0.343]
Pop. Den. * travel time 0.000
[0.152]
Value of yields (per hec) 0.001 -0.000
[0.587] [1.189]
Yields * travel time 0.000**
[2.072]
% leasing land in -0.011
[1.211]
% leasing land out -0.003
[0.334]
Trav time, nearest urban -0.000 -0.005*
[0.067] [1.765]




Conflict on commons, D -0.110 -0.642*
[0.374] [1.714]
Conflicts on borders, D -0.771** 0.105
[2.494] [0.278]




Landh. con.*Commons p.c. 0.000*
[1.713]
Is associated, D -0.259
[1.116]
Has internal registry, D -0.129
[0.537]








Size of the ejido 0.049**
[2.529]
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# Observations 190 190
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Heckman Probit: Maximum Likelihood
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Pop. Density 0.006 0.008 0.002
[0.385] [0.432] [0.640]
Density*Trav time 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
[0.825] [0.095] [1.308]
Yields (value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.467] [0.711] [1.274]
Yields*Trav time -0.000* 0.000** 0.000
[1.889] [2.037] [0.757]
% leasing in 0.002* -0.002 -0.001
[1.717] [1.066] [0.200]
% leasing out -0.000 -0.000 -0.006**
[0.563] [0.209] [2.063]
Commons per capita -0.000 0.000 -0.000
[0.394] [0.749] [1.492]
Comm p.c*trav time 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000
[0.373] [3.021] [1.062]
Conflict commons, D -0.035 -0.043 0.087
[1.018] [0.679] [0.798]
Conflict borders, D 0.000 -0.169*** -0.172*
[0.003] [2.736] [1.672]
Cultiv commons, D -0.021 0.010 0.075
[1.145] [0.222] [0.911]
Land inequality, D 0.001 -0.070 0.173**
[0.043] [1.510] [2.366]
Land ineq*pc commons 0.000 0.000 0.000**
[0.709] [1.619] [2.166]
Associated, D -0.009 -0.041 -0.287***
[0.529] [0.933] [3.489]
Internal registry, D 0.011 -0.029 0.159**
[0.696] [0.693] [2.057]
Comunal tenure -0.003 -0.542**
[0.108] [2.558]
Size of ejido (has) 0.003**
[1.968]





Travel time -0.000 -0.000 0.000
[1.429] [0.159] [0.199]
Observations 190 166 128
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4. 4: Determinants of positive attitude towards Procede adoption
Probit
(Marginal Effects)
Head of household education (years) 0.004
[0.824]
Head of household age -0.001
[0.877]
Head of household male (dummy) -0.004
[0.067]
Head’s primary activity non agriculture, D -0.058
[0.484]
Leasing in land in 1993 (dummy) 0.029
[0.562]
Leasing out land in 1993 (dummy) 0.120**
[2.541]
Land endowment (hectares) 0.002*
[1.838]
Cattle herd size -0.001
[1.643]
Had access to commons in 1993 -0.038
[1.409]
Posesionario in 1993 -0.415***
[6.253]
Travel time to nearest urban center -0.001
[1.453]
Observations 1190
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Controls for cluster effects
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Chapter 5: The Impact of Procede on Ejido Land Markets
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter we analyze the impact of the Procede and other variables reflecting 
institutional features of the ejido sector on the land rental decisions. A positive impact 
would imply that in those ejidos where the Procede was adopted transaction costs 
associated with weaker property rights had in fact been a factor limiting the entrance into 
the land market or reducing the amount of land supplied to the market 
In chapter 4 the determinants of Procede were analyzed and it was found that the 
program had in fact been ‘supplied’ by the bureaucrats to the ejidos in a non-random 
fashion and according to certain observable ejido characteristics. This raises the 
possibility that when analyzing individual decisions, treating the program as if it were 
exogenous might bias our results. Thus, in estimating land rental decisions we shall be 
very careful in assessing the assumption of exogeneity of the Procede dummy, which is 
our key explanatory variable. 
The next section will provide detailed descriptive evidence concerning ejidos land 
markets. Section 3 will review the empirical strategy followed in this chapter, while 
section 4 will analyze econometrically the impact of Procede and other variables, 
identifying institutional features at the ejido and household level that influence rental 
decisions. Section 5 will then test whether adoption of Procede has affected the choice of 
the contractual counterparts in ejido land markets. Finally, section 6 discusses the 
findings of this chapter.
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5.2. Descriptive evidence of ejido land markets
To better understand the nature of the variables used in the analysis, we provide in 
this chapter some descriptive evidence of the available information on ejido land markets. 
More rigorous econometric analysis will then uncover the relationship among variables 
otherwise not distinguishable by looking at simple means. 
The decision to rent out land is affected by several factors, among which the 
literature signals as the most prominent the cost of screening and monitoring hired labor; 
missing markets for non-tradable inputs, uncertainty in the labor supply, and the failure 
of insurance markets (e.g. Sadoulet et al., 1998). Some institutions, or contractual 
arrangements, play a key role in modulating the impact of these factors on the final 
decision to lease land. Legal prohibition to rent land are found in many countries, 
analogously to the case of Mexico’s ejidos before the 1992 reform. In some settings 
cultural norms may inhibit or limit the functioning of land rental markets (e.g. inter-cast 
land transactions in India). Finally, where the legal ‘infrastructure’ does not support land 
ownership or use rights, landowners may refrain from entering the land rental market due 
to the fear of losing the control of their property. We will not look here into the theory 
underlying the choice between cash and sharecropping arrangements, which is well 
developed in the literature43. Yet it is worth fleshing out some facts regarding contractual 
arrangements that characterize Mexico’s land rental markets44.
Besides cash rent, sharecropping is widespread in Mexico. Sharecropping 
arrangements and the division of revenues take various forms depending on the 
43 Recommended readings on the subject are Sadoulet, Murgai and de Janvry (1998) or Otsuka and Hayami 
(1988).
44 Procuraduría Agraria (1998) provides a detailed description of the contractual arrangements existing in 
Mexico’s ejidos using census-type of information collected during the implementation of the Procede. 
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contribution to costs by the two parties in the agreement. As in many other countries, the 
percentage of revenues going to the sharecropper depends on the amount of inputs 
contributed by the sharecropper, such as animal or mechanical traction, water, and 
liquidity to finance commercial inputs. As Finkler (1978) has shown, in Mexico’s ejidos 
sharecroppers are quite entrepreneurial individuals that enter into agreements with co-
villagers that otherwise would not have enough liquidity to purchase the optimal amount 
of inputs. In the villages examined by Finkler, sharecroppers were identified as 
individuals that had ramified connections with traders, input providers, and local 
authorities regulating access to irrigation. These attributes can be regarded as non-traded 
inputs that increase the convenience for both landlords and tenants of entering into 
leasing arrangements.   
Besides the traditional arguments that see sharecropping as an optimal response 
by both landlords and tenants to risk and imperfect markets, contractual arrangements 
may also depend on the degree to which tenure is secure. Sadoulet et al. (1998) and de 
Janvry et al. (2002) have pointed out that sharecropping can also be preferred to cash 
rents on the grounds that by requiring some commitment in the production process it 
reduces the landlord’s risk of losing the land to the tenant. In the case of Mexico’s ejidos, 
this hypothesis has as a corollary that Procede, by reinforcing tenure security, should 
favor cash rents vis a vis sharecropping.  Notice that the choice of sharecropping as 
means of reducing the risk of losing the land rented out implies that some other 
opportunity of increasing income is foregone by the landlord. Cash contracts allow for 
example the landlord to increase the supply of labor off-farm. Thus, tenure insecurity 
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may exact its toll on income by forcing landlords to prefer an otherwise sub-optimal 
contractual arrangement.  
Another common form among of leasing land in Mexico is that of the loan 
(prestamo). Borrowing or lending land is often matched by transactions in other markets, 
analogously to inter-linked transactions often cited in the literature on institutional 
economics applied to agricultural contracts (see Bardhan, 1984). Thus, the fact that the 
rent declared by interviewed ejidatarios is nominally equal to zero in the case of loaned 
land obsures the fact that there indeed is some sort of compensation attached to such 
transaction. We therefore shall not exclude land loans from our analysis below and a 
dummy variable will signal that this specific type of arrangements characterizes a 
particular observation.   
Table 5.1 provides a more detailed description with respect to our sample of 
households of rental decisions in 1993 and 1994 compared to that reported in chapter 1. 
Leasing decisions are divided into rentals, sharecropping contracts, and land loans. It 
immediately appears that the amount of land rental going on in the ejidos in 1997 is quite 
limited. While this is indeed so by European and North American, European, and Asian 
standards, it is quite in line with the rental activity documented for other Latin American 
countries (see de Janvry et al. 2002).  Second, as discussed in chapter 1, there has been an 
increase in the total amount of land rentals between 1994 and 1997, following a trend that 
had already started back in 1990 and which is probably attributable to the effect of the 
1992 reforms. We then notice that between 1994 and 1997 both leases in and leases out 
increased considerably, and more so the latter compared to the former. While land loans 
(i.e. loans and borrowings) remained relatively stable, the increase in leasing was mainly 
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due the increase in share contracts and rentals. Looking at the first two columns, one can 
see that total leases in have increased by similar percentages in titled and untitled ejidos 
(plus 2.4 and 3.0 percent). On the other hand, total leases out were higher in titled ejidos 
(5.9%) than in untitled ejidos (2.8%). Finally, in terms of composition, there seems to be 
no significant difference between titled and untitled ejidos in terms of contract patterns. 
We then look at contract characteristics for the crop year 1996/97, which are 
reported in table 5.2. Looking at the last column, we notice that land apt for cultivation of 
grain crops (corn primarily) is the main type of land on the market, both in leasing in and 
leasing out contracts. The pattern is stable across titled and untitled ejidos. The second 
part of the table examines the characteristics of the counterpart in the contractual 
arrangement. Some asymmetries should be mentioned. First, almost 50% of the 
ejidatarios that lease in do so from a relative, while only 26% of those leasing out do so 
to a relative. This asymmetry can be explained by looking at the status of the 
counterparts. While 23% of the rental out contracts involve as a counterpart a private 
landed farmer (26% if we include landless farmers), in the case of rental in contracts this 
share drops to 7%. These figures are consistent with the idea that in land-related 
contractual relationships family and community ties dominate exchanges such as those 
taking place between members of different ejido communities or with private farmers. 
In a regime in which rental out entails fewer transaction costs, one would expect a 
high percentage of renters to be small farmers and landless households. Landless farmers 
within the ejido (i.e. avecindados) and landless agricultural workers constitute around 
24% of the rental out contracts; 29% in uncertified ejidos and 22% in certified ejidos. 
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In 77% of the leasing in contracts, the counterpart is an ejidatario, implying that 
when ejidatarios expand their farm size they do so mostly within the community’s 
boundaries. This is quite natural considering that renting in land from farmers outside the 
community entails transaction costs attached perhaps to greater distances to be dealt with 
as compared to land located within the community. But ejidatarios might also be 
discriminated against in the private land market due to their role in the historical process 
of land expropriation. Overall, this suggests that by liberalizing land rentals, the 1992 
reforms have quite surely improved the legal access to landless farmers belonging to the 
ejido. To the extent that Procede has further improved the functioning of land markets, 
the program could be an important redistributive impact in favor of landless farmers. 
Thirdly, we do not observe major differences between titled and untitled ejidos in 
terms of counterpart characteristics, except for some more involvement of outsiders of 
the ejido in the case of rental out contracts in titled ejidos (74% versus 80%).  Although 
the difference is explained by a higher participation of farmers belonging to other ejidos, 
this difference is consistent with a more open land market in titled ejidos compared to 
untitled ejidos. 
An important aspect of land rentals in the ejido sector concerns the tenure status 
of the land being transacted. For example, among rent-in contracts common land appears 
more frequently in uncertified ejidos, reflecting two points. First, uncertified ejidos are
more likely to include communal ejidos, which were excluded from the Procede until the 
end of 1997 and a large portion of land in communal ejidos is typically under common 
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land tenure45.  Second, leases of communal land involve more leases-in than leases-out. 
This would be expected given the weaker rights that can be claimed on communal lands 
by its occupants, making leasing out communal land perhaps more risky than leasing out 
ejido land, whether titled or not. The difference between the leasing in and out on 
communal lands reflects probably the fact that the community tacitly approves most of 
the leases in while the leases out  (of lands which may in fact happen to be illegally 
occupied) are done individually and possibly require a more explicit consent by the 
community. 
Other characteristics that are worth mentioning concern the land quality and the 
degree of formality of leasing contracts. First, land rented out is more likely to have 
access to irrigation than land rented in. This asymmetry is consistent with the greater 
involvement of private farmers in out-leases than in in-leases and with the fact that 
private farmers tend to be relatively better endowed than ejidatarios with assets for 
cultivating land and better access to credit. Second, lease contracts are predominantly 
informal and short in terms of duration, with one year of leasing on average.  
That land leases in Mexico seem to be characterized, if not plagued, by short 
duration, anticipated payments, and informality is confirmed by Secretaria Reforma 
Agraria (1998).  The traditional informality of land rental contracts might be a signal that 
ejidos as communities are able to provide some sort of enforcement by which contracts 
are honored. Yet, the fact that most cash contracts are paid in advance suggests that this 
might not be the case after all and that advanced payment in fact makes formal contracts 
45 The reason why not all land in communal ejidos is common land is that there are communal ejidos that in 
all respect resemble typical ejidos, in that members have exclusive individual rights defined over parcels. 
This is basically a misclassification issue.
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irrelevant46.  The fact that rental contracts in Mexico’s ejidos commonly provide for an 
upfront payment of the rents has been documented in other studies (Procuraduría Agraria, 
1998; 2000).
To better appreciate the working of ejido land markets, we examine household 
and productive characteristics in table 5.3. Information is broken down by type of market 
participation in 1994 and 1997. We notice the following. First, the average head of the 
household is endowed with very little human capital. Those farmers leasing in have on 
average slightly more human capital than the rest. Second, heads of households are old by 
Mexican standards (and are becoming increasingly older). There appears to be no 
substantial difference across type of market participants. Third, land assets of farmers 
renting out are on average larger, while they are quite similar across households that rent 
land in or do not participate to the market. Fourth, farmers renting out have more access 
to irrigation than the rest. In particular, autarkic farmers are endowed with land with the 
scarcest access to irrigation. While farmers leasing in are endowed with less irrigated 
land as compared to farmers leasing out, they are advantaged with respect to autarkic 
farmers, signaling that participating into the land market by leasing in land requires some 
acquired productive potential. 
On average, farmers own small stocks of mules and oxen. Cow stocks are instead 
more important, especially among those that rent in land. This may be interpreted as 
another signal of the productive background that justifies entrance into the land market; 
something remarked by the fact that being a recipient of Procampo payments, and owning 
46 On the other hand, ejidos might ‘supply’ some sort of enforcement regarding non-monetary provisions of 
contracts such as not mistreating the land or some the structures located on it (fences, wells, etc). 
Unfortunately, we have no data on the type of legal problems and conflicts that landlords and tenants have 
typically experienced so that the role of the ejido as an effective local authority in backing contractual 
arrangements cannot be identified.
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a truck or a tractor are more frequent among farmers that rent in than among those renting 
out. Farmers renting in are also characterized by a higher amount of per capita transfers 
received through the Procampo payment47. Looking at differences in assets and transfers 
is important in explaining a positive association between wealth and leasing. Wealthier 
farmers face less liquidity constraints and manage better risk, thereby raising the 
propensity to expand farm size.  
The data suggest that access to irrigation surprisingly has a positive impact on 
renting out. One hypothesis that can be attempted on the basis of the available evidence is 
that an important part of the land rental market activity is centered on irrigated land and 
that farmers with a higher ratio of productive assets relative to irrigated land are those 
that rent in, while those with a lower ratio of productive assets to irrigated land are those 
that rent out. This would be consistent with the notion that access to productive capital is 
restricted by endowed liquidity (see also Finkler, 1978, cited above). 
Summarizing, we find some evidence that ejido land markets do allow landless 
farmers to access land; in particular landless community members (e.g. avecindados) do 
participate actively in the land market; participation by outside farmers is somewhat 
greater in certified ejidos; possession of communal lands limits participation in the land 
rental market; leasing in is associated with better endowment of productive assets. In the 
next sections we shall examine whether these initial inferences stand up to more rigorous 
econometric testing. 
47 We look at per capita Procampo payments as a means of normalizing total Procampo receipts. Dividing 
by hectares operated does not provide much variation as Procampo payments by design tend to be the same 
on a per hectare basis.
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5.3. Econometric methodology
The model elaborated in chapter 3 provides the basic framework for the empirical 
analysis of the role of tenure security and property rights in the ejido land markets The 






























where RI* and RO* are respectively the latent rental out and rental in equations for 
individual i in village j at time t; Xijt is a vector of household characteristics (to be 
specified later) that influence land rental decisions; Pj is the Procede dummy, which has 
the same value across all household living in village j;  Lijt is the land endowment of the 
individual and includes cultivated and fallow land and natural pastures; Nijt is the number 
of adult household members, where adults are defined as those household members older 
than 15 years; µij is a household-specific dummy that captures the effect that 
unobservable (to the econometrician) household characteristics may have on rental 
decisions. Depending on whether these unobservable effects may be assumed to be 
correlated or not with the observable characteristics the appropriate estimation approach 
is fixed effects or random effects respectively. While uijt  is the usual random error term, 
assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and variance σij, the term ja
represents unobservable time invariant, village-level effects that affect rental decisions by 
individual households in village j in the same direction. These effects may as well include 
social norms and commitments that bind households to each other and which might be 
rooted in the village’s history and modality of foundation. We assume that aj is 
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distributed normally with mean zero and variance σa2. The question is whether it is 
uncorrelated with all other variables included in either (1) or (2). We develop this 
possibility below.
As corner solutions associated with (1) and (2) cannot be ruled out, these two 
equations generate the following model in terms of observables:
(1’)   ∗= ijtijt RORO      if   0>
∗
ijtRO    and   0=ijtRO  otherwise
(2’)   ∗= ijtijt RIRI        if     0>
∗
ijtRI   and     0=ijtRI   otherwise
Given the likelihood that the Procede is not allocated randomly across villages, 
we need to develop an estimation framework that allows incorporating unobserved time-
invariant and/or village-member-invariant village level effects. These effects can be 
assumed to be fixed, thereby allowing for correlation with the explanatory variables. 
Alternatively, one can assume they are random, in which case the implicit assumption is 
that they are orthogonal with respect to the set of explanatory variables. 
It is well known that in the traditional context of models with corner solutions consistent 
estimates of the parameters cannot be obtained due to the incidental parameter problem48. 
To overcome this limitation, we follow the approach elaborated by Chamberlain (1984) 
and suggested by Wooldridge (2001) that assumes that unobserved fixed effects can be 
modeled as linear projections of averaged explanatory variables plus a random effects 
48 This problem could in principle be overcome by applying either semi-parametric methods devised by 
Honoré (1992) or by estimating the model using simulated maximum likelihood methods as in Carter and 
Yao (2002). We did not attempt to follow the latter method in view of the warning in Carter and Yao 
(2002) that the computational burden is significant and that the set of explanatory variables needs to be 
quite restricted. We prefer to maintain the richness of our specification in terms of explanatory variables. 
Concerning the Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) approach elaborated by Honoré, we 
attempted to apply it to our data, but without success. The reason of such failure might be the fact that 
almost 85% of the households do not participate on at least one side of the rental market.
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term. Mundlak (1978) has shown that in the context of linear panel data GLS estimation 
of such model is identical to estimation of a fixed effects estimator. 
Going back to equations (1) and (2), assume that the unobserved term ja , 
common to all households living in the same ejido, is in fact correlated with individual 
and ejido-level variables, including the Procede dummy and is time invariant. If one 
thinks about the historical process that has brought an ejido into existence, it is plausible 
to suspect that many individual variables could in fact be correlated with ejido 
characteristics that are potentially unobservable to the analyst, such as cultural specificity 
and institutions forged by a long process of interaction. Ejidos were formed as a result of 
landless peasants occupying a tract of land, which was then allocated on an egalitarian
basis by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (SRA). The presence of common lands and 
other ‘public goods’ shared among ejidatarios also implied frequent interaction and 
influence on household-level decisions. Although there might be a tendency for ejidos to 
display some degree of heterogeneity among member households, the origin of this 
institution is grounded in egalitarian principles, at least at the level of a given community 
and one would expect that the initial homogeneity across households in terms of 
endowments has survived at least to some degree among ejidatarios. The above implies 
that  a correlation between Pij and the village-specific component of the error term may in 
fact exist. To deal with such correlation, the appropriate way to proceed would be to 
assume that such unobserved effects are in fact fixed rather than random. As the 
dependent variables are censored, the need to use a Tobit approach raises the difficulty of 
relying on the assumption of the effects being fixed. Given the impossibility of 
concentrating the fixed effects out of the likelihood function (Greene 2000), one way to 
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overcome such constraint is to resort to Chamberlain’s approach to modeling unobserved 
effects (see Wooldridge, 2001, pp. 540-542) as specified in Mundlak (1978). This 
consists in modeling the unobserved effects as a linear projection of the explanatory 
variables or a subset of these. In particular, let "' | jtjtijt WWZ =   be a NTx(KW1+KW2)
matrix, where N is the number of households in the sample, T is the number of panels (2 
in our case), KW1 is the number of village time variant observable  variables and KW2 the 
number of village time-invariant observable variables. Assuming that 
ijtj Za | ~ ),(
2





,  we can re-write equation (1) as:
(1’’)   ),0max( 11 ijtaijijtijt uZXRO ++++= ηξβψ
where: 10 ψψψ += ; ηa|Zijt~ N(0, σa2); and where (1’) has been taken into account in 
restating the functional form for the dependent variable. A similar series of steps can be 
applied to (2) and (2’). Notice that averaged time-invariant village observable variables 
will be equal to their original observation-specific value by definition. Thus, when 
interpreting the results, one will not be able to separate the effect of those variables at the 
individual level from that imputable to the linear representation of the village-specific 
effects. 
Having specified a specific functional form for the village specific effects, we are 
left with the presence of potential household-level effects. Their inclusion would 
complicate considerably the estimation process. Moreover, as we have just explained, it 
is more village-level effects that are likely, if at all, to generate correlation between 
household assets and the error term in (1). Although heterogeneity in terms of 
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entrepreneurial ability might well exist, we hope that inclusion of education, gender, and 
age variables will capture a substantial portion of it.  
Notice that testing that jointly the community variables have no explanatory 
power, i.e. testing ξ1=0, is equivalent to testing that the Procede adoption variable is in 
fact uncorrelated with the error term in (1). .  
To summarize, we estimate equations (1) and (2) specified as follows:
(1’’’)  ),0max( 1 ijtajj
o
ijtijt uZXRO ++++= ηξβψ
(2’’’)  ),0max( 1 ijtajij
i
ijtijt uZXRI ++++= ηξβψ
under the assumption that the unobserved individual effects are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables. 
We have mentioned the fact that pooling data from the two surveys yields more 
observations and time variance, yet reduces the set of information available on some 
institutional aspects one may want to explore in relation to the evolution of land rights in 
the ejidos. Therefore, we repeat the above steps limiting the estimation to data from the 
1997 survey. A comparison of coefficients will allow gauging the extent to which relying 
on the 1997 survey data only will produce qualitatively different results. 
5.4. Results
To specialize to the problem at hand the theoretical model of land rental decisions 
presented in chapter 3 and outlined in the previous section, we posit that the amount of 
land rented in and rented out is a function of the following set of variables: 
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Head of the household characteristics: the age of the household head and its 
square, the education of the household head, and a dummy equal to one if the household 
head is male.
Household productive assets: the number of adult household members; the size of 
land endowments and of the land endowment squared, the number of oxen owned, the 
number of tractors owned, the number of pick-ups and trucks owned, the size of the cow 
herd, a dummy equal to one if the household cultivates perennials or horticultural crops. 
As shown in equation (1) and (2), we also allow for land endowments and number of 
adult household members to interact with the Procede dummy to test implications of 
certification for factor market efficiency. Finally, the share of land endowments with 
access to irrigation is also included. 
Institutions:  the Procede adoption dummy; the share of owned land that is 
private; the share of owned land that is communal under individual exploitation; a 
dummy for whether the village is a comunidad; the size of the village population; a 
dummy equal to one if the ejido has common lands cultivated or used for grazing 
livestock; a dummy signaling the existence of a roster of internal rules – or registro; and 
three dummies signaling the presence of conflicts or disputes with neighboring ejidos or 
private landowners, among ejidatarios on parcel borders, and on delimitation of common 
lands. 
Ejido infrastructure: total travel time to the nearest urban center; the size of the 
population – also a proxy for the size of the ‘internal’ ejido land market (pobtota); the 
number of urban areas within one hour of transportation (menosu).  
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Table 5.4 reports the results of the Tobit estimates of equations (1) and (2) using 
the panel of data obtained from the 1994 and 1997 surveys. Both equations were initially 
estimated by maximum likelihood methods assuming the unobserved effects being the 
sum of random effects component and a linear projection component based on village 
averages of the explanatory variables. 
For the rental out equation, a Chi2 test of the null that the random effects and 
pooled model do not differ systematically was rejected at the 5% level of significance. In 
the case of rental in equation convergence under the assumption of random errors was not 
achieved as the estimate of the panel component of the overall error term tended to 
‘explode’ to infinity. Thus, the latter equation was estimated using a Tobit pooled 
estimator (see second part of table 5.4), and it also was estimated by maximum likelihood 
methods. We then tested for both equations the null that the coefficients on the village 
averages are jointly equal to zero. The Wald test of the null was rejected at the 5% 
confidence level in the case of the rental in equation. A likelihood ratio test of the same 
null in the case of the rental out equation yielded a rejection at the 5% confidence level. 
Thus, it appears that in both equations village characteristics, analogous to peer effects, 
do have a conditioning power and that excluding them from the rental in regression will 
result in biased parameter estimates. On the other hand, in the rental in equation 
unobserved village level effects are more appropriately dealt with through the assumption 
of clustering effects rather than through the assumption of random-errors. This 
‘asymmetry’ might be explained by the fact that almost 20% of the rental in counterparts 
is owners of land located out of the ejido. Thus, unobserved factors influencing the rental 
in decision may in fact be related to institutions or local specific factors that are not 
132
directly related to the ejido. Yet, given the structure of the data at hand, we have no way 
to test such hypothesis. 
The results of the rental out equation using the two panels show that certification 
and titling indeed matter in the ejido land markets. First, while in all ejidos the amount of 
land rented out increases with the size of the landholdings, such relationship is stronger in 
the case of certified ejidos. This result is consistent with the notion that land markets tend 
to be more efficient in certified ejidos, where by efficient we mean that there is a perfect 
substitution between owned and rented land and farm size is independent of 
landholdings. 
How important is the effect of Procede on the efficiency of land rental markets? 
We recall from chapter 3 that if factor markets were competitive, output and input prices 
would determine the optimal size of the farm. One hectare of owned land would then 
trade with one hectare of leased land. Whether that land is leased in or out depends 
respectively on whether the size of the landholdings is below or exceeds the optimal size 
of the farm.  Table 5.4 reports also the estimated expected marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on the amount of land rented out and in. For each type of rental 
decisions both the marginal effect conditional on the explanatory variables as well as the 
marginal effect conditional on participating into the market are provided. Marginal 
effects are computed at the sample average of the explanatory variables. In ejidos without 
Procede, each additional hectare of land endowment will add 0.10 hectares conditional on 
market participation. Procede adds 0.025 hectares to that already small marginal effect. 
Thus, in spite of the positive impact of the Procede, leasing out decisions continue to 
appear quite unresponsive to the size of landholdings. 
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Second, the sign of the square of land endowments shows that in both ejidos the 
monotonic relationship between land holdings and land rented out breaks down when 
land holding exceeds a given (large) size. 
Third, the evidence concerning the importance of wealth for land rental out 
decisions is mixed. The number of tractors owned, the size of cattle herd, and ownership 
of trucks (although at the 10% level), all reduce the amount of land rented out. 
Production of perennials, a proxy for land-related capital investment, is also negatively 
related with the amount of land rented out. The latter effect may also be imputed to a 
crop-specific effect, whereby land with apt for grains and horticultural products as well as 
grazing land present less transaction costs in the land rental market. In other words, trees 
might face a higher risk of being damaged by the tenant. An alternative interpretation is 
that the perennial dummy captures the positive impact of the relative price effects of 
fruits on farm size. Yet, we favor the earlier interpretation in view of the fact that price 
effects are likely to be captured better by the ejido-level average of this variable (see 
latter part of table 5.4). 
With respect to herd size, note that its ejido-level average is positively related to 
the amount of land rented out by the household. The same relationship holds for the 
average number of oxen owned by ejidatarios.  This is possibly an indication of a demand 
effect, whereby larger average herds denote a potentially higher demand for grazing land 
at the village level once the average size of land holdings is controlled for. 
Fourth, various variables that are related to different types of transaction costs 
appear also to play a role in rental out decisions. The presence of a conflict regarding the 
ejido’s borders decreases land rental out. The impact is statistically weak – at the 10% 
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level – but this might be interpreted as a result of the possible substitution that might exist 
between tenants coming out of the ejido and those that belong to the ejido (i.e. other 
ejidatarios, avecindados, and posesionarios). A larger population within the ejido 
increases participation to the land rental market significantly. This is likely to be a 
consequence of lower search costs within the local land market. Finally, the more 
disconnected is an ejido from markets, as proxied by the travel time to the nearest urban 
center, the lower the participation and size of land rented out. As the remoteness of the 
ejido increases, the less scope there is for commercialization of crops while participation 
to the urban labor market on a circular base becomes less favorable. An insurance 
motivation may be at work, whereby poor ejido farmers may in fact attach importance to 
maintain access to land as a form of insurance against shocks in the labor market or in the 
price of corn (see Fafchamps, 1992; Burgess, 2003). Thus, the more remote an ejido is 
the higher the costs will be of cultivating while simultaneously maintaining employment 
in non-farm activities. As the cost of returning to the ejido on a cyclical basis is 
independent of the size of the plot, there is an incentive to reduce the amount of land 
rented out. Interestingly enough, we do not find an effect associated with the communal 
tenure of land at the ejido level.  
Fifth, with respect to ejido effects and their influence on rental out decisions, we 
note that there is more participation to the market in ejidos where ejidatarios are on 
average older, and where the average number of female ejidatarios is higher49.  
49 Note that the presence of women as ejidatarios is becoming increasingly important in the ejido sector 
(PA, 2001). As of 2000, it was estimated that 15% of the ejidatarios were women. Before the 1992 reform, 
ejidatarios could only be males. After the 1992 reform, an increasing number of women are becoming 
ejidatarios when their husbands die. They often entrust their son with the cultivation of the land.  
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Concerning the rental in of land, the sign on the landholdings variable is negative 
and significant at the 5% level of confidence. Although this is consistent with theory, it is 
important to notice that the magnitude of the response is quite low. As the second and 
third column of table 5.4 (rental in equation) show, each additional hectare of 
landholdings reduces on average the amount of land rented in by 0.03 hectares or by 0.10 
hectares if we restrict our attention to decisions taken conditional on participating to the 
land rental market. If one is satisfied with a 10% level of confidence, an even more 
striking result emerges. In those ejidos where the Procede was adopted, there is no 
relationship between landholdings and the amount of land rented. Both results indicate 
that from the point of view of land rentals, small ejido farmers do face substantial 
impediments in adjusting their farmland to an optimal size and that the Procede has not 
helped improving this state of affairs. Thus, contrary to what concluded in Olinto (1999) 
and World Bank (1999), the Procede did not have a quantitatively significant impact on 
access to land by the ejidatarios. Those conclusions were induced by the fact that the 
model estimated implicitly imposed a symmetry between rental in and rental out 
decisions. In our case, estimating separately the two types of decisions allows discerning 
the different type of response that ties the demand and supply of land to the size of the 
original landholdings.    
With respect to the issue of how access to capital influences rental decisions, we 
find that indeed renting land in is influenced by liquidity constraints. Capital is here 
proxied by the size of landholdings, the number of tractors and trucks owned, the size of 
the cattle herd owned, the ownership of trees in orchards (or in plantations), and the 
involvement in horticulture production, usually quite intensive in capital and labor 
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relative to land. All of these variables, with the exception of the perennial dummy, have a 
positive impact on the amount of land rented in. 
Interestingly enough, in ejidos where common land is used for agricultural 
purposes, there is more land rental in activity going on as the positive sign on the dummy 
for common grazing lands shows. We do not have a clear interpretation of this 
relationship, which incidentally is significant at the 5% level. It should be noticed, 
nevertheless, that the same dummy averaged at the ejido level and across time, has a 
significant negative impact on the amount of land rented in. The same holds for the 
average dummy for cultivated common lands. These findings can be interpreted as a 
manifestation of the fact that as common lands is reduced (in some ejidos commons have 
disappeared as a result of the process of appropriation), individual farm sizes tend to 
increase on average as a result of the ‘erosion’ of the commons. Larger holdings reduce 
the incentive to rent land in. On the other hand, once the evolution of common lands 
embodied in the average dummy for common grazing lands is controlled for, access to 
these reduce the cost of maintaining cattle and oxen, while simultaneously offering a way 
of sustaining eventual shocks to crop production. These effects might in fact have an 
impact on the decision to increase the size of the farm. 
We now examine the rental equations estimated using the 1997 survey data only.  
As we mentioned, the use of the 1997 panel allows us to include in the regression 
potentially important variables. These are the share of owned land that falls under 
communal and/or private tenure, the share of owned land that is irrigated, and three 
dummies for conflicts in the ejidos, on ejido borders, on parcel borders, and on 
assignment of common lands rights respectively.  Both equations were initially estimated 
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using the same random error plus village averages as we did before using the two panels. 
Nevertheless, in both cases a likelihood ratio test could not reject the null that the panel-
level variance component of the error term is equal to zero. We therefore estimated the 
two equations using the Tobit estimator while controlling for village-level cluster effects. 
In both cases, a Wald test rejected the null that village averages were jointly equal to 
zero.  
Looking at the rental out decisions, we first notice that from a qualitative point of 
view the parameter estimates do not differ very much from those appearing in table 5.4, 
with the exception of the communal dummy, which now has become insignificant.
The marginal effects of landholdings on rental decisions are quite similar to what 
seen in table 5.4 above. The impact of Procede is somewhat stronger in the case of the 
rental out of land (with a net marginal effect of 0.40 versus 0.25 in table 5.4).  
An important result is that the amount of owned land that is irrigated affects 
positively the decision to rent land out. This seems to contrast with the effect of those 
variables that are assumed to be related with access to capital. What the result suggests is 
that ejidatarios endowed with land of better quality are more inclined to rent out and 
reduce their farming activities rather than increasing their involvement in farming. 
Finally, we notice that the ‘more private’ a farmer is (i.e. the more of his land 
holdings are under private tenure) the less likely he is to rent out land. Does this imply 
that Mexico’s land markets are characterized by an asymmetry between private farmers 
and ejidatarios? We cannot test for this given the structure of our data. In fact, the 
negative coefficient may also be explained by the hypothesis that mixtos (i.e. ejidatarios 
that also own private land) face higher transaction costs in renting their land out within 
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the ejido. They might be able to rent their land to outsiders, but this would raise search 
costs. Thus, we have competing explanations for this observation and no real way to 
discriminate empirically among them, except noticing that in the rental in equation the 
same variable has no explanatory power. This would tilt the balance in favor of the 
second hypothesis. 
With respect to the rental in equation, we notice that many variables that were 
significantly different from zero when the two panels were used are now not significantly 
different from zero. In particular, this is the case for the land endowment both as such and 
when interacted with the Procede dummy, the number of tractors and cows owned the 
ownership of land with trees, the presence of common grazing land, and the dummy for 
communal villages. On the other hand, we see that the presence of agricultural common 
lands reduces the amount of land rented in, as access to such land is a substitute for 
renting individually owned parcels. 
What do we learn from these results? The World Bank (1999) and Olinto et. al
(2001) studies concluded that the Procede had contributed to increase the efficiency of 
ejido land markets. As argued above and in chapter 2, those studies implicitly imposed a 
symmetric relationship in the response of the demand and supply of land rental to the size 
of land holdings. Thus, a marginal unit of land holdings is assumed to have, in absolute 
terms, the same impact in terms of the final amount of land rented in or out. The model 
estimated in the previous section, by separating renting in from renting out decisions, 
relaxes that assumption. A shortcoming of this model is that it still does not allow for
simultaneity of rental in and rental out decisions, an aspect that could be amended by 
adopting a modeling strategy such as the friction model of land rental markets in Skoufias 
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(1995). The estimation of a friction model that incorporates the assumption of random-
effects with village unobserved time invariant effects is not trivial and we leave it for 
future research50. In spite of the shortcoming of the model presented here, we are 
confident that the approach followed in modeling unobserved village effects has provided 
parameter estimates with a satisfactory degree of reliability. 
What then could explain the weak relationships between land holdings and land 
rental decisions we have observed?  And why does Procede have some effect on rental 
out decisions, but not on the amount of land rented in?
Regarding the first question, the results confirm that tenure insecurity is one 
possible source of inefficiency of land markets, but that by no means it is the most 
important one. While land titles may surely reduce substantially tenure insecurity, it may 
well be that the final impact is quite modest.  
An answer to the second question relies on the structure of the data at hand, in 
particular the sampling strategy adopted by the two ejido surveys. We in fact miss 
information on the rental decisions of private neighboring farmers and of landless ejido 
members, mostly avecindados. As we have mentioned at several points, private farmers 
border the ejidos in the typical setting of rural Mexico, and it is to be expected that while 
the Procede might have reduced the cost of transacting among ejidatarios, it might have 
had a modest impact on the cost of transacting between ejidatarios and private farmers. In 
general private farmers neighboring an ejido would be wary of renting their lands to those 
that possibly might have contributed to the expropriation of their land a few years before. 
It is difficult to argue that the Procede may have had an indent in this state of affairs. 
50 That type of modeling approach was carried out using the 1997 survey data and the results obtained are 
very much consistent with those obtained in our initial tobit regression with village cluster effects. The 
results are presented in the appendix
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Thus, to rent land in, ejidatarios would need to restrict their market to land located within 
the ejidos. Yet, this does not explain why land rented in is weakly related to land holdings 
in certified ejidos. The key point to notice is that Procede might have proved successful at 
increasing the access to land by landless households residing in the ejido (i.e. the 
avecindados). The ejidatarios included in our sample are almost all landed, and therefore 
are not the least endowed with land in the ejido. The lack of impact of the Procede can 
therefore be explained by the fact that those that have beneficiated most in terms of 
increased access to the ejido land are not observed and by the concurrent fact that access 
to private farm land has not been affected by land titles. To indirectly assess the merit of 
this explanation we examine how tenure-related characteristics of the counterparts in land 
rental contracts involving ejidatarios have been affected by the Procede.  
5.5. Procede and the choice of the contractual counterpart 
To test whether the Procede has affected the characteristics of the contractual 
counterpart we exploit retrospective information on land rentals contained in the 1997 
survey that extends back to 1992. By counterpart, we mean the other side of the 
transaction in the land rental market. Thus, in the case of lease-in contracts the 
counterpart would be the landlord, while in the case of lease-out contracts it would be the 
tenant. The available information allows to reconstruct the characteristics of the 
contractual counterpart in terms of the characteristics of the respondent51. 
51 A legitimate question is why was such retrospective information used in order to reconstruct some of 
those variables whose use justifies estimating the land rental decisions with the 1997 Survey only. 
Retrospective information on market participation was compared to what effectively declared by 
respondents during the 1994 survey. The result was that participation was underestimated when  
retrospective information was used. Here the use of retrospective information is justified by the fact that we 
are limiting our sample to those farmers that, retrospectively, have declared having rented out their land. 
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Counterparts to rental out contracts are divided into five groups: ejidatarios with 
land and posesionarios; avecindados (which are landless ejido members, but not 
ejidatarios); ejidatarios from other ejidos; private farmers; and others52 (non farmers and 
others). We then posit that the choice of the contractual counterpart is a function of the 
following ejidatario and village characteristics: the Procede dummy, the age, education, 
and gender of the ejidatarios, the (log of) endowments of land, the number of adult 
household members, the population of the ejido, the number of urban areas within one 
hour of the ejido, a dummy for the existence of a village register, the dummies for 
conflicts on ejido borders or on common lands, the ejido population density, travel time 
to nearest urban center and travel time interacted with the Procede dummy, the share of 
ejido land irrigated, the year to which the observation corresponds (i.e. either 1994 or 
1997) and a dummy indicating whether the observation corresponds to that of a land loan 
contract. Finally, dummies controlling for the regional location of the ejido were also 
included. 
As the choice of the counterpart is not an ordered categorical variable, we 
estimated the model using a Multinomial Logit (ML), controlling for village-level cluster 
effects. The choice of renting land to an ejidatario was taken to be the reference type of 
counterpart. The results reported in table 5.7 are to be interpreted as relative risk ratios 
and are computed taking the exponential of the corresponding parameter. They measure 
the marginal effect of a given variable on the probability of selecting one of the 
alternative counterparts relative to an ejidatario from the same ejido.  A coefficient less
52 We abstain from interpreting the results for this specific group. It includes several typologies of 
counterparts such as non-farmers, private firms, etc. whose participation into the land market is not 
explainable by the rental model in chapter 3. 
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than one means that the alternative group is less likely to be selected relative to the 
reference group. The opposite holds when the coefficient is greater than one. 
Table 5.7 reports also the marginal effects estimated at the sample averages of a 
given variable on the probability of a given counterpart being selected. As discussed in 
Greene (2002; p. 722) these parameters are not easily interpreted. They nevertheless 
provide further information that helps in explaining how the ejido land market has 
changed as a result of the Procede. 
The results in table 5.7 can be summarized as follows. Certification though the 
Procede has had a negative impact in absolute terms (i.e. through the intercept effect) 
only on ejidatarios from other ejidos. Concerning avecindados (i.e. members of the ejido 
without land) we see that in uncertified ejidos these are ‘discriminated’ against by those 
ejidatarios with more land. On the other hand, in certified ejidos the avecindados tend to 
be the preferred counterpart choice of larger farmers relative to landed ejidatarios. This 
result has quite strong implications, as it suggests that with the Procede previously 
excluded groups of the village population have now found their way into the land market. 
From the results, it can also be inferred that stronger cohesion, perhaps induced by 
conflict resolution among ejido households, has also improved the stand of avecindados 
within the ejido agricultural economy. Avecindados are also favored by the presence of 
an internal registry, which as we have explained in chapter 1 contains the rules that 
govern the use of lands within the ejido. Thus, where local institutions for conflict 
resolution are developed, the weakest segments of the ejido sector find more participative 
space within the local land market. This increased participation by the avecindados takes 
place in the context of ejidos where land quality seems to be lower as the estimated 
143
relative risk ratio of the share of ejido irrigated land shows. The share of irrigated land at 
the ejido level should be a reasonable indicator of the ejido’s land productivity and 
propensity to commercialization. In these types of ejidos, so the estimates suggest, 
avecindados tend to be discriminated against in favor of landed ejidatarios. Finally, 
avecindados tend to be selected by older ejidatarios, probably in the context of inter-
generational land rentals taking place within the same household or between an 
avecindados and an older relative. The association of avecindados with land loan 
contracts also reflects the importance of familiar ties. 
We mentioned the impact of Procede on members from other ejidos. The data also 
reveal that members of other ejidos tend to be less favored as the size of the ejido, 
probably reflecting the size of the ‘internal’ market increases. There is weak evidence 
(i.e. at the 10% confidence level) that larger ejidatarios tend to prefer renting their land to 
ejidatarios from other communities rather than renting it to own ejido members. The fact 
that this is the case in ejido with Procede implies that, consistently with what happens 
with the avecindados, the program has opened the ejido land market also to outside 
ejidatarios but only with respect to those ejidatarios with more land. This signals, once 
more, some heterogeneity within ejidos as to how stronger property rights affect the 
rental decisions of farmers. Finally, population pressure, which in the rental out equation 
was not significant, is instead a factor favoring outside ejidatarios. An interpretation of 
this result might be based on the hypothesis that ejidos characterized by higher 
population density belong to regions where population density is higher. In that case, 
search costs for outside farmers interested in renting land in, which are fixed, might be 
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inversely related population pressure. As a result, outside ejidatarios face lower search 
costs per hectare rented and are therefore more likely to be selected. 
With respect to private farmers, the model lacks explanatory power. The only 
result that makes some sense is the weak evidence that ejidos with border conflicts do not 
trust renting their land to private farmers and tend to favor, and this is a reasonable thing 
to expect, ejido landed members. The equation for private farmers should be interpreted 
for what it does not say. Private farmers seem to have not beneficiated from the Procede 
relative to ejidatarios, al least not in absolute terms.     
5.7. Conclusions
What have we learned from the findings of this chapter? In general terms, we 
have confirmed that the Procede has had an impact on ejido land rental markets, although 
only rental out decisions seem to be those that have been most influenced by the program. 
We also saw that Procede has had a sizeable impact in terms of the responsiveness of 
land rental out to landholdings relative to the conditions prevailing in uncertified ejidos.  
Yet, it appears that the impact of Procede is concentrated among the largest ejidatarios, 
while the smallest ejidatarios do not register significant effects. This raises the question 
of the distributive impact of the Procede through land market participation. Nevertheless, 
the final result is still far away from that one would expect in a setting characterized by 
efficient land markets. As we saw, land rentals are quite unresponsive to the size of land 
holdings even after titling. 
Concerning other institutional aspects, we found that that communal villages, 
common lands, and ownership of private land do have an impact on individual rental 
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decisions. We therefore suspect that more needs to be done in Mexico in order to improve 
the efficiency of land markets if the key policy concern is raising farm productivity. 
Access to working capital is strongly connected to farm size. This was to be 
expected in an environment plagued by missing or imperfect capital and insurance 
markets. On the other hand, it seems that farm size is unrelated to the labor endowment of 
the household, perhaps suggesting that labor markets in rural Mexico work enough 
competitively. 
A relevant point that emerged from the previous analysis is that Procede has had a 
negligible effect on the relationship between the amount of land rented in and the land 
endowments. To interpret the finding we suggested that the Procede, by lowering rental 
transaction costs, has favored access to ejido rental markets by farmers endowed with 
enough liquidity to farm good quality land (mainly private farmers) and to avecindados 
that live within the ejido. This is supported by the importance of irrigated land in the 
decision to rent out land, as it can be seen from our cross section regression (tables 5.6 
and 5.7) and by the fact that avecindados are landless and generally poorly endowed with 
working capital. If this were indeed the case, we would expect small ejidatarios in 
certified ejido losing access to the internal market to the advantage of small private 
farmers and avecindados of the same community with enough capital. 
Would this imply that small ejido farmers have in fact lost from Procede? Such a 
question needs to be broken down into several parts. First, we need to separate farm from 
non-farm income. By changing the shadow price of land rentals, the Procede might have 
had an impact on household resource allocation, including labor allocation between farm 
and non-farm activities. Second, we need to understand whether the Procede has affected 
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the income patterns of ejidatarios of different sizes. This is the subject of the next 
chapter.  
One more consideration concerns the strong degree of asymmetry between rental 
in and rental out decisions. From a methodological point of view, a framework that 
imposes symmetry on the two behavioral equations, as done in the World Bank (1999) 
runs the (unnecessary) risk of imposing too strong constraints on the parameter estimates, 
yielding a distorted or partial picture of the functioning of ejido land markets. 
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Table 5. 1: Land rental characteristics
Untitled Titled Total
1994 1997 1994 1997 1994 1997
% % % % % %
Transactions
Rent in 3.0 4.6 3.5 5.0 3.3 4.8
Shacropped in 0.7 2.1 1.1 3.2 0.9 2.6
Borrowed 2.2 3.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 3.2
Rent out 2.1 3.4 5.0 7.4 3.5 5.3
Shacropped out 0.3 1.8 1.1 3.5 0.7 2.6
Loaned 1.9 1.9 1.4 2.2 1.7 2.1
Summary of transactions
Total leases in 6.0 9.0 8.0 10.4 7.0 9.7
Total leases out 4.3 7.2 7.5 13.1 5.9 10.1
Total rentals 5.1 8.1 8.5 12.2 6.7 10.1
Total sharecrops 0.9 3.9 2.2 6.7 1.5 5.3
Total loan/borrowed 4.2 5.1 5.1 5.4 4.6 5.3
Source: 1994 and 1997 Ejido Surveys
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% % % % % %
Vocation of land 
Grains 83 77 81 73 81 75
Horticulture 3 1 4 4 4 2
Other agricultural 9 5 6 10 7 8
Grazing 3 16 8 12 6 14
Counterpart characteristics
Relative 23 50 28 48 26 49
Ejidatario 28 80 28 74 28 77
Avecindado 25 0 19 1 21 0
Members of ther 
ejidos 12 4 13 10 13 7
Private with land 25 0 22 0 23 0
Private landless 4 7 3 6 3 7
Non 
farmer/enterprise 4 1 8 2 7 1
Other 0 6 7 6 5 6
Tenure status of land
Ejido land 92 75 89 88 90 81
Dominio pleno 0 0 1 0 1 0
Communal 8 19 7 5 7 12
Private 0 6 3 6 2 6
Other characteristics
With irrigation 48 23 50 37 50 30
Written agreement 37 13 34 28 35 20
Registered in ejido 36 17 33 15 34 16
Length of contract 
(months) 12 12 11 14 11 13
Source: 1994 and 1997 Ejido Surveys
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Table 5. 3: Characteristics of households by land market participation
Autarkic Lease in Leasing out
1994 1997 1994 1997 1994 1997
# adults in household 2.3 3.5 2.7 3.5 2.0 3.5
# children in household 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.3 1.8
education of the head (years) 3.1 3.1 3.6 3.5 2.9 3.3
age of the head 49.3 52.2 50.5 52.6 51.7 55.1
hectares of owned land 10.9 14.0 10.5 11.1 19.9 20.2
share owned land irrigated - 16% - 24% - 43%
# oxens owned 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
# horses, mules owned 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.6
# of cows owned 5.7 4.8 12.4 8.8 4.0 2.8
ejidatarios owning a tractor 6% 6% 22% 22% 5% 4%
ejidatarios owning a truck 14% 9% 38% 31% 13% 6%
per capita Procampo payments (MX $) - 422 - 737 - 581
ejidatarios receiving Procampo - 83% - 82% - 74%
# observations 1126 1037 89 124 75 129
Source: 1994 and 1997 Ejido Surveys
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Table 5. 4: Rent-out equation: panel data and random effect with and without village 
averages









Procede dummy 3.534 0.06 0.37 3.381
[1.171] [1.184]
# adult household members -0.324 -0.01 -0.03 -0.141
[0.690] [0.316]
Procede*# adult hh. members -0.278 0.00 -0.03 -0.305
[0.389] [0.438]
Age of ejidatario -0.216 0.00 -0.02 -0.116
[0.789] [0.445]
Age of ejidatario squared 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.001
[0.639] [0.575]
Schooling years of ejidatario -0.174 0.00 -0.02 0.030
[0.722] [0.130]
Gender of ejidatario (1=female) -3.510 -0.06 -0.37 -6.844***
[1.331] [2.719]
Landholdings (hectares) 0.971*** 0.02 0.10 1.003***
[7.027] [8.709]
Procede*landholdings 0.226*** 0.00 0.02 0.177***
[2.805] [2.577]
Landholdings squared -0.007*** 0.00 0.00 -0.009***
[4.871] [7.013]
# oxen owned -0.073 0.00 -0.01 -0.200
[0.096] [0.370]
# tractors owned -6.664** -0.11 -0.71 -5.477**
[2.380] [2.088]
# trucks, pickups owned -3.407* -0.05 -0.36 -3.169*
[1.895] [1.777]
# cattle owned -0.269*** 0.00 -0.03 -0.192**
[3.194] [2.565]
Producer of perennials (dummy) -3.556** -0.06 -0.38 -5.490***
[2.078] [3.462]
Hort producer  (dummy) -0.017 0.00 0.00 -0.145
[0.010] [0.095]
Ejido commons cultivated (dummy) 0.525 0.01 0.06 -0.410
[0.234] [0.254]
Ejido commons grazed (dummy) -0.868 -0.01 -0.09 -1.109
[0.370] [0.705]
Ejido has internal rules (dummy) -2.046 -0.03 -0.22 -2.665*
[1.111] [1.869]
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Ejido with border conflict (dummy) -4.067** -0.06 -0.43 -1.689
[2.045] [1.076]
Ejido comm.. with conflict (dummy) 2.130 0.03 0.23 1.860
[0.851] [0.910]
Village population 0.001*** 0.00 0.00 0.001***
[2.639] [2.760]
Population pressure -0.067 0.00 -0.01 -0.063
[0.513] [0.520]
Travel time to nearest urban area -0.039* 0.00 0.00 -0.058***
[1.930] [2.650]
# urban centres within 2 hrs. -0.131 0.00 -0.01 -0.082
[1.508] [0.915]
Ejido is communal (dummy) 2.359 0.04 0.25 3.066
[0.698] [0.828]
Share of ejido lands with irrigation 3.115 0.05 0.33 4.808*
[0.772] [1.749]
North Pacific (dummy) 2.994 5.924**
[1.004] [1.989]
Central Mexico (dummy) -1.100 -0.479
[0.433] [0.179]
Gulf (dummy) -1.019 -4.543
[0.249] [1.057]
South Pacific (dummy) -1.005 -0.743
[0.352] [0.246]
Sub-humid tropical (dummy) -9.915*** -7.962**
[2.813] [2.121]
Humid temperate (dummy) -9.236 -8.452
[1.619] [1.325]
Sub-humid temperate (dummy) -9.200** -5.330
[2.305] [1.258]
Arid and semi-arid (dummy) -10.776** -6.838
[2.560] [1.572]
V_Procede (dummy) -1.021 -0.02 -0.11
[0.105]
V_# adult household members 0.044 0.00 0.00
[0.034]
V_Procede*# adult hh. members 0.411 0.01 0.04
[0.156]
V_Age of ejidatario 0.512 0.01 0.05
[0.695]
V_Age of ejidatario squared -0.002 0.00 0.00
[0.301]
V_Schooling years of ejidatario 1.033* 0.02 0.11
[1.645]
V_Gender of ejidatario (%) -19.971** -0.32 -2.12
[2.550]
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V_Landholdings (hectares) 0.109 0.00 0.01
[0.444]
V_Procede*landholdings -0.157 0.00 -0.02
[0.717]
V_Landholdings squared -0.004 0.00 0.00
[1.372]
V_# oxen owned 3.035* 0.05 0.32
[1.776]
V_# tractors owned -0.184 0.00 -0.02
[0.033]
V_# trucks, pickups owned 4.395 0.07 0.47
[0.902]
V_# cattle owned 0.259** 0.00 0.03
[2.036]
V_Producer of perennials (%) -9.495*** -0.15 -1.01
[2.677]
V_hort producer (%) -0.265 0.00 -0.03
[0.078]
V_Ejido commons cultivated (%) -1.790 -0.03 -0.19
[0.567]
V_Ejido commons grazed (%) -1.515 -0.02 -0.16
[0.486]
V_Ejido has internal rules (%) 0.289 0.00 0.03
[0.106]
V_Ejido with border conflict (%) 4.496 0.07 0.48
[1.476]
V_Ejido commons with conflict (%) 0.648 0.01 0.07
[0.165]





Number of ejidos 249 249
LR Test within-ejido averages=0: 50.389; prob>Chi2: 0.001
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5.4 (continued). Rent-in equation: pooled data with and without village averages










Procede dummy -0.43 -1.28 -11.498
[1.059] [1.386]
# adult household members -0.376 -0.02 -0.05 -0.109
[0.301] [0.095]
Procede*# adult hh. members 2.781 0.13 0.37 1.330
[1.374] [0.686]
Age of ejidatario 0.730 0.03 0.10 1.094
[0.795] [1.333]
Age of ejidatario squared -0.008 0.00 0.00 -0.010
[0.926] [1.293]
Schooling years of ejidatario 0.069 0.00 0.01 0.888
[0.087] [1.318]
Gender of ejidatario (1=female) -3.425 -0.15 -0.46 -1.868
[0.331] [0.191]
Landholdings (hectares) -0.741** -0.03 -0.10 -0.614**
[2.348] [1.990]
Procede*landholdings 0.602* 0.03 0.08 1.026***
[1.832] [3.316]
Landholdings squared -0.001 0.00 0.00 -0.004
[0.495] [1.078]
# oxen owned -0.013 0.00 0.00 -0.446
[0.011] [0.399]
# tractors owned 10.448** 0.47 1.40 16.224***
[1.967] [3.519]
# trucks, pickups owned 9.840** 0.44 1.32 12.687***
[2.495] [3.533]
# cattle owned 0.512*** 0.02 0.07 0.630***
[3.645] [5.211]
Producer of perennials (dummy) 2.640 0.12 0.35 1.396
[0.540] [0.346]
Hort. producer  (dummy) 9.653** 0.43 1.30 8.325**
[2.058] [2.139]
Ejido commons cultivated (dummy) -3.232 -0.15 -0.43 -12.621***
[0.508] [2.971]
Ejido commons grazed (dummy) 15.618** 0.70 2.10 5.498
[2.521] [1.457]
Ejido has internal rules (dummy) 0.108 0.00 0.01 -4.158
[0.020] [1.198]
Ejido with border conflict (dummy) -0.895 -0.04 -0.12 -0.079
[0.156] [0.021]
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Village population 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.001
[0.751] [0.924]
Population pressure -0.453 -0.02 -0.06 -0.354
[1.133] [0.916]
Travel time to nearest urban area 0.016 0.00 0.00 0.007
[0.348] [0.157]
# urban centres within 2 hrs. -0.319 -0.01 -0.04 -0.294
[1.525] [1.426]
Ejido is communal (dummy) -15.840* -0.71 -2.13 -17.027**
[1.815] [1.982]
Share of ejido lands with irrigation -6.295 -0.28 -0.85 -7.575
[0.501] [1.086]
North Pacific (dummy) 0.148 1.297
[0.019] [0.179]
Central Mexico (dummy) 13.994** 9.463*
[2.557] [1.812]
Gulf (dummy) 13.295 11.305
[1.482] [1.314]
South Pacific (dummy) -3.854 -5.503
[0.543] [0.812]
Sub-humid tropical (dummy) 2.570 -2.297
[0.312] [0.300]
Humid temperate (dummy) 16.936 13.391
[1.446] [1.181]
Sub-humid temperate (dummy) 8.380 4.541
[0.898] [0.515]
Arid and semi-arid (dummy) 4.481 -4.247
[0.455] [0.456]
V_Procede (dummy) 17.869 0.80 2.40
[0.788]
V_# adult household members 0.390 0.02 0.05
[0.126]
V_Procede*# adult hh. members -11.393* -0.51 -1.53
[1.845]
V_Age of ejidatario 1.037 0.05 0.14
[0.539]
V_Age of ejidatario squared -0.005 0.00 0.00
[0.295]
V_Schooling years of ejidatario 2.045 0.09 0.27
[1.269]
V_Gender of ejidatario (%) 0.001 0.00 0.00
[0.000]
V_Landholdings (hectares) -0.257 -0.01 -0.03
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[0.841]
V_Procede*landholdings 0.994** 0.04 0.13
[1.989]
V_Landholdings squared -0.000 0.00 0.00
[0.400]
V_# oxen owned -2.548 -0.11 -0.34
[0.589]
V_# tractors owned 19.847 0.89 2.67
[1.608]
V_# trucks, pickups owned 5.910 0.27 0.79
[0.518]
V_# cattle owned 0.206 0.01 0.03
[0.662]
V_Producer of perennials (%) -1.447 -0.07 -0.19
[0.174]
V_Producer of greens (%) -0.894 -0.04 -0.12
[0.105]
V_Ejido commons cultivated (%) -12.935 -0.58 -1.74
[1.569]
V_Ejido commons grazed (%) -18.961** -0.85 -2.55
[2.370]
V_Ejido has internal rules (%) -4.005 -0.18 -0.54
[0.570]
V_Ejido with border conflict (%) 2.439 0.11 0.33
[0.306]
V_Ejido commons with conflict (%) 15.582 0.70 2.09
[1.629]





Number of ejidos 249 249
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5. 5: Rent-out equation: 1997 survey and  effects with and  without village 
averages










Procede dummy -0.859 -0.01 -0.09 -1.891
[0.130] [0.545]
# adult household members 0.305 0.01 0.03 0.287
[0.508] [0.485]
Procede*# adult hh. members -0.194 0.00 -0.02 -0.339
[0.268] [0.456]
Age of ejidatario -0.273 0.00 -0.03 -0.249
[0.895] [0.870]
Age of ejidatario squared 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.003
[0.936] [1.118]
Schooling years of ejidatario -0.172 0.00 -0.02 0.196
[0.727] [0.817]
Gender of ejidatario (1=female) -2.634 -0.04 -0.28 -8.145***
[0.995] [3.513]
Landholdings (hectares) 0.949*** 0.02 0.10 0.870***
[5.008] [5.280]
Procede*landholdings 0.372** 0.01 0.04 0.370***
[2.182] [3.607]
Landholdings squared -0.009*** 0.00 0.00 -0.009***
[4.821] [4.321]
# oxen owned -0.131 0.00 -0.01 -0.112
[0.582] [0.369]
# tractors owned -8.053** -0.13 -0.86 -5.623*
[2.056] [1.734]
# trucks, pickups owned -1.472 -0.02 -0.16 -1.136
[0.509] [0.423]
# cattle owned -0.302*** -0.01 -0.03 -0.173*
[3.144] [1.827]
Producer of perennials (dummy) -2.879 -0.05 -0.31 -7.668***
[1.501] [3.732]
Hortic. producer  (dummy) 0.514 0.01 0.06 -0.874
[0.225] [0.471]
% landholdings with irrigation 14.431*** 0.24 1.55 12.350***
[3.479] [5.329]
% landholdings communal -2.253 -0.04 -0.24 -6.294*
[0.357] [1.925]
% landholdings private -17.998* -0.30 -1.93 -15.391*
[1.812] [1.829]
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Access to Procampo (dummy) -3.541* -0.06 -0.38 -2.688
[1.691] [1.432]
Ejido commons cultivated (dummy) -0.229 0.00 -0.02 -0.755
[0.117] [0.346]
Ejido commons grazed (dummy) -1.520 -0.03 -0.16 -1.349
[0.872] [0.772]
Travel time to nearest urban area -0.043* 0.00 0.00 -0.056**
[1.906] [2.193]
Village population 0.000** 0.00 0.00 0.000***
[2.099] [2.678]
# urban centres within 2 hrs. -0.096 0.00 -0.01 -0.022
[1.561] [0.403]
Ejido has paved access road -0.918 -0.02 -0.10 -2.364
[0.563] [1.313]
Ejido has internal rules (dummy) -0.016 0.00 0.00 -0.440
[0.010] [0.263]
Population pressure -0.035 0.00 0.00 -0.041
[1.097] [1.568]
Ejido is communal (dummy) 6.933* 0.12 0.74 7.036*
[1.771] [1.773]
Ej.with conflicts on parcels (dummy) -0.306 -0.01 -0.03 0.194
[0.199] [0.126]
Ejido with border conflicts (dummy) -1.668 -0.03 -0.18 -1.866
[0.898] [0.923]
Ejido comm. with conflicts (dummy) 0.855 0.01 0.09 0.857
[0.364] [0.338]
North Pacific (dummy) 3.181 3.159
[1.116] [1.186]
Central Mexico (dummy) 1.209 1.135
[0.520] [0.478]
Gulf (dummy) 7.962* 0.105
[1.824] [0.026]
South Pacific (dummy) -0.188 -1.234
[0.062] [0.386]
Sub-humid tropical (dummy) -4.009 -6.292**
[1.223] [1.978]
Humid temperate (dummy) -6.903 -9.178
[1.044] [1.225]
Sub-humid temperate (dummy) -0.925 -2.460
[0.245] [0.639]
Arid and semi-arid (dummy) -2.452 -4.889
[0.639] [1.241]
V_# adult household members 0.563 0.01 0.06
[0.393]
V_Procede*# adult hh. members -0.794 -0.01 -0.09
[0.433]
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V_Age of ejidatario -0.008 0.00 0.00
[0.008]
V_Age of ejidatario squared 0.002 0.00 0.00
[0.289]
V_Schooling years of ejidatario 1.619*** 0.03 0.17
[2.653]
V_Gender of ejidatario (%) -24.035*** -0.40 -2.57
[3.273]
V_Landholdings (hectares) -0.156 0.00 -0.02
[0.707]
V_Procede*landholdings 0.060 0.00 0.01
[0.240]
V_Landholdings squared -0.000 0.00 0.00
[0.989]
V_# oxen owned 0.861 0.01 0.09
[0.958]
V_# tractors owned 2.628 0.04 0.28
[0.455]
V_# trucks, pickups owned 0.278 0.00 0.03
[0.057]
V_# cattle owned 0.318** 0.01 0.03
[2.007]
V_Producer of perennials (%) -13.420*** -0.22 -1.44
[3.656]
V_Producer of greens (%) -4.651 -0.08 -0.50
[1.129]
V_share of landhold. with irrigation -5.411 -0.09 -0.58
[1.118]
V_share of landhold. communal -4.854 -0.08 -0.52
[0.702]
V_share of landhold. private 2.171 0.04 0.23
[0.213]




# Observations 1431 1431
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Cluster effects controlled
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Table 5.5 (continued): Rent-in equation: 1997 survey and  effects with and  without 
village averages










Procede dummy -39.157 -1.58 -5.11 -32.431
[1.241] [1.621]
# adult household members -2.486 -0.10 -0.32 -3.044
[1.010] [1.140]
Procede*# adult hh. members 5.019 0.20 0.66 4.576
[1.547] [1.390]
Age of ejidatario 1.421 0.06 0.19 0.764
[1.112] [0.686]
Age of ejidatario squared -0.013 0.00 0.00 -0.005
[1.076] [0.496]
Schooling years of ejidatario -0.281 -0.01 -0.04 0.854
[0.258] [0.887]
Gender of ejidatario (1=female) 19.919 0.80 2.60 26.538
[1.108] [1.380]
Landholdings (hectares) -1.752 -0.07 -0.23 -1.120
[1.255] [1.294]
Procede*landholdings 0.893 0.04 0.12 1.175
[0.784] [1.509]
Landholdings squared -0.000 0.00 0.00 -0.002
[0.043] [0.400]
# oxen owned -0.431 -0.02 -0.06 -0.704
[0.345] [0.691]
# tractors owned 11.784 0.47 1.54 17.406**
[1.391] [2.104]
# trucks, pickups owned 17.829** 0.72 2.33 16.248**
[2.105] [2.412]
# cattle owned 0.808 0.03 0.11 0.945*
[1.525] [1.732]
Producer of perennials (dummy) 15.524* 0.63 2.03 12.641**
[1.821] [2.004]
Hortic. producer  (dummy) 9.641 0.39 1.26 9.395*
[1.434] [1.697]
% landholdings with irrigation 5.637 0.23 0.74 3.525
[0.428] [0.473]
% landholdings communal -17.237 -0.69 -2.25 -12.353
[1.146] [1.468]
% landholdings private -0.996 -0.04 -0.13 -20.605
[0.044] [0.992]
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Access to Procampo (dummy) -3.747 -0.15 -0.49 3.064
[0.493] [0.454]
Ejido commons cultivated (dummy) -22.112** -0.89 -2.89 -21.481**
[2.201] [2.197]
Ejido commons grazed (dummy) 10.408 0.42 1.36 10.895
[1.502] [1.610]
Travel time to nearest urban area -0.018 0.00 0.00 0.021
[0.320] [0.371]
Village population 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.002
[1.266] [1.439]
# urban centres within 2 hrs. -0.385 -0.02 -0.05 -0.241
[1.505] [0.798]
Ejido has paved access road -1.659 -0.07 -0.22 -2.106
[0.329] [0.397]
Ejido has internal rules (dummy) -0.494 -0.02 -0.06 -1.407
[0.109] [0.283]
Population pressure -1.169** -0.05 -0.15 -1.441**
[2.006] [2.117]
Ejido is communal (dummy) -22.521 -0.91 -2.94 -25.045
[1.167] [1.219]
Ej. with conflicts on parcels (dummy) -1.270 -0.05 -0.17 -4.534
[0.272] [0.838]
Ejido with border conflicts (dummy) 0.857 0.03 0.11 2.619
[0.162] [0.489]
Ejido comm.. with conflicts (dummy) -9.273 -0.37 -1.21 -10.004
[1.046] [1.053]
North Pacific (dummy) 5.894 6.573
[0.595] [0.653]
Central Mexico (dummy) 26.178** 21.131*
[2.117] [1.942]
Gulf (dummy) 36.058** 30.126*
[2.103] [1.954]
South Pacific (dummy) 2.435 -1.584
[0.249] [0.161]
Sub-humid tropical (dummy) -0.099 -8.282
[0.010] [0.924]
Humid temperate (dummy) 26.277 15.454
[1.490] [0.974]
Sub-humid temperate (dummy) 15.300 8.421
[1.229] [0.714]
Arid and semi-arid (dummy) 8.153 -4.862
[0.651] [0.419]
V_# adult household members -4.272 -0.17 -0.56
[0.782]
V_Procede*# adult hh. members 1.405 0.06 0.18
[0.195]
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V_Age of ejidatario -3.547 -0.14 -0.46
[1.242]
V_Age of ejidatario squared 0.039 0.00 0.01
[1.438]
V_Schooling years of ejidatario 3.911 0.16 0.51
[1.247]
V_Gender of ejidatario (%) 2.448 0.10 0.32
[0.091]
V_Landholdings (hectares) 0.742 0.03 0.10
[0.950]
V_Procede*landholdings 0.180 0.01 0.02
[0.271]
V_Landholdings squared -0.001 0.00 0.00
[0.656]
V_# oxen owned -0.692 -0.03 -0.09
[0.153]
V_# tractors owned 27.248 1.10 3.56
[1.438]
V_# trucks, pickups owned -17.837 -0.72 -2.33
[0.967]
V_# cattle owned 0.309 0.01 0.04
[0.474]
V_Producer of perennials (%) -2.387 -0.10 -0.31
[0.187]
V_Producer of greens (%) -2.049 -0.08 -0.27
[0.186]
V_share of landhold. with irrigation -3.518 -0.14 -0.46
[0.228]
V_share of landhold. communal 8.408 0.34 1.10
[0.506]
V_share of landhold. private -12.221 -0.49 -1.60
[0.370]




# Observations 1431 1431
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Cluster effects controlled
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Table 5. 6: Partial effects and predicted average hectares of rented land* 
* Computer at sample average
** Conditional on participation to the land market
Rent-out Rent-in
E(y | x)E(y | x, y>0)** E(y | x) E(y | x, y>0)**
Panel 0.5 5.0 1.4 16.5
1997 Survey 0.9 5.3 2.0 19.8
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Table 5. 7: Determinants of counterpart choice in rental out contracts, RRR*




Procede (dummy) 0.016 0.002* 0.310 0.262
[1.498] [1.908] [0.394] [0.524]
Age of ejidatario 1.097*** 1.009 1.011 1.052
[2.894] [0.397] [0.409] [1.299]
Gender (1=male) 0.022 0.944 1.415 0.350
[1.447] [0.026] [0.197] [0.316]
Landholdings (log) 0.165*** 1.975 0.805 0.249*
[2.738] [0.895] [0.332] [1.890]
Landholding*Procede 8.418** 8.879* 2.346 6.558**
[2.288] [1.736] [0.895] [2.151]
# adult household members 0.863 0.879 1.404 0.880
[0.426] [0.368] [0.950] [0.450]
Village population 1.060 0.469*** 0.716 1.115
[0.167] [2.871] [1.439] [0.414]
# urban areas within 1 hour 0.970 0.995 0.863 1.111
[0.726] [0.092] [0.923] [1.110]
Internal rules (dummy) 18.460** 0.504 0.368 3.254
[2.329] [0.541] [1.181] [0.895]
Conflict on ejido border (dummy) 1.484 0.192 0.179* 1.001
[0.439] [1.510] [1.761] [0.001]
Conflict on ejido comm.. (dummy) 2.186 4.741 0.609 0.659
[0.644] [1.112] [0.364] [0.237]
Population pressure 0.984 3.297** 1.872 0.708
[0.024] [2.304] [1.540] [0.612]
Travel time to nearest urban area 1.015 0.957 0.981 1.003
[0.715] [1.278] [0.338] [0.148]
Procede*Travel time 0.979 1.078* 0.985 0.963
[0.966] [1.839] [0.281] [1.066]
Share of landholdings with irrig. 0.008** 0.018 0.766 0.007*
[2.268] [1.469] [0.150] [1.687]
Year of contract 0.746 0.460* 0.372*** 0.422**
[0.552] [1.693] [2.589] [2.108]
Land loan (dummy) 28.913*** 0.161 0.472 3.454
[3.111] [1.600] [0.535] [1.194]
North Pacific (dummy) 11.168 273.074 5.014 62.944*
[1.640] [1.633] [1.170] [1.936]
Centre (dummy) 1.078 18.738 0.442 3.000
[0.042] [1.109] [0.655] [0.543]
Gulf (dummy) 2.435 0.003** 1.996 1.368
[0.483] [2.325] [0.415] [0.136]
164
South Pacific (dummy) 2.526 235.330 0.000*** 44.493*
[0.611] [1.500] [32.352] [1.917]
Observations 164 164 164 164
Wald Test - Chi2 value: 12081.067. p-value: 0.000
Robust z statistics in brackets




Table 5.7 (continued): Marginal effects on counterpart choice




Procede (dummy) -0.610 -0.273 0.001 0.035
[1.355] [1.095] [0.144] [0.128]
Age of ejidatario 0.015** -0.001 -0.000 0.003
[2.252] [0.975] [0.789] [0.593]
Gender (1=male) -0.651* 0.061 0.002 0.004
[1.714] [0.630] [1.121] [0.012]
Landholdings (log) -0.285*** 0.077 0.001 -0.124
[2.645] [1.332] [0.631] [1.579]
Landholding*Procede 0.284* 0.074 -0.000 0.149
[1.815] [1.052] [0.106] [1.593]
# adult household members -0.020 -0.004 0.001 -0.010
[0.357] [0.250] [1.117] [0.325]
Village population 0.017 -0.044 -0.000 0.020
[0.293] [1.283] [0.996] [0.652]
# urban areas within 1 hour -0.009 -0.001 -0.000 0.015
[1.035] [0.285] [1.149] [1.221]
Internal rules (dummy) 0.495** -0.091 -0.003* 0.054
[2.384] [1.345] [1.723] [0.347]
Conflict on ejido border (dummy) 0.096 -0.098 -0.002 0.001
[0.643] [1.218] [1.607] [0.009]
Conflict on ejido comm.. (dummy) 0.136 0.080 -0.001 -0.100
[0.674] [1.036] [0.489] [0.446]
Population pressure -0.007 0.070 0.001 -0.057
[0.058] [1.166] [1.090] [0.791]
Travel time to nearest urban area 0.003 -0.003 -0.000 0.000
[1.065] [1.227] [0.368] [0.132]
Procede*Travel time -0.004 0.005 -0.000 -0.005
[1.065] [1.346] [0.165] [1.181]
Share of landholdings with irrig. -0.633** -0.110 0.003 -0.438
[2.041] [0.855] [1.155] [1.258]
Year of contract -0.009 -0.031 -0.001 -0.096*
[0.107] [0.909] [1.379] [1.849]
Land loan (dummy) 0.590*** -0.162 -0.002 0.056
[3.157] [1.245] [1.254] [0.452]
North Pacific (dummy) 0.201 0.241* 0.000 0.408
[0.760] [1.716] [0.032] [1.532]
Centre (dummy) -0.069 0.153 -0.002 0.116
[0.218] [1.579] [0.814] [0.436]
Gulf (dummy) 0.232 -0.342 0.001 0.063
[0.739] [1.014] [0.550] [0.225]
South Pacific (dummy) -0.038 0.261** -0.064** 0.429*
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[0.163] [2.056] [2.294] [1.793]
Constant 0.964 2.840 0.100 9.080*
[0.118] [0.885] [1.402] [1.822]
Observations 164 164 164 164
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Reference group: Ejidatarios
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Chapter 6:  Assessing the impact of the Procede on household income
6.1. Introduction
Typically, evaluation of titling programs is carried out by examining how farm 
productivity is affected by the increased security of tenure that titles are assumed to 
deliver. The analysis of the previous chapter follows that line of thought. In the present 
chapter we shift the focus of the analysis in order to better understand the full impact of 
the Procede on household incomes via reallocation of resources. The principle is that 
evaluating Procede’s impact on household income requires examining separately farm 
and non-farm income. Following the implications of the model outlined in chapter 3, by 
changing relative perceived factor prices, one would expect Procede to affect the 
allocation of household resources across farm and non-farm activities. 
With respect to the impact on farm activities, sources of efficiency gains typically 
explored in the literature on land titling are not relevant or applicable in the case of the 
Procede. As we have argued in chapter 1, the legal framework restricting the use of ejido 
land as a collateral for loans was unaffected by the 1992 reforms, so that even though 
tenure security may have increased as a result of the program it could not improve access 
to short and long terms loans53. 
Investments in land improvements are also not important in our specific case, due 
to the short time interval between the first and second ejido survey. While these may 
emerge as a significant effect of the Procede in the long run, evaluating this dynamic 
53 As Lopez (1996) has shown, where the institutional and legal framework are appropriate, land titles can 
improve the farmer’s access to credit market, although only the better off farmers will benefit. The 
ineffectiveness of the Procede and the 1992 reforms in improving access to credit among ejidatarios has 
been documented in Deininger and Bresciani (2001). 
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effect using the short panel of data provided by the 1994 and 1997 ejido surveys is not 
appropriate. Future work in Mexico should address this concern.
Given the available data, we focus more closely on short-term impacts of the 
Procede. We approach the problem estimating income functions for the different type of 
activities pursued by ejidatarios. In particular, as the setting in which ejido households 
operate is characterized by incomplete or absent markets, a program like Procede is 
expected to affect the shadow value of land and labor (see chapter 3). Thus, it is 
important to recognize that households will face income functions whose parameters may 
differ according to whether they are located in certified or uncertified ejidos. We assess 
the Procede’s impact in the framework of the literature of program evaluation and 
treatment effects. 
Before proceeding, one word of caution is necessary. Ideally, one would want to 
include landless ejido members (i.e. the avecindados) in a full evaluation of Procede’s 
impact on the ejido sector. In evaluating the program’s impact through farm size 
adjustment, we face some difficulties due to the particular sampling strategy followed in 
designing the ejido surveys. In fact, avecindados were excluded from the survey and this 
means that a sizeable portion of ejido members that might in fact have resulted as 
relevant beneficiaries from the Procede are in fact ‘cut-off’ from the evaluation. The 
evaluation of the Procede’s benefits has therefore to be confined to the subset of 
ejidatarios. 
Section 2 will discuss the methodology that will be followed in order to estimate 
the income effect of the Procede. Section 3 will present the empirical results of the 
analysis, while section 4 will draw the conclusions. 
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6.2. Methodology
To estimate the impact of the Procede on the income of the ejidatarios, we shall 
follow two steps. First, we examine whether participation to activities other than farming 
is influenced by the completion of the Procede in the ejido where the household is 
located. Second, we estimate an income function at the household level. The key 
assumption is that increased tenure security and stronger property rights affect the 
shadow price of production factors, in primis land and labor. The functional form of the 
income function needs to account for the possible influence of the Procede on factor 
returns. 
Household income is disaggregated into four components: farm profits, non-farm 
income, off-farm income, and other income. Farm profits comprise profits from crops 
and from livestock activities. Land rentals paid and received are included in the 
computations of farm income. Receipts from Procampo and Alianza are also included in 
the computation. Receipts from Procampo are an important part of household income, 
averaging roughly 8% of the total. Although in some cases Procampo has been treated 
more as a transfer from the government and therefore included in a category of other 
income along with pensions and other non-productive subsidies (e.g. de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, 2001), we follow a different line. First, Procampo is paid on the basis of 
hectares of land owned inscribed in a roster established in 1994. Procampo would be paid 
only if that land was cultivated with at least one of the eight crops considered admissible 
at that time (see chapter 1). In additions, to be eligible for the Procampo payment the land 
inscribed in the roster had to be under cultivation. Thus, receipt of Procampo is 
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conditional on production and is therefore to be considered as a transfer only in a partial 
sense. Guaranteed prices were administered also as transfers conditional on a production 
(and marketing) decision. 
Yet there is a second important, and more practical, question related to the 
inclusion of Procampo as part of income from farming. Although formally tenants of
rented land could claim the Procampo, it often happened that it would be the landlord the 
one to claim the payment. Land rentals were influenced by the decision of who would in 
the end claim the Procampo. Thus separating Procampo from income from land rentals 
may generate inconsistencies in the computation of farm income as this is computed by 
subtracting rental payments and adding rental receipts. By including Procede and 
Alianza, farm income can then be understood as net returns to land holdings and 
household labor. 
Non-farm income is the sum of wages received from employment out of 
agriculture plus income from self-employment. The former includes wages from 
employment in the services, constructions, and industrial sectors among others. The latter 
would include incomes received from owned business other than farm, sale of artisan 
crafts, and the like. Non-farm income is intended to comprise all of those income sources 
that are unrelated, in a direct sense, to the level of activity of the local farm economy54. 
Off-farm income is instead hereby defined as that part of income derived from 
activities that are directly related, in an ejido economy, to the level of activity in the farm 
sector. Agricultural wages and income received from the exploitation of common lands 
are included in this category. Although exploitation of common lands sometimes 
54 Indirect linkages can of course occur indirectly through higher farm income as consumption and 
production linkages lead to higher consumption of non farm products and therefore higher non farm 
incomes. 
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involved mining or other activities that are hardly related to agricultural activity at the 
local level, these were the exception rather than the norm. Common lands would in fact 
be mostly exploited by grazing livestock owned jointly by the ejidatarios, by cultivating 
land in collective groups, or by renting the commons to ejido members or private farmers 
or firms.  Finally, other income comprises transfers from government (pensions and non 
farm subsidies) and from privates (i.e. remittances). 
The importance that these income sources have in forming the income of the 
ejidatarios is shown in table 6.1, which provides also a breakdown by status of 
certification. 
These aggregates of non and off-farm activities are then employed in constructing 
dummies that denote whether households are participating in the underlying income 
generating activities55. We use these dummies, which describe household behavior, in 
order to estimate how Procede has affected household income strategies and resource 
allocation. This is done as follows. Let dij be the dummy that is equal to one if household 
i is participating in activity j, where j is one of the non-farm or off-farm activities. We 
model the household decision to participate in market j using a probit model specified as 
follows:





ξγβεξγβ vvjjijivvjjivij PXPXobdob )0(Pr)1(Pr
where Xiv is a vector of household variables (including a column of ones) that explain the 
decision to participate into activity j by household i in village v; βj is a vector of unknown 
parameters relative to activity j that needs to be estimated; Pv is the Procede dummy 
55 Note that participation decisions are modeled as household outcomes rather than as a result of individual 
choice. This approach was followed in Yunez and Taylor (2001) in an analysis of the role of education on  
in Mexico’s rural incomes. 
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which is equal to one if the program is completed in village v and zero otherwise; ζv is a 
village unobserved and time invariant effect56; εi is a random error term which is assumed 
to be i.i.d. across households according to a normal distribution, N(0,σε2); and Ф ( . ) is 
the cumulative normal distribution. 
One possible approach to the analysis of participation decisions would be to 
model the household choice of which activities to participate in using a multinomial logit 
(see de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001). Yet, as all households included in our sample are 
engaged in farming, we lack a reasonable alternative choice against which the probability 
of selecting other activities can be compared. In addition, we are not interested in 
analyzing the probability of being employed in non-farm versus off-farm activities. We 
are interested in understanding which households would participate in these activities (as 
a result of the Procede) given their involvement in farming. Thus, the model does not 
analyze the decision to exit farming (although the results we obtain can be suggestive of 
that choice). 
As we have argued in the previous chapter, unobserved village effects are likely to 
be important when analyzing households in the ejido sector and one should expect these 
time invariant effects to be correlated with household variables such as human and land 
assets and more specifically with the decision to adopt the Procede. Yet, if we were to 
model these unobserved village effects as fixed, we would lose along the way the 
Procede dummy, as this is common to all ejidatarios. That would in principle be a 
56 As argued in the course of chapter 5, village level affects are appropriate in the ejido setting. Ejidos are 
tightly knit communities whose internal life is regulated by commonly shared (or at least felt) institutional 
arrangements. Moreover, ejidos were created on an egalitarian basis and even though inequality in access to 
assets may have evolved over time individual ejidatario characteristics are likely to be closely correlated to 
each other. For these reasons, it is not off-the-mark to assume that individual decision making is subject to 
peer pressure in these communities. A village unobserved effect approximated through village averages of 
individual characteristics, the approach followed here and explained below, is therefore quite in line with 
the institutional setting treated here.
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solvable problem if we could use in the analysis data from both ejido surveys. However 
that is not possible for two reasons. First, the methodology of collecting information on 
household income and activity participation differs between the two surveys. Second, 
costs sustained in farming are not reported so that it is impossible to construct farm 
income for the 1992/93 crop year. The latter would be a problem only when we estimate 
the income functions. 
We are therefore left with the option of resorting to the methodology elaborated 
by Chamberlain (1984) which models unobserved ‘fixed’ effects as a projection of the 
averages of variables at the household level. In other words, we assume:












 is a vector of the household characteristics averaged across the nv
households in village v. In addition, av is a village unobserved effect that is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with both individual variables and village averages. Inserting (6.2) into 
(6.1), one obtains:









We estimate (6.3) using a probit with random effects. We then test (i) whether ψj=0, and 
(ii) whether the estimates of the parameters obtained by applying model (6.3.)  differ 
from those estimated using a simple ‘pooled’ probit model57. 
Household income functions are a useful mean of relating household assets and 
characteristics of their environment such as location and village characteristics. The 
57 We also include estimates of a fixed effects logit model as a mean of comparing  the estimates of the 
parameters on the household level variables obtained under (6.3) with those obtained under the assumption 
that unobserved village effects should in fact be modeled as fixed.
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parameter estimates can be interpreted as the returns to those assets. The derivation of the 
household income functions in an imperfect factor markets setting was discussed in 
chapter 3. There we saw that the household income function, when factor prices are 
endogenous to household and location characteristics, including institutions, could be 
modeled as:
(6.4.)                                     );,,,( ivvii
jj
iv TVPSKYY =
where Ki are household assets, Si is a vector of variables that affect household 
productivity, Pv is the Procede dummy, Vv are village characteristics that are assumed to 
influence the final outcome, such as land quality, location variables, etc. Finally, Ti
denotes the state of the technology under which household i operates. 
Specification (6.4) implicitly assimilates tenure security to the set of assets that 
influence income. Yet that does not capture an essential aspect of the problem at hand. As 
shown in chapter 3, when tenure security and property rights are strengthened, the 
shadow prices of land and of labor are affected by the changes in transaction costs that 
result from incomplete or rights. This implies that if one were to include in equation (6.4) 
the Procede dummy as a proxy for the strength of tenure security, one would be implicitly 
assuming that the return to a given asset, given by K
Y ∂∂  is independent of whether the 
ejido of residence has been certified or not. On the other hand, the assumption that the 
completion of the Procede, by changing the shadow prices of assets, would affect their 
returns could be modeled by interacting the marginal returns with the Procede dummy, 
i.e. by extending (6.4) so that:
(6.5)                               ( )ivviviijjiv TVPSPKKYY ;,,,,=
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In fact, equation (6.5) is a wrong specification of the empirical model that should be 
adopted to estimate Procede’s impact. On the other, as we shall briefly see, (6.4) would 
be a correct specification only under some restrictive assumptions. The point to notice as 
a factor that affects tenure security and property rights, the completion of the Procede 
contributes to a switch in regime. In other words, equation 6.4 holds with different 
parameters depending on whether the household operates in a certified or uncertified 
ejido. 
Following Wooldridge (2001: pp.603-614) let Yu denote the income of a 
household if it operates in an uncertified ejido and let Yc denote the income 
corresponding to the same household if it were to operate in a certified ejido. Let P be an 
indicator of Procede’s completion in a given ejido, such that  P=1 if the ejido is certified 
and P=0 otherwise. The observed household income Y is therefore equal to:
(6.6)                                    uc YPPYY )1( −+=
Assume now that the income functions under the certified and uncertified regimes can be 
modeled respectively as: 
(6.7)                              ccc uY += µ  and  uuu uY += µ
Where uc and uu are two error terms such that E(uc)=E(uu)=0.  Let X be a vector of 
observed variables (i.e. our Ki’s in equation (6.4)) Assume now that u
c and uu satisfy the 
following assumptions:
(6.8)                  cuc XXuE βκ +=)|(  and uuu XXuE βκ +=)|(
Taking  E(Y | X, P), i.e. expectations of household income conditional on the observed 
covariates and the Procede dummy, and using (6.7) and (6.8) one obtains:
(6.9)    [ ])()()(),|( uccuuuucu XPXPPXYE κκβββκµµµ −+−+++−+=
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Now, 0)()|( == iiX uEXuE , i=u,c.  Thus, from (6.8) we obtain that 
ii Xβκ −= . 
Substituting into (6.9) one obtains: 
[ ]))(()(),|( cuuuucu XXPXPPXYE βββκµµµ −−+++−+=
or 
(6.10)                   δβαµ )(~),|( XXPXPPXYE u −+++=
Expression (6.10) has three important aspects that are worth discussing. First, α is a key 
parameter that identifies the average effect (or treatment effect) of the Procede on the 
income of the sampled households. This can be easily seen by noticing that the impact of 
the Procede on household income is given by 
ucuccuuc uuEYYE µµµµ −=−+−=− )()( . Second, (6.10) allows assessment of the 
distributive impact of the Procede across households according to their specific asset 
endowments. To see why that is the case, notice that using (6.8) we get:
 (6.11)            δαµµ )()|()|( XXXuuEXYYE ucucuc −+=−+−=−
 Having obtained α̂  and δ̂ , one can then derive how household assets affect Procede’s 
impact:
 (6.12)                                         




Finally, we note that if one is willing to accept the restrictive assumption 
(6.13)                         )|()|( XuEXuE uc =
then (6.10) ‘shrinks’ to 
(6.14)                              uXPPXYE βαµ ++= ~),|(
which is what one would get by specifying (6.4) as a function linear in variables, 
including P. Assumption  (6.13) is restrictive because it implicitly restricts the switch in 
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regime to affect only the intercept terms in (6.7).  That assumes that the returns to assets 
are unaffected by the change in regime, which might be questionable in environments 
characterized by a high degree of market imperfection.
To proceed with the empirical analysis of the impact of Procede, we need to 
specify equations (6.10) and (6.14). The first step is to decide which variables should be 
included.  Household assets are assumed to consist of labor, land, machinery and working 
animals, and livestock. Labor is defined to be the number of household members older 
than 16 and is separated into female and male adult members. Land assets are separated 
into rainfed and irrigated cultivable lands and into natural pastures. The latter are 
typically used for grazing livestock, although in some instances households cultivate 
crops on these lands. Units of measurement are hectares.  
As machinery, working animals, and livestock are reported in terms of units by type 
rather than in terms of their value, their inclusion as a vector of variables would have 
complicated the estimation process while adding little in terms of information. To 
aggregate the various types of assets we proceeded as follows. Concerning machinery 
and working animals, the 1997 survey provides information on the number of units of 
various types of machinery (tractors, trucks, harvesters, threshers, etc.) and working 
animals (oxen, horses). In addition, ejidatarios that have rented machinery and working 
animals report information on the rental rates paid. These rates are used to construct 
municipal level rental rates for each category of machinery and working animals. Owned 
machinery and working animals are then aggregated using the imputed rental rates as 
weights. 
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The value of owned livestock, which includes cattle, sheep, and goats, is computed 
using the information on prices of animals purchased and sold. Prices averaged at the 
municipal level are then used in a procedure analogous to the one used in the 
computation of the value of machinery and working animals. 
Following other studies on Mexican households’ income sources (e.g. Yúnez-Naude 
and Taylor, 2001, de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001), we assume that the household income 
function corresponding to regime i is given by a linear function in levels:
(6.15)  ivjivjivjivjivjivjivjivj
j
iv NLARIFMSY 98654321 ββββββββ +++++++= , 
j = c, u58, where Yjiv is the net income of household i in village v
59, M is the number of 
males, F that of females; I, R, and A are the hectares of irrigated, rainfed, and pasture 
land respectively; L is the value of livestock owned, while N is the value of machinery 
and working animals owned; S is taken to be: jivZS λ= , where Z is a vector of 
household and location characteristics.  The vector of unknown (reduced form) 
parameters β and λ depends on which type of regime j the household operates in. 
The Z vector is assumed to include the age and age squared and education of the 
head of the household (both expressed in years and their squared terms), a dummy equal 
to one if the ejidatario is a male; a dummy for whether the ejido is endowed with 
common lands; and the number of urban areas located within one hour of public 
transportation as a measure of location and non-farm opportunities. Unobserved village 
effects are modeled as done in the participation analysis. 
58 Note: c stands for certified, while u stands for uncertified. 
59 Net income is defined as the sum of farm profits and revenues from off and non farm income. See above 
for an explanation of how farm profits were computed. 
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The Procede dummy is included as an additional element in the vector Z in the 
restricted model (6.14). In addition, we expand (6.16) by including the interaction terms 
as in (6.10). More specifically, we interact the Procede dummy with the variables 
representing land assets and male and female household members, all transformed in 
deviation from the sample mean (see (6.10)). 
Finally, we estimate (6.15) in its ‘restricted’ and ‘interaction’ forms (see 6.14 and 
6.10 respectively) for the four different types of incomes. As all ejidatarios included in 
the sample are farmers60, we estimate the income function for farm income and total 
household income using the GLS estimator assuming random effects with village 
averages (which in the case of the equation with interaction terms will include also 
averages of such interaction terms in the linear projection of the village unobserved 
effects).  The equations for non-farm, off farm, and other income will be estimated using 
a Tobit, along the lines of the land rental equations in chapter 5. 
6.3. Results
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 report descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis 
that follows. These tables suggest that farming is more important as a source of income 
for ejidatarios in uncertified ejidos, while farm size tends to be somewhat larger in the 
case of certified ejidatarios. Participation in off farm and non-farm activities is greater 
among certified ejidatarios. Table 6.2 compares certified and uncertified ejidatarios by 
type of out of farm activity61. Years of education of the household head are higher for 
60 We recall that not all ejidatarios own land. Some ejidatarios may have retained their title, which gives 
rights of access to common lands, even though they own no land.  
61 A give ejidatario may contribute to the average of more than one columns of the table if its household is 
involved in more than one out of farm activity. 
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households that participate into non-farm activities, for both type of ejidadatarios. 
Ejidatarios engaged in non-farm activities appear to own more land, and of better quality, 
and to being endowed with more machinery and livestock.   
We begin by examining the participation equations with a probit model with 
random effects and village-level variables (see above). Moreover, we provide estimates 
of a logit model with fixed effects in order to compare the implications in terms of 
parameter estimates of alternative specifications of unobserved (village-level) effects.  
The traditional fixed effects approach does not allow separating the effect of the Procede 
on the participation decisions, as the variable is common to all households living in a 
given ejido. The results of the logit model with fixed effects are therefore presented only 
as a mean of comparing the parameter estimates obtained from the regressions based on 
the specification of the unobserved effects á la Chamberlain (1984). 
A likelihood ratio test of the null that the random effects model does not differ 
systematically from the pooled model is rejected at the 5% confidence level in the case of 
both the non-farm and off-farm regressions. On the other hand, the test that the effects of 
village averages (excluding the dummies for the Procede and for the presence of common 
lands, and the regional and agro-ecological zones dummies) are jointly equal to zero 
cannot be rejected at the 5% level of confidence. Thus, we examine the results of the 
regressions presented in columns 2 and 4 of table 6.3.
First, households that are relatively more endowed with labor, controlling for land 
assets, do participate more to off and non-farm activities. This in itself is not surprising, 
but the results suggest that there is some specialization by females in participating to non 
farm activities, while males seem to influence participation to off-farm activities 
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comparatively more. The coefficient on the female adult members is significant at the 1% 
level in the non-farm equation and insignificant in the off-farm equation. As off-farm 
activities are largely local in nature, women seem to be relatively more mobile than men 
in finding employment out of the farm. Notice that the gender of the head of the 
household is ‘neutral’ with respect to out of the farm employment decisions. The results 
point towards a gender-based specialization in working activities out of the farm.
Second, land assets play a very different role in the participation in off versus 
non-farm activities. Regarding individual land assets, the negative and significant at the 
1% level relationship between irrigated land and off-farm activities is to be expected. 
Rainfed land fails to be significant. This may reflect different intensities of labor in the 
production of crops: if crops on irrigated land, such as vegetables and fruits are more 
labor intensive, farmers that own these type of land will demand more hired labor and 
supply less of their own on the local market. A second explanation is that irrigated land 
implies double cropping, while rainfed land typically implies a single crop in a year62. 
Thus, the difference in the patterns of seasonality among farmers with and without 
irrigated land may explain why the two types of lands have different impact (rainfed land 
has none in fact) on activities out of the farm. Irrigated land may also be a proxy for 
better access to capital, which would then reduce the need to supply labor in order to 
circumvent liquidity constraints. However, this hypothesis seems not to be corroborated. 
If a liquidity constraint motivation were really at work one would expect to find a 
significantly negative relationship also in the non-farm activities equation. In addition, 
other proxies for access to capital such as value of machinery and livestock owned would 
62 There are exceptions such as farms in States located in the Gulf region, where climatic conditions favor 
double cropping on rainfed lands. 
182
also appear significantly negatively related. Concerning common lands, their presence in 
an ejido is a source of income at the local level.  
Human capital, as one would expect, is a significant asset in improving 
participation to non-farm activities, while it has no effect on participation to off-farm 
activities.  This is an interesting result that resembles those obtained in recent work on 
rural poverty in Latin America (see López and Valdés, 2001). Livestock capital is 
negatively related to off-farm employment, perhaps reflecting the nature of the activity, 
which is less subject to the seasonal peaks that characterize crop production. 
The key variable is the Procede dummy. The interesting result we obtain is that at 
the 1% level of significance certification through the Procede is associated with a higher 
share of income from (and participation in) off-farm activities, controlling for other 
factors. In spite of its statistical significance, the impact is not too high. The marginal 
effect at its maximum is roughly equal to 0.4 (the maximum value of a standard normal 
density function) times the estimated coefficient, 0.303. Participation to the Procede 
increases the probability for a household to participate to off-farm activities by 13%. As 
on average 23% of the households participate in off-farm income activities (table 6.2), 
this impact is not trivial. On the other hand, Procede fails to be associated with increased 
participation to non-farm activities. As employment in off-farm activities is typically 
inversely related to access to land63, one would assume that the former result would be 
particularly important for those households that are net suppliers of labor on the local 
market, i.e. small farmers and avecindados, i.e. for those households endowed relatively 
more in terms of labor. As the households included in the sample are ejidatarios only (i.e. 
63 Provided land and labor are complements in production (i.e. increase in the use of one factor raises the 
marginal productivity of the other). 
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avecindados are excluded), it is difficult to state with certainty that an activation of the 
local labor market has been another channel through which the Procede has benefited the 
landless ejido members. Yet that is a reasonable suspicion on the basis of the evidence 
produced relative to the ejidatarios. 
To bring more convincing evidence on how Procede’s impact is mediated by 
access to assets, we need to look at the income function model with interaction effects 
presented in equation (6.10). The model was applied to estimate the total income function 
and the income functions for the separate types of activity. Non-farm, off farm and other 
income activities64are estimated using a Tobit given the large number of zeros appearing 
in the data (see table 1). All equations assume unobserved village heterogeneity being 
modeled as described in the previous section. In all equations with the exception of the 
one for other income, a likelihood ratio test that the random error model is not 
systematically different from a pooled model is rejected. For all equations a Wald test of 
the null that the village averages are simultaneously equal to zero is rejected at the 1% 
level. In the case of the ‘other-income’ equation, the model is re-estimated assuming 
cluster effects. The results of the estimations are reported in table 6.4, which is divided 
into four sections. The first reports results for variables referring to household 
characteristics and the Procede dummy. The second section contains the results that 
concern the interaction terms (i.e. the result of the demeaned assets interacted with the 
Procede dummy), in turn reflecting the distributive effects of the Procede. The following 
section of the table reports village averages. The last section reports results on variables 
reflecting location and on dummies that signal whether the household is a borrower or 
64 Notice that in a strict sense it is improper referring to other income as an activity as this source of income 
is made of state transfers and remittances, both of which households have little ability to influence over the 
short term. Nevertheless, we adopt the ‘activity’ terminology for convenience. 
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lender of land. The dummy is included in order to control for the monetary effect that 
land loans have on farm income. One would expect (as in fact it does) that these variables 
would be irrelevant in the case of out-of farm activities. 
We begin our discussion of the results by looking at the impact of Procede, the 
focus of our analysis. The clear result is that Procede affects the income received from 
farm, non-farm, and off-farm activities65. Interestingly, the program’s impact on farm 
income is significantly different from zero and negative while it is significantly different 
from zero and positive on the other two types of income. This contrast helps explaining 
why the coefficient on Procede in the total income equation appears with a negative sign 
while being not significantly different from zero66. 
These results imply that the impact of Procede via land markets and on-farm 
household labor allocation decisions is negative. Although counterintuitive, the result is 
consistent with the results in chapter 5. There we saw that the Procede increased the 
supply of land, but did not improve the ejidatarios’ access to land via rental market67. 
Thus, the evidence suggests that reinforcing property rights of the ejidatarios has in fact 
led to their disengagement from farming. Given that in our sample avecindados and 
private farmers are not included, the negative impact we have found is only a partial 
equilibrium result and it cannot be extrapolated to conclude that the Procede has reduced 
farm income in the ejido sector and even less so in the whole agricultural sector of 
Mexico. 
65 Other income sources are largely transfers and remittances and therefore it is not surprising that they are 
largely unaffected by the Procede.
66 Sample variability and measurement noise are also likely to play a role in this lack of significance.
67 As we saw in chapter 5, the ejidos’ avecindados were those that most likely have increased their access 
to land as a result of the Procede.
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The parameter of the Procede dummy is an average treatment effect, meaning that 
averaging across all observations, the impact of the program on income that households 
derive from farming is negative, while that from off-farm and non-farm activities is 
positive. Yet, the program’s impact may differ across households depending on their 
access to assets. The interaction terms, which describe the pattern of the distributive 
impact, are reported in the second of table 6.4. Here we limit the discussion to 
coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10% confidence level. 
Interestingly enough, the interaction terms with respect to (demeaned) land assets plays a 
role only in the case of farm income. In particular, above average size farms have a 
negative return from the Procede, while farms below the average size gain. Thus, looking 
at farm income, the data suggests that Procede has had an equalizing effect along the 
farm size distribution curve. Given the importance of farm income, this conclusion is 
reflected also in the case of the total income regression (i.e. column 1).  Second, land is 
the only type of asset that has a significant interaction with the Procede dummy. The lack 
of significance of the interaction terms involving male and female labor lends support to 
the conclusion that there is no systematic difference in the returns to these types of labor 
across the regimes with and without the Procede (see equation 6.10). 
We now look at the returns to household assets, controlling for Procede and other 
location characteristics (see the first part of table 6.4). The estimates are quite reasonable 
and in line with expectations. The marginal return to a hectare irrigated land is higher 
than the one to rainfed land. Land, irrespective of access to irrigation, does not affect the 
returns to off-farm and non-farm income activities. The presence of common lands in the 
ejido negatively affects total household income, mainly due their negative impact on farm 
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income and in spite of its positive impact through the off-farm income activities that 
include distribution of ‘dividends’ from management of the commons. This result may 
suggest that in Mexico common lands are not a factor supporting income, although this 
does not imply they may have a redistributive or insurance function for the poorest ejido 
members.  The underlying causes might be found in the excessive cost of managing these 
lands relative to the benefits they effectively provide. This does not imply that common 
lands should be privatized. Common lands are an important source of income for the 
poorest ejidatarios and they are relied upon under adverse contingencies. Yet, on average 
the net effect might be negative across all ejidatarios. 
Household labor does have a relevant impact on household income. This is to be 
expected. Yet the impact of female and male adult members is quite different across type 
of income. First, the endowment of male labor has no impact on farm income, differently 
from female labor. Second, male labor has a significant impact on off-farm income, while 
female labor has none. Thirdly, both female and male labor endowments have a 
significant return from non-farm income. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that hired and family male labor is quite substitutable in local agricultural labor markets 
that are quite competitive. Therefore, the demand for farm labor would depend only on 
real wages and perhaps other assets, but not on the household endowment of male labor. 
The endowment of male labor instead increases the supply of household labor to off and 
non-farm activities, and therefore the income the household derives from these sources. 
On the other hand, the endowment of female labor increases income received from non-
farm activities and, to a lesser extent from farm activities. Coupled with the observation 
that it is male labor the type of labor endowment that drives the supply of labor to off-
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farm activities, the results on female labor lend credit to the hypothesis that it is this type 
of labor that is less substitutable on the ejido farms. 
We have already noticed the negative impact of livestock assets on participation 
to non-farm activities. This was rationalized by hypothesizing that the nature of livestock 
production limits the periods of slack during which labor might temporarily be allocated 
to non-farm activities. Here we find that one peso of livestock yields a yearly net return 
of 0.14 pesos, i.e. 14% rate of return, slightly below the 18% interest rate prevailing in 
Mexico in 1997. 
The characteristics of the household head are also important in explaining the 
composition of household income. Older heads are less involved in non-farm activities, 
while they are receptors of remittances68. Education improves the return from non-farm 
activities, while it has no impact on farm income and off-farm income69. This is in line 
with other studies that have also found the importance of education of farm households to 
lie in their increased opportunities to access jobs located out of the farm sector (see 
López and Valdes, 2000). Finally, a female head of the household will receive on average 
higher remittances per capita. 
As a way of comparing the results discussed so far with what would have been 
obtained by assuming away the interaction terms (i.e. limiting the impact of the Procede 
68 This finding supports the conclusion that remittances are perhaps motivated by self-interest, more 
precisely bequest motivations, by the head’s family members (see Lucas and Stark, 1999, for a model of 
remittances which includes farm assets and family size and attempts to separate altruistic from self-
interested motivations.  
69 The average level of education of the household’s labor force was also included as a regressor but did not 
prove quite satisfactory. The education of the head performs much better. Perhaps, the education of the 
household head is a good predictor for the average level of education of the household. In addition, the 
head’s level of education has additional value added as a source of coordination ability in the sense of 
allocating resources to non farm activities more efficiently. 
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to the intercept terms in the regime income functions), we report in table 6.5 the set of 
results of the estimations of the income functions under the restrictive assumption. 
What is therefore the return to the Procede? The results in table 6.4 can be used to 
estimate the answer to that question. Computations of income effects can be made in 
terms of alternative scenarios by focusing on the subsets of certified and uncertified. 
We compute the estimates of net gains relying on coefficient estimates that are 
significant at the 10% level. The first step is to compute expression 6.10 for each type of 
income using information from table 6.4. For the non-farm, off-farm, and other income 
equations, we use the derivative of the unconditional expectations E(Y|X) to compute the 





. Given that we have estimated these 
income equations with a Tobit, expression 6.10 needs to be weighted by the probability 
that the income being considered is in fact positive, ( )σxbΦ , where (.)Φ is the 
cumulative standard normal. 
The results are displayed in table 6.6. The interesting result is that the Procede has 
affected negatively the income of the ejidatarios. In particular, those ejidos that have 
participated in the program (i.e. certified ejidos) report a loss of MX$ 4,43970, roughly 
US$ 490. This loss needs to be added to an estimated per farm cost of certifying an ejido 
household of MX$ 4,00071. On the other hand, and here we find a really remarkable 
result, the loss in income comes through its farm component. Non-farm and off-farm 
70 This is the difference of MX$ 7,360 (off-farm income) and MX$ 4,588. 
71 Personal communication with Mr. Nikolás, director of the Procede program at the Procuraduría Agraria 
in  Mexico City.  The figure corresponds to approximately US$ 500 in 1997 and does not include the cost 
of measuring and certifying common lands. 
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incomes compensate partially the loss of net farm income. The predicted income loss for 
uncertified ejidos if they were to participate to the program are estimated at MX$ 3,194, 
with the same of patterns of losses and gains as in the case of certified ejidos. In addition, 
in both cases the program has a stronger positive effect through its non-farm than off-
farm component. If Procede is indeed able to reduce those transaction costs related to 
insecurity of tenure and property rights, then the program will likely have a larger impact 
through non-farm activities rather than through the local agricultural labor market.  
Why do we obtain such unexpected results? How could a program like Procede 
generate such a loss? Which factors can systematically affect the impact of the Procede 
on the various components of household income and in particular net farm income? We 
are inclined to believe that the answer to this question does not lie in an exceptional 
behavior of farm income. Had yields or prices been particularly good during the 1996/97 
crop year, then households that had reallocated their labor from on farm to out of farm 
activities would have been negatively surprised relative to households who had kept their 
labor on the farm. In fact, this is not the case. Corn yields and prices were below average 
compared to 1994, the year in which Procede was launched. This outcome can in fact 
help explaining why local agricultural labor markets were not particularly ‘remunerative’ 
for the ejido farmers. In other words, we would expect to find a negative impact of the 
Procede on farm income if households had been reallocating labor from the farm to out-
of-farm activities72.  Instead, the explanation needs to be found in the particularly 
negative impact of the Tequila crisis on urban labor markets, with a fall of real wages and 
rising unemployment in the few years following the end of 1994. Households that had 
72 Obviously, some degree of market imperfections explains why farm size adjusted to family labor 
reallocation away from the farm. 
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reallocated their labor to non-farm activities were therefore able to realize less income 
than expected as compared to households that had remained more concentrated on 
agricultural production.   
The key point, nevertheless, is that the Procede has impacted household income 
sources in opposing directions, signaling a definite drift towards less labor intensity in 
agricultural production in the ejido sector. This pattern of response signals that the 
introduction of stronger property rights in the ejido sector through the Procede has started 
a process of gradual reallocation of labor away from agriculture and towards a pattern of 
diversification of income sources. This is the fundamental result of this analysis. It sheds 
light on an aspect related to land titling programs that is at variance with the traditional 
literature more focused on measuring the impact of titles on land productivity and access 
to credit. 
6.4. Conclusions
In this chapter we have provided an analytical framework to measure the impact 
of a land titling program on household income and on its different components. The 
model is based on the assumption that the implementation of the program, by affecting 
property rights and the institutional dynamics within villages characterized by traditional 
social structures, has led to a new ‘regime’ in terms of shadow facto prices. This 
motivated the switching regression approach followed here. 
We then have estimated the impact of the Procede on participation by ejido 
households to non-farm and off-farm activities. The important finding is that Procede has 
affected household income components in opposing directions. The results are consistent 
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with the hypothesis elaborated in chapter 3 that households have reallocated their labor 
endowment from farming to out of farm activities. This has caused a loss of farm income 
uncompensated by an increase in income from out-of-farm activities. Yet, the evidence is 
that a process of disengagement of labor resources from farming, previously 
characterized by a high labor to land intensity relatively to the private sector, has started 
with the Procede. It is likely that once the urban economy will be back on a growth path, 
these changes will produce a positive impact on ejido households and on rural poverty in 
Mexico. 
Should the Procede go on? To begin with, the estimated costs of certifying an 
ejidatario are likely to increase as the Procede advances for at least two reasons. First, 
uncertified ejidos are increasingly located in remote areas with a difficult topography (see 
chapter 4). This will increase the measurement and administrative costs. Second, the cost 
of conflict resolution will also increase as the program advances as ejidos with border 
problems have been clearly bypassed in an effort to speed the program (again chapter 4). 
In addition, the benefits of certification are also likely to get smaller as non-farm income 
opportunities will be scarcer for more remote ejidos located in mountainous regions and 
more segregated from the urban economy. Having said that, we believe that the net 
benefits from the continuation of the program will materialize in the near future and that 
therefore the option of advancing with the program should not be discarded. 
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that the social benefits generated 
by the program may also be higher than those accruing through the ejidatarios’ incomes. 
First, we have good reasons to suspect that the avecindados have been an important 
social group whose opportunities in the local agricultural economy have been improved 
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through the Procede. Second, a titling program of the breadth and scope of the Procede 
generates two long-term benefits that are difficult to quantify using micro-economic data. 
One is related to the support that the agrarian cadastre will provide for improving the 
effectiveness of policy making in rural areas. The second benefit, even more intangible, is 
related to the reduction in conflicts brought about by the Procede through its built-in 
decentralized and participative conflict resolution process.  
Finally, one important conclusion we draw from the present analysis is that land 
titling programs do not need to be assessed against their impact on farm productivity. The 
Procede teaches that the farm economy may be the one least affected by a titling 
program. Small farmers in many poor areas of the world are undergoing rapid changes in 
their marketing and commercial environments. There is a growing sense that small 
farmers find it increasingly difficult to compete with commercial farms in settings where 
factor markets are largely absent or incomplete. Where land tenure insecurity is a strong 
deterrent to exit the farm, even if temporarily, titles might offer an initial opportunity to 
start a process of diversification of household income into more remunerative jobs. 
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    Household size 5.6 5.7 5.4
    # male adults 1.7 1.8 1.7
    # female adults 1.6 1.6 1.6
    # children 2.1 2.2 2.0
Head of household characteristics
   % male household head 96 97 96
   education (years) 3.2 3.2 3.2
Age 52 51 53
Productive assets
Land assets
    Rainfed land (ha) 7.7 7.6 7.9
    Irrigated land (ha) 1.7 1.2 2.2
    Natural pasture (ha) 4.2 3.5 4.9
    Forest (ha) 1.5 1.1 1.9
Farm production capital 
    Machinery, working animals, struct. (MX$) 820 830 808
    Livestock (thousand pesos)        14,604          13,600        15,738 
Household income:
Participation to non-farm income sources (%)
    Non farm 50 48 53
    Off farm 23 20 26
    Other income 30 26 33
Income by source
   Total income        24,591          24,083        25,166 
   Farm income        15,738          16,387        15,004 
   Non farm income          5,328            4,484          6,282 
   Off farm income          1,946            1,635          2,297 
   Other income          1,580            1,577          1,582 
Per capita income by source
  Total income          5,661            5,385          5,973 
  Farm          3,850            3,806          3,899 
  Non farm             996               866          1,143 
   Off farm             420               327             525 
   Other income             395               387             405 
Urban centers within 1 hour transportation 3.5 3.9 3.1
# Observations          1,663 882 781
Source: 1997 Ejido Survey
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Table 6. 2: Descriptive statistics by income sources other than farm income
Income activities other than farm








Household size 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.0 5.2 5.3 5.1
# male adults 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6
# female adults 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
# children 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.8
% male household head 96 97 96 97 97 97 93 94 93
education (years) 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.2 2.5 2.6 2.4
age 51 51 51 50 50 50 59 59 58
Rainfed land (ha) 7.5 7.5 7.5 5.7 5.1 6.2 8.8 8.9 8.7
Irrigated land (ha) 1.6 1.1 2.0 1.1 0.6 1.6 1.9 1.7 2.1
Natural pasture (ha) 3.8 3.0 4.6 3.1 2.8 3.4 4.7 5.2 4.2
Forest (ha) 2.0 1.1 3.0 1.0 0.7 1.2 1.2 0.6 1.7
Machinery, working animals, structures (pesos) 858 903 813 677 734 627 977 1,112 857 
Livestock (thousand pesos) 13,911 13,831 13,992 8,142 8,206 8,087 17,041 18,878 15,416 
Urban centers within 1 hour transportation 4.0 4.6 3.4 3.9 5.3 2.7 4.4 5.9 3.1
# Observations 831 419 412 377 175 202 492 231 261
Source: 1997 Ejido Survey
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Table 6. 3: Determinants of household participation to non and off farm activities
Non-Farm Activities Off-farm activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit r.e. probit r.e. Logit f.e. Probit r.e. probit r.e. Logit f.e.
Rainfed land 
(ha)
-0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.024*** -0.029*** -0.046***
[0.147] [1.402] [0.312] [2.868] [4.124] [2.924]
Irrigated land 
(ha)
-0.014 -0.010 -0.028 -0.004 -0.019 0.001
[1.136] [0.989] [1.280] [0.214] [1.206] [0.023]
Grazing land 
(ha)
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.016




0.130 0.103 0.459** 0.479***
[1.081] [0.862] [2.561] [2.673]
# adult 
males
0.124*** 0.140*** 0.203*** 0.174*** 0.196*** 0.291***
[2.929] [3.506] [2.884] [3.535] [4.247] [3.379]
# adult 
females 
0.220*** 0.220*** 0.373*** 0.082* 0.059 0.136
[5.091] [5.444] [5.034] [1.649] [1.263] [1.571]
Value of farm 
machinery
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
[0.149] [0.235] [0.155] [0.538] [1.647] [0.593]
Value of 
livestock
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000
[0.680] [0.122] [0.649] [1.761] [2.135] [1.376]
Age of 
ejidatario
-0.005 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008** -0.017**




-0.004* -0.004* -0.007* -0.003 -0.004 -0.008
[1.808] [1.709] [1.892] [0.926] [1.032] [1.101]
Education of 
ejidatario
0.093*** 0.098*** 0.156*** 0.019 0.023 0.041




0.131 0.086 0.292 0.155 0.138 0.285
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[0.620] [0.438] [0.771] [0.610] [0.575] [0.636]
# urban areas 
within 1hour
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
[0.346] [0.701] [0.435] [0.484]
Procede 
(dummy)
0.144 0.140 0.309** 0.303**


















































-0.515** -0.352* -1.137*** -1.016***
[2.529] [1.914] [4.066] [3.923]
Center 
(dummy)
-0.012 0.073 -1.065*** -0.976***
[0.073] [0.499] [4.916] [4.928]
Gulf 
(dummy)
0.271 0.254 -0.084 0.023
[1.203] [1.150] [0.284] [0.079]
South Pacific 
(dummy)
-0.487*** -0.394** -1.369*** -1.248***




-0.023 -0.013 0.180 0.144
[0.119] [0.066] [0.710] [0.559]
Humid 
temperate
0.020 0.039 0.152 0.215
[0.058] [0.115] [0.350] [0.501]
Subhumid 
temperate
-0.007 0.017 0.317 0.309
[0.032] [0.077] [1.052] [1.050]
Arid and semi-
arid
0.185 0.231 -0.122 -0.113
[0.788] [0.993] [0.385] [0.361]
Constant -0.485 -0.750** -0.231 -0.761
[0.658] [1.992] [0.218] [1.564]
Observations
1645 1645 1373 1645 1645 870
Number of 
efolio
286 286 233 286 286 149
Wald test: 
Chi2=
123.688 115.673 133.604 126.620
LR test: Chi2= 68.973 42.260
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6. 4: Household income functions with distribution effects
(1) (2)
Total income Farm net income
Rainfed land (ha) 1,076.751*** 984.117***
[6.161] [6.595]
Irrigated land (ha) 2,659.944*** 2,630.302***
[6.194] [7.174]
Natural pasture (ha) -56.674 -113.897*
[0.710] [1.670]
Common lands (dummy) -6,544.079** -6,823.211***
[2.294] [2.645]
# Male adults 1,699.638 -382.226
[1.126] [0.296]
# Female adults 4,657.276*** 2,628.443**
[3.161] [2.090]
Farm capital value 1.162 1.408*
[1.260] [1.788]
Livestock value 0.134*** 0.144***
[3.402] [4.307]
Age of head 72.308 -5.636
[0.777] [0.071]
Age of head squared -96.352 -69.701
[1.493] [1.265]
Education of head (years) 2,164.438** 1,248.215*
[2.566] [1.733]
Head gender (dummy=1 if male) -3,163.171 558.496
[0.584] [0.121]
# urban areas within 1 hour -158.763 -143.972
[1.526] [1.534]
Procede (dummy) -2,402.619 -4,587.811**
[1.063] [2.244]
Demeaned  interacted  terms
Rainfed land -658.647*** -616.283***
[2.754] [3.018]
Irrigated land -1,765.768*** -1,774.081***
[2.798] [3.292]
Natural pasture 29.101 115.625
[0.200] [0.931]
# Male adults -86.725 -1,455.082
[0.040] [0.795]
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# Female adults 673.774 -764.796
[0.312] [0.415]
Village averages
Rainfed land 31.833 144.408
[0.110] [0.566]
Irrigated land -522.722 -425.752
[0.779] [0.718]
Natural pasture 768.607*** 781.845***
[3.726] [4.228]
# Adult female -7,826.203** -8,270.752**
[2.068] [2.440]
Farm capital 1.287 -0.210
[0.688] [0.126]
# Adult male 1,094.028 2,741.053
[0.275] [0.769]
Livestock capital -0.078 -0.139*
[0.902] [1.793]
Age of head 75.579 60.476
[0.402] [0.361]
Age of head squared 356.556** 292.380*
[2.018] [1.841]
Head education -3,382.919* -2,423.612
[1.681] [1.343]
Head gender (dummy=1 if male) 3,625.910 -1,090.158
[0.267] [0.090]
Demeaned Rainfed land -24.468 168.250
[0.062] [0.485]
Demeaned Irrigated land 1,922.709** 1,535.004*
[2.150] [1.953]
Demeaned Natural pasture -740.890*** -721.999***
[2.683] [2.943]
Demeaned # Adult male 3,050.771 1,444.858
[0.550] [0.291]
Demeaned # Adult female 6,218.761 8,030.338
[1.135] [1.638]
Other variables
Loans land (dummy) 10,382.994* 12,277.764**
[1.810] [2.489]
Borrows/lends land (dummy) -9,865.949 -11,043.070*
[1.446] [1.876]
North Pacific (dummy) -10,300.778** -1,960.943
[2.088] [0.441]
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Center (dummy) -11,636.599*** -4,640.873
[3.058] [1.349]
Gulf (dummy) -13,606.539** -4,527.937
[2.520] [0.927]
South Pacific (dummy) -13,981.348*** -5,026.823
[3.446] [1.369]
Sub-humid tropical (dummy) 2,130.011 4,452.839
[0.465] [1.075]
Humid temperate (dummy) 716.469 4,505.551
[0.089] [0.608]
Sub-humid temperate (dummy) 3,541.215 6,918.093
[0.691] [1.492]




R2 Within 0.11 0.12
R2 Between 0.43 0.42
R2 Overall 0.22 0.22




Number of ejidos 286 286
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Off-farm income Other income
Rainfed land (ha) 174.265 -707.884 125.979
[1.396] [1.594] [1.170]
Irrigated land (ha) -60.518 -2,147.655 -22.740
[0.180] [1.644] [0.105]
Natural pasture (ha) 61.258 12.163 19.058
[1.057] [0.153] [1.172]
Common lands (dummy) 1,471.789 5,107.719** 968.621
[0.666] [1.966] [0.772]
# Male adults 3,634.287*** 3,346.475** -1,152.720*
[3.365] [2.341] [1.668]
# Female adults 3,549.525*** 1,555.610 138.671
[3.385] [0.948] [0.156]
Farm capital value -0.580 -0.049 0.737
[0.875] [0.046] [1.554]
Livestock value -0.015 -0.098* 0.019
[0.542] [1.872] [1.029]
Age of head -83.506 24.985 293.482***
[1.236] [0.154] [5.642]
Age of head squared -40.805 -108.295 8.851
[0.906] [1.258] [0.260]
Education of head (years) 1,372.358** 1,394.086 -462.859
[2.275] [1.129] [1.088]
Head gender (dummy=1 if male) -1,271.311 -2,228.347 -4,442.774**
[0.323] [0.373] [2.322]
# urban areas within 1 hour -6.663 -14.771 47.596*
[0.085] [0.191] [1.724]
Procede (dummy) 3,173.949* 7,359.796*** 550.871
[1.824] [2.916] [0.574]
Demeaned  interacted  terms
Rainfed land -151.302 344.002 -174.459
[0.903] [0.774] [1.315]
Irrigated land -196.705 2,692.526* -274.106
[0.426] [1.861] [0.963]
Natural pasture -24.019 -305.932* -124.832**
[0.227] [1.681] [1.976]
# Male adults 697.208 258.827 346.768
[0.463] [0.147] [0.344]




Rainfed land -320.628 -283.526 -113.239
[1.461] [0.981] [0.590]
Irrigated land -564.005 -536.896 287.249
[1.006] [0.503] [1.027]
Natural pasture -55.936 137.954 -52.421
[0.356] [0.614] [0.820]
# Adult female -512.633 1,688.176 1,547.846
[0.177] [0.557] [0.816]
Farm capital 0.889 -3.498 1.095
[0.639] [1.564] [1.326]
# Adult male -1,791.298 -1,200.187 -2,253.229
[0.585] [0.379] [1.361]
Livestock capital 0.055 0.009 0.040
[0.846] [0.087] [0.883]
Age of head 97.879 -180.623 192.786***
[0.692] [0.839] [2.613]
Age of head squared 131.135 88.763 -40.448
[0.982] [0.487] [0.504]
Head education -198.650 -1,886.422 85.383
[0.131] [0.997] [0.093]
Head gender (dummy=1 if male) -198.044 -3,676.349 4,959.294
[0.019] [0.345] [0.992]
Demeaned Rainfed land 219.969 -232.126 77.234
[0.750] [0.674] [0.359]
Demeaned Irrigated land 1,251.948* -228.960 31.600
[1.794] [0.186] [0.097]
Demeaned Natural pasture -143.183 -89.543 194.193
[0.676] [0.321] [1.632]
Demeaned # Adult male 4,137.309 6,705.884 -1,481.339
[0.988] [1.523] [0.647]
Demeaned # Adult female -1,604.895 -8,705.317** -421.381
[0.384] [2.027] [0.171]
Other variables
Loans land (dummy) -205.842 -8,077.814 2,128.487
[0.050] [1.189] [1.003]
Borrows/lends land (dummy) 4,740.016 2,866.166 -498.708
[1.004] [0.559] [0.198]
North Pacific (dummy) -9,568.498** -24,140.376*** -2,895.815
[2.494] [3.068] [1.293]
Center (dummy) -3,088.027 -23,976.460*** -1,611.132
203
[1.075] [3.459] [0.888]
Gulf (dummy) -752.322 -10,486.213* 1,085.188
[0.184] [1.865] [0.523]
South Pacific (dummy) -10,742.4*** -26,354.4*** -4,258.2*
[3.431] [3.979] [1.959]
Sub-humid tropical (dummy) 782.349 -1,031.009 -997.574
[0.225] [0.199] [0.593]
Humid temperate (dummy) 741.811 -7,200.068 -2,670.726
[0.119] [0.908] [0.789]
Sub-humid temperate (dummy) 722.438 -2,593.490 -3,410.858
[0.184] [0.451] [1.585]
Ardi and semi-arid (dummy) 2,669.335 -10,505.020 -1,937.197
[0.630] [1.409] [0.878]
Constant -16,972.729 9,247.562 -31,599.762***
[1.194] [0.645] [3.834]
Chi 2 (Wald test of model 
significance)
174.39 109.52 102.56
Observations 1645 1645 1645
Number of ejidos 286 286 286
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6. 5: Household income functions without distributive effects
Total income Farm net income
Random Effects Random Effects
Rainfed land (ha) 740.596*** 675.994***
[5.983] [6.381]
Irrigated land (ha) 1,852.126*** 1,818.297***
[5.842] [6.702]
Natural pasture (ha) -48.179 -80.114
[0.712] [1.383]
Common lands (dummy) -5,621.883* -6,357.056**
[1.909] [2.417]
Male adults 1,817.226* -955.948
[1.654] [1.017]
Female adults 5,009.978*** 2,295.035**
[4.617] [2.472]
Farm capital value 1.401 1.683**
[1.524] [2.139]
Livestock value 0.129*** 0.141***
[3.292] [4.182]
Age of head 94.294 15.879
[1.013] [0.199]
Age of head squared -102.615 -74.495
[1.586] [1.346]
Education of head (years) 2,347.397*** 1,373.929*
[2.787] [1.906]
Head gender (dummy=1 if male) -3,684.704 -311.156
[0.679] [0.067]
# urban areas within 1 hour -99.957 -102.228
[0.933] [1.070]
Procede (dummy) -2,690.624 -4,815.141**
[1.143] [2.290]
Village averages
Rainfed land 82.297 263.653
[0.379] [1.380]
Irrigated land 429.070 278.168
[0.868] [0.641]
Natural pasture 250.590* 316.154**
[1.713] [2.448]
# Adult female -3,787.358 -3,669.354
[1.293] [1.412]
Farm capital 0.566 -0.736
[0.297] [0.436]
# Adult male 1,898.879 2,809.248
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[0.658] [1.097]
Livestock capital -0.048 -0.118
[0.534] [1.490]
Age of head 111.209 91.677
[0.575] [0.535]
Age of head squared 373.386** 310.973*
[2.052] [1.922]
Head education -3,656.806* -2,718.009
[1.760] [1.473]
Head gender (dummy=1 if male) 12,410.055 5,139.492
[0.912] [0.426]
Other variables
Loans land (dummy) 9,983.239* 11,994.217**
[1.733] [2.421]
Borrows/lends land (dummy) -9,853.124 -11,105.191*
[1.430] [1.869]
North Pacific (dummy) -7,234.529 -248.906
[1.454] [0.056]
Center (dummy) -8,896.002** -3,064.815
[2.294] [0.885]
Gulf (dummy) -11,399.919** -3,102.331
[2.056] [0.626]
South Pacific (dummy) -12,843.139*** -4,703.897
[3.073] [1.259]
Sub-humid tropical (dummy) 1,734.845 4,094.674
[0.368] [0.972]
Humid temperate (dummy) -1,236.097 3,178.940
[0.146] [0.416]
Sub-humid temperate (dummy) 3,945.358 7,103.541
[0.741] [1.493]





Number of ejidos 286 286
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1/ Tobit controlling for cluster effects
206






Tobit, r.e. Tobit1/ Tobit1/
Rainfed land (ha) 89.346 -467.210** 36.400
[1.036] [2.011] [0.553]
Irrigated land (ha) -153.144 55.311 -128.959
[0.672] [0.165] [0.941]
Natural pasture (ha) 53.382 -115.660 -11.909
[1.070] [1.073] [0.431]
Common lands (dummy) 2,271.400 5,887.487* 861.331
[1.024] [1.786] [0.690]
Male adults 4,048.345*** 3,357.068*** -940.366*
[5.243] [3.362] [1.762]
Female adults 4,526.218*** 1,610.763 520.044
[5.915] [1.454] [0.869]
Farm capital value -0.549 -0.459 0.764
[0.838] [0.473] [1.591]
Livestock value -0.015 -0.098* 0.018
[0.554] [1.867] [0.933]
Age of head -78.397 19.079 295.570***
[1.162] [0.120] [5.658]
Age of head squared -43.526 -100.497 8.495
[0.965] [1.191] [0.251]
Education of head (years) 1,470.061** 1,253.151 -415.050
[2.445] [1.074] [0.949]
Head gender (dummy=1 if male) -1,005.869 -1,465.083 -4,340.598**
[0.256] [0.275] [2.293]
# urban areas within 1 hour 16.920 13.458 41.345
[0.215] [0.140] [1.522]
Procede (dummy) 3,284.432* 6,036.093** 476.310
[1.875] [2.243] [0.486]
Village averages
Rainfed land -172.028 -383.604 -63.581
[1.079] [1.459] [0.579]
Irrigated land 227.360 -696.914 279.144
[0.629] [1.150] [1.508]
Natural pasture -160.890 74.589 18.418
[1.457] [0.459] [0.347]
# Adult female -1,295.566 -2,254.191 1,266.788
[0.594] [0.798] [0.990]
Farm capital 0.384 -2.861 1.195
[0.276] [1.237] [1.399]
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# Adult male 218.606 2,341.809 -3,007.927**
[0.103] [0.834] [2.031]
Livestock capital 0.069 0.016 0.040
[1.051] [0.150] [0.884]
Age of head 95.690 -183.780 190.656***
[0.672] [0.768] [2.587]
Age of head squared 100.284 57.380 -35.564
[0.750] [0.261] [0.454]
Head education -51.361 -1,661.006 15.229
[0.034] [0.730] [0.016]
Head gender (dummy=1 if male) 2,414.577 -4,604.718 4,261.996
[0.238] [0.360] [0.852]
Other variables
Loans land (dummy) -499.290 -8,748.425 1,638.634
[0.120] [1.263] [0.801]
Borrows/lends land (dummy) 4,598.275 1,239.932 -550.166
[0.971] [0.210] [0.234]




Center (dummy) -2,007.9 -22,300.9*** -1,550.4
[0.706] [2.976] [0.852]
Gulf (dummy) -638.414 -10,275.482 1,492.330
[0.157] [1.399] [0.762]
South Pacific (dummy) -9,713.0*** -23,995.1*** -4,239.2*
[3.110] [3.408] [1.954]
Sub-humid tropical (dummy) 263.690 -2,395.161 -895.226
[0.076] [0.413] [0.539]
Humid temperate (dummy) -12.811 -7,181.257 -2,642.840
[0.002] [0.907] [0.800]
Sub-humid temperate (dummy) 629.035 -2,893.080 -3,324.501
[0.158] [0.412] [1.570]
Ardi and semi-arid (dummy) 2,875.362 -10,961.844 -1,843.772
[0.673] [1.259] [0.858]
Constant -26,766.7** 6,244.3 -30,028.2***
[1.964] [0.354] [3.809]
Observations 1645 1645 1645
Number of ejidos 286 286 286
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1/ Tobit controlling for cluster effects
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Table 6. 6: Average Treatment Effects of the Procede
*Total income is not equal to the sum of farm, non-farm, 
off-farm and other income as only significant coefficients
in table 6.4 were used in the computations.
All 
ejidos Certified Uncertified
Total income* -3,778 -4,439 -3,194
Farm income -4,588 -5,679 -3,630
Non-farm income 724 974 503
Off-farm income 128 231 36
Other income -19 17 -51
# observations 1645 772 873
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and policy implications
7.1. Summarizing the results
This dissertation has examined the rationale, the effects, and the implications of 
the Procede, a large scale land titling program that was designed as a tool for unlocking 
the competitiveness of Mexico’s ejido sector and raising its income level. The premises 
of the Procede were that land tenure in Mexico was insecure and that productive 
incentives were constrained by the local institutions governing access to land. Tenure 
insecurity and weak property rights over land were at the root of the sector’s 
backwardness.  The Procede was conceived as a program that would improve tenure 
security and increase the incentives to improve land productivity, thereby raising the 
sector’s overall living standards. Looking back at the set of propositions spelled out at the 
end of chapter 3, what have we found?
A first conclusion is that the Procede has had an impact on land rental out  
decisions but a minor one on land rental in. Moreover, the magnitude of the former 
impact is not particularly large. The main conclusion we draw in this respect is that 
tenure insecurity is only one of several institutional constraints that limit rental market 
activities in the ejidos. 
A second important finding of this research is that the Procede has contributed 
increased diversification of ejidatarios’ income sources. The results suggest that it has 
affected negatively farm profits, but has favored participation by ejidatarios to non 
agricultural activities while opening spaces for increased participation in the local land 
market by avecindados, mostly landless farmers. The overall impact was negative, but 
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this appears to be mostly a reflection of the external shocks affecting the agricultural 
sector versus the rest of the economy in the years following the ‘Tequila crisis’. The key 
point is that Procede has structurally affected the composition of household income and 
the participation by households in non-farm and off-farm activities. 
Whether these changes will also translate into more land-related investments is a 
point we could not analyze in this setting given the structure of the available data. Indeed 
it is an issue that should be researched once the appropriate data will become available. In 
what follows we discuss some specific implications of the evidence found so far with 
respect to land rights in Mexico, land markets, and the process of diversification of 
income sources undertaken by the ejido households as a result of the new regime of land 
rights now existing in the country. 
7.2. Administration of land titling programs
In chapter 4, we examined the important issue of whether the Procede had been 
implemented following economic incentives or bureaucratic interests. We found indeed 
that the nature of the process by which the P.A. had selected ejidos in the early stages of 
the certification process is consistent with the hypotheses that this institution was 
planning its operations with goals that were not entirely consistent with the idea of 
maximizing the program’s social impact.  In order to acquire enough mass and maintain 
the program in case of a change in country’s presidency, the PA decided to proceed by 
maximizing the number and the area of certified ejido at any given point in time. This has 
led many ejidos that would in fact have benefited from the conflict resolution mechanism 
embodied in the Procede to remain excluded from the process. In addition, it appears that 
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more populous ejidos were left out and these, as we saw in chapter 6, were those ejidos 
who might have benefited most from the Procede by increasing the supply of labor to non 
and off-farm activities. This raises questions, on a scale that transcends Mexico’s context, 
regarding the implementation of compulsory or quasi-mandatory titling programs when 
these are subject to political uncertainty. The lesson that one draws is that mandatory 
titling programs need to be given a realistically long enough horizon to complete their 
operations. The Procede, from its inceptions, was assigned the unrealistic task of titling 
an extension of land equal to the sum of the land areas of Portugal, Spain, and France 
within a four year time period. This has created the incentives to distort the objectives. 
A fundamental problem in mandatory or quasi-mandatory land titling programs is
that of their sustainability over time. We have mentioned in chapter 1 that only a small 
percentage of the land sales that took place (of the few that effectively took place since 
1992, contrary to the fears of the reforms’ opponents) were in fact registered in the 
Agrarian Registry. The Procuraduría Agrária also confirmed this finding in a recent 
study. If such trend dominates future land sales, there is a concrete risk that the 
investment undertaken with the Procede will be become meaningless, as land rights will 
revert to informality. The risk of never achieving formality of land rights is not an 
exclusive characteristic of mandatory programs. As Firmin-Sellers and Sellers (1999) 
have shown, in societies where customary rights are still enough strong, individuals may 
resort to land titles in order to affirm their rights to land in front of other community 
members, without in fact completing the bureaucratic procedure required for those rights 
to be recognized by the State. In other words, the individual investment in demarcating 
and registering land rights is left incomplete, as it only serves the purpose of informing 
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the local community of the existence of such rights. In Mexico’s ejidos there is the risk 
that something analogous may in fact happen. Once the Procede has established among 
members of a community the rights of each member to a given plot of land, there is no 
interest in investing in further formalizing those rights. The low volume of land 
transactions may in fact reinforce such lack of interest, at least until the intensity of 
conflicts will revert to the pre-Procede state. This possibility suggests that alternative 
ways, cheaper and subject to fewer transaction costs, need to be found in order to record 
changes in land ownership systematically. Yet, the problem transcends the registration of 
changes in present land rights. In fact, large tracts of land are still maintained as common 
property and the privatization process that is now underway may give rise to a substantial 
share of land with informal rights.   
Besides the issue of land certification, it is evident that the Procede has had 
another major drawback with respect to common lands. As explained in chapter 1, there 
are no figures that can substantiate fully the following assertion, but good sense suggests 
that the increase in individual landholdings observed between 1993 and 1996 corresponds 
to a sizeable privatization of common lands. By offering low-cost means of titling land 
appropriated informally, the Procede might have favored such a process. It still remains 
unclear whether the privatization of the commons has advanced too much and it remains 
a topic for further research once the next agricultural census becomes available73. Yet, the 
privatization of the commons might have created in some cases a group of small 
ejidatarios enough strong to oppose the program and thereby avoid the legalization of 
appropriations of common lands carried out by other ejidatarios. As a result, the mere 
presence of the program might have increased the set of ejidos that would oppose it. 
73 The last agricultural census was carried out in 1991. 
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These ejidos would then continue to be plagued by internal conflicts, which in turn might 
undermine the program’s intended objective of bringing social peace among ejidatarios. 
The last three points suggest a further principle to apply when designing land 
registration and titling programs. Effective mechanisms for land dispute resolution and 
for land transaction registration need to be permanently deployed in the field and become 
operative once the formal program is finalized. These mechanisms need to be devised so 
as to keep transaction costs low, while maintaining operational flexibility. Regional 
programs that can proceed to title without necessarily registering ownership of newly 
appropriated common lands or recently purchased land would allow fielding programs 
later on that could proceed to a more formal certification of such transactions. These 
informal, or quasi-formal, programs could be organized at the community level provided 
the local village assembly approves the new transactions. As it stands, the Procede only 
offers full titles and their formal registration in alternative to widespread informality. 
7.3. Land markets
Land titling programs are thought of as means of reinforcing tenure security and 
leading to more efficient land markets. This key proposition, relative to land rental 
market only, was tested with detail in chapter 5. There we found that indeed the Procede 
increased the supply of land for rental, but that the overall impact was quite modest. The 
results show that land markets in Mexico’s ejido sector are far less efficient than 
estimated in previous work and other factor are at work increasing the transaction costs 
participants face. In fact, it was found that land markets are heavily influenced by the 
productive assets owned by the household, something one would expect in a setting 
214
where access to production credit is severely restricted. In other words, farm size is on 
average sub-optimal and tenure insecurity appears to be a relatively minor factor in that 
situation. Customary rights that regulate land transactions, mainly in communal ejidos, do 
offer tenure security (communal tenure reduces the likelihood of a positive attitude 
towards the Procede), but reduce participation to the land market. Other institutional 
factors are also at work. Ejidatarios that are also private owners are less involved in 
renting land out. This might be easily explained by the fact that ejidatarios with private 
holdings are ‘acquired’ ejidatarios (i.e. previously they were pure private landowners), or, 
alternatively, ejidatarios that have ‘exited’ the village boundaries placing themselves out 
of the close web of interpersonal relationship that characterize a stylized closed ejido 
village economy. Whatever the case, these mixed landowners participate less in the land 
market. 
Yet, as we have mentioned above, the Procede has favored the inclusion of 
avecindados in the local farm economy. This was clearly seen by analyzing the 
counterpart choice in chapter 4. The increased participation by avecindados was one of 
the key objectives of the 1992 reform. Whether the inclusion of these younger farmers 
into the local ejido farm economy will raise farm productivity is an issue that has been 
raised from time to time in the context of the debate on the intergenerational transfer of 
land in Latin American agrarian societies (see Tejo, 2003). It remains an area for future 
research. The key question is whether a tenancy ladder may in fact be at work, favoring 
the access to landownership by a generation of young farmers with a higher propensity to 
invest in land improvements. If that is the case, then the 1992 reforms and the Procede 
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will have indeed favored an important process whose fruits will become more evident in 
the long term. 
7.4. The non-farm economy
In chapter 1 it was shown that a marked characteristic of the ejido sector was the 
higher labor to land and labor to capital ratios relatively to the private sector. This clearly 
explains the widespread poverty among ejidatarios. Has the Procede favored the 
reallocation of labor from farm to non-farm activities? The analysis in chapter 6 has show 
that the major impact from the Procede came in fact from the increased participation by 
ejido households to the local agricultural labor market and to non-farm activities. This 
was an important result as it showed that land titling programs might have quite different 
results than that of raising land productivity. One of their main effects may in fact consist 
in favoring the integration of farm households into the rural economy, promote a 
diversification of household income sources, thereby leading to more adaptable 
livelihood strategies, and open new channels through which credit constrained 
households may accumulate enough liquidity to finance accumulation of capital and 
smoothen the adverse effects of income shocks.  
These findings suggest that it might have become more profitable to invest in 
public infrastructures to better connect those ejidos that are less integrated into the urban 
economy, accommodating the increased supply of labor to non-farm activities that 
accompanies the Procede.  The same considerations hold also in the case of additional 
investments in raising education levels and standards in those areas where labor is being 
‘released’ towards non-farm activities as a result of the Procede. 
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7.5. Final considerations
Dissolution of the ejido land tenure system through a complete privatization 
presently is not even a theoretical proposition in Mexico. The extremely low rate of 
adoption of the dominio pleno (full private property rights) shows that given the actual 
structure of transaction costs (including the land tax that only affects private farmers), the 
ejido sector has reached an ‘equilibrium’ in the sense that there is no pressure from below 
towards a complete privatization of land rights. In the meantime, the Procede has been 
suspended and land tilting now becomes completely voluntary, although it is not yet clear 
what the costs for titling land would be for an ejido farmer and whether ejidos would still 
need to act collectively in order to title the land. Yet one would expect that as the share of 
household income coming from farming will progressively diminish, full privatization 
will become increasingly more attractive from the point of view of the ejidatarios as the 
tendency to exit the sector will become more widespread. This process will of course 
differ from ejido to ejido given socioeconomic characteristics and opportunity for further 
redistribution of common lands. In this sense, the Procede has marked an important 
transition in the system of agrarian rights in Mexico, laying the basis for future 
individualization of rights. It is reasonable to expect that when common lands cease to be 
an important source of insurance for the poorest ejido households, the process of 
privatization may in fact accelerate. At that stage, though, a further constitutional reform 
might become appropriate in order to move the agrarian sector to that new stage of 
increased individualization of land rights.  
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